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Since the early 1990s, a shift away from a top-down subsidy-based European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) focusing mainly on the agricultural sector 
and a reduction of regional disparities, towards a much broader family of policies 
designed to improve regional competitiveness has become apparent. This new 
policy approach for rural development, which will be described below, focuses 
on using endogenous local assets and knowledge and is commonly known as the 
new rural paradigm (e.g. OECD, 2006; VAN DER PLOEG et al., 2000; KORF, 2003). 
According to the OECD (2006) the reasons behind the policy change are manifold 
but are mostly seen in: (1) the declining importance of agriculture for rural econo-
mies; (2) the new challenges for farms with respect to the provision of public or 
semi-public goods for rural municipalities; (3) the increasing pressure the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) places on the distorting nature of subsidies associated 
with farm policy; and (4) the crucial need for a more diverse rural economy to im-
prove rural livelihoods. Such a policy change also renews the focus on the role of 
governments in supporting rural development and strengthening rural actors. Hence, 
if governments are no longer seen as actors who intervene directly on markets, 
as was the case for most traditional agricultural policy instruments, how should 
governmental action stimulate all sorts of rural economic sectors and contribute 
to an increase in the local standard of living? 
The literature regards the new rural policy measures as new forms of coordination 
and participation between many different actors in rural areas, starting from local 
governments, associations, and enterprises up to individual persons (OECD, 2006). 
Relationships in such new rural coordination and participation mechanisms can 
therefore be multi-faceted. Indeed, they can be based on market relations or commu-
nity management, but they can also be strongly facilitated by governmental action. 
Altogether, a large number of studies evaluating the rural development policies 
of the new rural paradigm were published, though the majority abstains from 
any theoretical reflection and were in parts dictated by legislative body guide-
lines. And although those rather descriptive studies provide important information 
on the success and failure of single cases, authors such as BAUM and WEINGARTEN 
(2005, p. 218) and MAIER and TÖDTLING (2002, p. 195) express the need for a 
coherent analytical framework capable of guiding and visualizing the impact of 
rural development policies and also of defining the role of governments. This 
monograph, therefore, aims to contribute to the elaboration of an analytical frame-
work that provides a basic understanding of how rural development measures Introduction 
 
2 
assigned to the new paradigm are functioning and which role governments should 
play to force rather than hinder the sustainable social and economic development of 
rural areas. 
The empirical portion of this study focuses on rural areas in Poland. Polish rural 
areas are an outstanding example of pressing rural development needs, which to 
a lesser extent exist in all European Union (EU) member states’ rural areas. The 
challenging situation in rural areas continued after Poland’s accession to the EU 
in 2004 and even became more critical for small farms due to further liberalization 
of the agricultural markets. Within this period, Poland also began to implement 
rural development measures of the new rural paradigm. However, will these new 
ideas of the new rural paradigm, which have shown successful results in the EU-15, 
also work in Poland? In the 1990s, a few rural communes in Poland introduced 
rural development measures similar to those of the new rural paradigm. Three of 
these communes will serve as case studies to provide an understanding of how the 
policy measures of the new rural paradigm respond to crucial problems in Polish 
rural areas, and to what extent governmental action was necessary to facilitate local 
development.  
The first chapter of this monograph introduces the reader to the principal problems 
and policy action on rural development in Poland (Sections 1.1 and 1.2), discusses 
the characteristics of the policy instruments assigned to the new rural paradigm 
(Section 1.3), and presents a rural development theory focusing on the lacking 
provision of local public goods (Section 1.4). Section 1.5 contains the research 
questions that will guide this book, and Section 1.6 describes the monograph’s 
organization. 
1.1  Current situation in Polish rural areas 
Rural areas in Poland cover 93.2 % of the country's area and are inhabited by 
14.7 million people (38.6 % of the Polish population) (MARD, 2006). The eco-
nomic, social, and environmental impact of rural areas in Poland was often assessed 
as "huge" (MARD, 2007). Several studies revealed an increasing gap in family 
income and economic development between rural and urban regions in Poland 
(MARD, 2006; CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX, 1997; ZEGAR and FLORIANCZYK, 2004; 
ZILLMER, 2003), a problem which is typical for most rural areas in the new EU 
member states (BAUM and WEINGARTEN, 2005). MARD (2006, p. 14) declares that 
the average nominal net income of rural households was lower than that of urban 
households by almost 35 %. ZEGAR and FLORIANCZYK (2004) posit two main 
reasons for the increasing income gap between rural and urban households: First, 
the diminishing role of agriculture as a source of income for rural inhabitants; and 
second, the high unemployment rate. Agricultural incomes decreased primarily 
because of two opposite tendencies that were present in Polish agriculture during 
transition. On the one hand, farm income was affected by a decline in agricultural 
terms of trade caused by market liberalization and the reduction in producer and Introduction 
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consumer subsidies in the early 1990s (PETRICK and TYRAN, 2003). In 2002, the 
agricultural output/input price ratio reached just 65.5 % of the level from 1990 
(MARD, 2003). On the other hand, a significant inflow of people of working age 
could be observed on peasant farms in the second half of the 1990s. This increase 
of the agricultural labor force is a result of workers being laid-off in other sectors 
such as rural industries and state farms. Hence, peasant farms adopted the role of 
"social buffers" (PETRICK and TYRAN, 2003), which led to a decrease in labor pro-
ductivity and incomes on farms, as well as a lacking technical progress in farm 
production equipment and facilities (LERMAN et al., 2004; MARD, 2006). In 2001, 
agricultural investments amounted to 36.4 % of their 1990 level, while at the same 
time the national economy as a whole doubled its investment volume in real terms 
(WOŚ, 2004). Such stagnation of agricultural farm structures can in particular be 
seen in most southeastern Polish regions. According to Figure 1-1, the share of farms 
endowed with between 1-2 ha even increased by 2005 and in the last two years has 
begun to decrease. Also, the number of farms between 2-5 ha has increased, and at 
the same time the number of farms larger than 15 ha has increased. The latter 
farms, although they cultivate more than 53 % of the Polish agricultural area, 
make up 11 % of the total number of farms. The number of farms between 5-10 ha 
and 10-15 ha has remained stable or even decreased, respectively. 
















1990 1995 2000 2005 2007
 
Source:  GUS (2001, 2007) and MARD (various years). 
While the income of agricultural households decreased from the beginning of 
the 1990s until Poland’s EU accession in 2004 (MARD, 2005)
1, 58.2 % of the 
rural population still depended to some extent on agricultural farm income, as 
the agricultural census from 2002 shows. Even in relation to the income of labor 
households, the income of agricultural families decreased after the late 1990s, 
and only in 2005, as a result of the additional subsidies farmers received due to 
                                                 
1 As WOŚ (2004, p. 9) mentions, the gross disposable income of Polish farmers decreased from 
1992 to 1999 by 27.4%. Introduction 
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EU accession, has it again reached the same level (PETRICK, 2007a). But still, as 
Figure 1-2 shows, the importance of agriculture as a source of income in rural areas 
has increased during recent years. This results mainly from the lack of non-
agricultural job opportunities. The share of non-agricultural businesses in total busi-
nesses in rural areas increased only slightly, from 8.1 % (1996) to 12.4 % (2002) 
(MARD, various years). In contrast, the unemployment rate increased from 15 % 
(2000) to 17.6 % (2005) (MARD, various years) and it is further estimated that 
one million rural inhabitants are in hidden unemployment on agricultural farms 
(MARD, 2006b). Altogether, structural change in Polish rural areas is lagging. 




























Source: GUS,  2002. 
Problems can also be seen in the low educational level of rural inhabitants 
(KŁODZIŃSKI and FREDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA, 2004; ZABŁOCKI, 2004; MARD, 
2006b). In 2002, 43.3 % of rural inhabitants finished primary school, 29.2 % 
attended basic vocational training, 22.4 % had secondary or post-secondary educa-
tion, and only 4.3 % went to universities or colleges (KŁODZIŃSKI and FREDYSZAK-
RADZIEJOWSKA, 2004, p. 46)
2. This is a result of the unfavorable learning condi-
tions in Polish rural areas compared to urban regions. There are e.g. less educational 
possibilities for children, including nursery schools, as well as a lower standard of 
education at secondary schools (MARD, 2006b, p. 12). Furthermore, 32 % of Polish 
farmers only have a primary education, which as a consequence not only leads to 
the lower development of their professional and social skills compared to their more 
educated colleagues (MARD, 2006b, p.8), it also reduces their chances of finding 
alternative non-agricultural jobs. 
                                                 
2  The same figures for urban regions are: Primary education – 23.7 %; basic vocational – 21.1 %; 
secondary and post-secondary – 38.6 %, higher education (college and university) – 13.7 % 
(KŁODZIŃSKI and FREDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA, 2004, p. 46). Introduction 
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Furthermore, as KŁODZIŃSKI and FREDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA (2004)  and 
KŁODZIŃSKI and WILKIN (1999) emphasize, Polish rural areas often lack public 
infrastructure. The latter influences both the standard of living for rural inhabi-
tants and the willingness of businesses to invest in rural areas. Indeed, there is still a 
need for adequate sewerage and water supply systems, well-constructed roads and 
electricity networks (MARD, 2005), as well as access to telecommunication net-
works and the Internet.  
Another problem in Polish rural areas, which is often seen as a relic of the socialism 
era, is the lack of social and economic cooperation between rural inhabitants 
(KŁODZIŃSKI and FREDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA, 2004). Many rural village institutions 
ceased to exist at the beginning of the transformation process in the early 1990s. 
Thus, nowadays there is often a lack of community centers, clubs, libraries or asso-
ciations. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development writes in the National 
Strategic Plan: "The traditional forms of rural inhabitants’ cooperation, based on 
neighborhood and family assistance and cultural community, as well as on rural 
localities' common interest, are significantly weakened or even have disappeared 
completely. New forms, which put more emphasis on common interest, have not 
been formed to a sufficient degree yet," (MARD, 2006b, p. 15). Further, KŁODZIŃSKI 
and FREDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA (2004, p. 47) state that: "The Polish village is 
disintegrated, people distrust one another and are unable to co-operate. […] the 
Polish village is an institutional desert […]." This is also true for farmers’ asso-
ciations or producer groups. Although peasant farms in particular require producer 
groups or similar associations to strengthen their market position and negotiation 
power, or to reduce production and transport costs, of the more than 1.95 million 
Polish farmers who have more than 1 ha of land, only 22,112 were members of agri-
cultural associations or producer groups (BŁĄD and KAMIŃSKI, 2004).  
One last problem mentioned by some authors in recent publications concerns the 
environmental aspects of Polish rural areas (MARD, 2006b; WOŚ, 2004). Polish 
rural areas, in contrast to EU-15 member states, mostly do not face environmental 
problems that result from intensive farming. Rather, the opposite is often the case. 
Since many small farms, particularly in southern and southeastern regions, do 
not operate profitably and in some cases even quit farming, an increasing area of 
agricultural land remains unused, which may also influence the biodiversity pro-
tection of some areas, as well as change the cultural landscape of the concerned 
regions. The condition of the local landscape influences the image of a region and 
fallowed land can reduce the attractiveness of a region as a place for living, 
working or recreating. Introduction 
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Figure 1-3:  Determinants of income disparities between rural and urban 
regions 












Source: Author’s  depiction. 
Figure 1-3 summarizes the situation of Polish rural areas. The increasing income 
gap between rural and urban households is strongly influenced by the persistence of 
the small-sized farm structure and the lack of non-agricultural income sources. 
Although farm income increased due to Poland’s EU accession
3, a large share of 
peasant farms is not able to generate a sufficient income from their farm activities. 
However, the lack of non-agricultural job opportunities forces peasants to remain 
in agriculture or to receive their income from seasonal migration. The development 
of farms and rural enterprises is strongly affected by the provision of infrastructural 
facilities and rural inhabitants’ access to education services. Enterprises, particu-
larly in the northern and northwestern regions, often abstain from investing in rural 
areas since they, in most cases, do not find labor with the needed qualifications, 
and rural inhabitants generally lack management skills and the access to capital, 
which enables them to start new businesses or to expand existing ones. In addition, 
since many peasant farms do not operate profitably and in many cases quit pro-
ducing, an increasing amount of agricultural land remains fallow. This reduces the 
attractiveness of regions and has an impact on the regional image as a place for living 
and working or as a place for tourist recreation.  
                                                 
3  For further discussions on the development of farm income after EU accession, see sub-
chapter 1.2. 
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1.2  Policy action on rural development in Poland 
Prior to EU accession, Polish rural development policy aimed to promote rural 
development initiatives through support for modernizing and restructuring agri-
culture. This was done, on the one hand, through preferential credits for farmers 
and processors for investments, working capital and relief (PETRICK, 2004). On the 
other hand, this money was also used to subsidize training programs, agricultural 
information and consultancy services, as well as support physical infrastructure 
(CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX, 1997, p. 23). However, as CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX 
(1997, p. 41) assess, most public support spent on rural development initiatives 
went to farmers rather than non-farmers, and non-farming activities received much 
less governmental support for creating employment or developing infrastructure.  
As a consequence of the implementation of the two pillars of the European CAP 
in Poland, after 2004 Polish farmers received direct payments ("first pillar"), as 
well. Although the direct payments started in Poland from a lower level and will 
gradually increase to reach parity with those provided to farmers in the EU-15 
countries in 2013, they greatly contributed to farmers’ income, as will be discussed 
below. From 2004 to 2006, the rural development policy in Poland was guided by 
two programs: the Rural Development Plan (RDP) and the Sectoral Operational 
Program (SOP). Both programs very much referred to the "second pillar" of the 
European CAP. Their objectives were, among others: To improve the competi-
tiveness of agricultural farms and the quality of agricultural products; to improve 
rural income and living conditions; to reduce rural unemployment, as well as to 
preserve the natural value and environmental resources in rural areas (RDP, 2005; 
SOP, 2004). The RDP mainly comprised instruments such as the early retirement 
program, support for semi-subsistence farms, support for agricultural producer 
groups, payments for agricultural land in less-favored areas, agri-environmental 
measures, and subsidies for investments in farm facilities to assist farmers by 
meeting EU production standards (RDP, 2005). The SOP aimed to support invest-
ments in agricultural holdings, to provide financial incentives for young farmers, 
and to support investments in the agricultural market structure as well. The SOP 
further comprises measures that focus on the protection and preservation of cul-
tural heritage and the development of infrastructure related to agriculture.  
As recent studies show (EUROSTAT, 2004; USDA, 2007), the subsidies that 
Polish farmers received due to EU accession led to a noticeable increase of farm 
incomes; between 2000 and 2006, the average farm income in Poland increased 
by 80 % (USDA, 2007). According to WILKIN (2008), between 2004-2006 agri-
cultural producers received as much as 89 % of the EU funds allocated to the CAP 
implementation in Poland. In 2005, just the direct payments contributed 44 % to 
the total income of Polish farm households. Although peasant farms benefited from 
the direct payments, the average amount they received was 1,250 € per farm (USDA, 
2007). According to the USDA (2007) direct payments will probably not lastingly 
boost the structural change in Polish agriculture and may even conserve the current Introduction 
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structure, as they encourage peasants endowed with less than 5 ha, who might other-
wise have quit producing, to continue farming. This was also shown in Figure 1-1, 
where we could see that between 2005 and 2007, the number of farms in the group 
of 2-5 ha increased, whereas the number of farms with between 5-15 ha remained 
stable. In addition, more than two-thirds of the rural population are not endowed 
with any agricultural land (KLODZINSKI and WILKIN, 1999) and will therefore 
not benefit at all from those measures.  
Figure 1-4:  Determinants of income disparities between rural and urban  
regions and the focus of the traditional agricultural policy  
     
 










Source: Author’s depiction. 
Thus, considering the complexity of rural development problems discussed in 
Section 1.1 it is a debatable point whether the abovementioned policy measures 
are adequate to overcome the current problems of Polish rural areas. Figure 1-4 
depicts the determinants of income disparities between rural and urban regions 
attached to traditional agricultural policies in Poland prior the EU accession (see 
the darkened area in Figure 1-4). However, as discussed above, the majority of 
the policy measures comprised by the Polish rural development policy in the SOP 
and the RDP still strongly focus on subsidizing the agricultural sector, and their 
effects remain to be seen. KLODZINSKI and WILKIN (1999) and CHRISTENSEN and 
LACROIX (1997, p. 2) argued before EU accession that the sustainable develop-
ment of Polish rural areas requires policy measures focusing on the lacking in-
vestments in physical and institutional infrastructure and the provision of educa-
tional facilities, rather than traditional agricultural policy instruments that only 
benefit one sector of the whole rural economy. 
Income disparities between 
rural and urban regions 


















1.3  New rural paradigm of rural development policy 
Various authors claim that policy measures of the new rural paradigm are capable 
of responding more closely to institutional (see KLODZINSKI and WILKIN, 1999) 
and educational problems (see KOZIŃSKA-BAŁDYGA, 2008), and to the unfavorable 
business environment (see HAŁASIEWICZ, 2008) in Polish rural areas. Thus, we 
should look at the characteristics of those policy measures and discuss why they 
should be more adequate than traditional agricultural policy instruments for solving 
the crucial problems of Polish rural areas. 
The OECD (2006) confronts both the design of traditional agricultural policy and 
the new paradigm of a rural development policy. As shown in Table 1-1, the new 
paradigm not only concentrates on the agricultural sector, but also focuses on all 
rural economic sectors and mainly undertakes start-up financing instead of subsidi-
zation over a long period of time. Furthermore, there is currently a shift away from 
a pure top-down approach, which involves the European or national governmental 
spheres as well as farmers, towards an approach which comprises all governmental 
levels starting from the supra-national to local governments. This step into a further 
decentralization of rural development policy measures comprises non-governmental 
actors like local enterprises and associations as well.  
Table 1-1:  The old and the new paradigm of rural development 
  Old (top-down) approach  New (bottom-up) approach 
Objectives  Equalization, farm income, 
farm competitiveness 
Competitiveness of rural areas, 
valorization of local assets, ex-
ploitation of unused resources 
Key target 
sector  Agriculture 
Various sectors of rural econo-
mies (e.g. rural tourism, craft  
activities) 
Main tools  Subsidies  Investments 
Key actors  National governments, 
farmers 
All levels of government (supra-
national, national, regional and 
local), various stakeholders  
(public, private, NGOs) 
Source:  According to OECD, 2006. 
According to the comparison of the two approaches in Table 1-1, measures of 
the Polish rural development policy before 2004 were not similar to the policy 
measures of the new rural paradigm, as they mainly focused on a market interven-
tionist policy like interest rate subsidization. It was further shown in the last section 
that from 2004-2006, the majority of measures comprised by the Polish rural 
development policy still focused only on the agricultural sector and obviously led, 
first and foremost, to an increase of farm incomes. Hence, most of the measures Introduction 
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belonging to the RDP and SOP, which by the way also constitute the majority of 
the measures comprised by the second pillar of the CAP, can hardly be assigned 
to the new rural paradigm. 
A famous example of policy measures assigned to what is called the new rural 
paradigm is the Community Initiative LEADER (see BOLLMAN, 2006, p. 108). 
LEADER stands for "Links between actions of rural development
4" and is based 
purely on a participatory bottom-up approach, which aims to elicit endogenous 
potentials and spatial interaction (RAY, 2000). Compared to traditional agricultural 
policy instruments, LEADER is seen as a method of mobilizing and delivering 
rural development in local communities (CEC, 2006). The core of the LEADER 
approach is a type of local partnership known as the local action group (LAG), which 
consists of local authority figures, local enterprises and NGOs. LAGs should identify 
and implement local development strategies, make decisions about the allocation 
of funds and also manage them. By strengthening local partnerships, the LEADER 
program also tries to replace hierarchies with mechanisms that involve all local 
bodies on an equal footing (OSTI, 2002, p. 172). 
LEADER is already in its third generation; from 1991, when pilot projects were 
established, its importance for rural development policy has increased continuously. 
As early as 1997, the European Commission emphasized that LEADER might 
become the main vehicle for rural development outside a reduced area eligible for 
Structural Fund support (CEC, 1997). The latter has proven to be true considering 
that the LEADER method received its own 'axis' in the new European Agricul-
tural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which supports rural development 
in the EU between 2007-2013 (CEC, 2005), and must be integrated in all national 
and regional rural development programs of the EU member states (CEC, 2006). 
However, policy measures of the new rural paradigm were merely underrepre-
sented in the budget of the two Polish rural development programs for 2004-2006. 
Only 1.05 % of the SOP budget, which amounts to 18 billion € in total, was 
spent on a pilot program of LEADER+ (FUNDUSZONLINE, 2004). However, in 
the Rural Development Program, which finances rural development measures in 
Poland in 2007-2013, funds spend on the LEADER axis also increased, though they 
still amount to only 4.7 % of the whole budget for rural development (BUDZICH-
SZUKAŁA, 2008, p. 130). 
However, although LEADER-type measures are underrepresented in Polish rural 
development policy, it is still worth analyzing whether the latter measures are apt to 
solve problems that keep Polish rural areas from developing more successfully. 
As mentioned above, the initial LEADER projects were first implemented in Poland 
after 2005, meaning that during the time this study was conducted, analyzing those 
projects would not have provided the researcher with broad knowledge of the 
impact of LEADER partnerships on rural development problems in Poland. 
                                                 
4  Translated from French: Liaison entre actions de développement rural. Introduction 11
However, since a few rural communes  in Poland established LEADER-like 
partnerships in the 1990s, analyzing the performance of those partnerships may help 
us to understand whether the LEADER approach is well-equipped for responding to 
crucial problems in Polish rural areas. Three cases out of the latter partnerships 
will be analyzed in Chapter 4 and will have a critical look at that issue. 
The very broad focus of rural development measures assigned to the new rural para-
digm is depicted in Figure 1-5 (see the encircled area without the dashed lines). 
The latter measures not only aim to influence the performance of all economic 
sectors in rural areas, they also attempt to have an impact on local infrastructural 
conditions and educational facilities. But how do those rural development measures 
influence different rural sectors, local public infrastructure, or educational facilities? 
Figure 1-5:  Determinants of income disparities between rural and urban 
regions and the focus of the traditional agricultural policy and 
the rural development policy measures of the new rural paradigm 
     
Source: Author’s depiction. 
1.4 Lacking provision of public goods as a reason for developmental 
problems in rural areas 
As I will further discuss in Chapter 2, in this study I hypothesize that the sustainable 
development of rural areas depends on the provision of different local public goods. 
Public goods are characterized by a non-rivalry and a non-excludability in consump-
tion. Local public goods only benefit the inhabitants of a certain jurisdiction. 
Adapted to rural areas this means that local public goods such as public infra-
structure, a favorable cultural landscape, a high level of human capital, and favorable 
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conditions for local businesses benefit all the inhabitants of a certain region, whereas 
only non-residents can be excluded from a permanent consumption of these goods. 
In Figure 1-6, local public goods are assigned to different determinants that affect 
the development of non-agricultural businesses and the agricultural sector. Thus, 
a well-constructed local public infrastructure, a high level of human capital, local 
cooperations and business networks, effective local service institutions, as well as a 
favorable image of a region, all boost local economic activities and enable the deve-
lopment of existing businesses or the start-up of new ones. However, although all 
inhabitants would benefit from, for example, good local public infrastructure or 
favorable conditions for local businesses, the latter local public goods are not pro-
vided or are, but only to a slight extent. 
Figure 1-6:  Determinants of income disparities between rural and urban  
regions and local public goods facilitating rural development 
     
 












Source:  Author’s depiction. 
Various economic theories portray the lacking provision of public goods differently. 
According to the welfare economists’ view, which provided concepts and models 
suitable for giving quantitative assessments on traditional agricultural policy instru-
ments, the lack of public goods results from market failure that can only be cured by 
means of governmental intervention. Considering this argumentation, rural deve-
lopment measures still need to fall back on direct market intervention to success-
fully provide public goods in rural areas. Measures of the new rural paradigm, in 
contrast, rely on decentralized, community based mechanisms rather than on central 
governmental action. Therefore, I further hypothesize in this study that policy 
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measures of the new rural paradigm such as LEADER aim to strengthen institu-
tional arrangements, which then facilitate the coordination of individual motiva-
tions to contribute to the provision of local public goods. Those measures accelerate 
the creation of institutional arrangements (GRAMZOW and PETRICK, 2006) or local 
constitutional systems (SOLARI, 2004) that comprise characteristics of market or/and 
community mechanisms and, hence, define different forms of coordination between 
rural actors, which induce the latter to improve their individual contribution to the 
provision of local public goods.  
1.5  Resulting research questions and organization of the monograph 
Rural development policy instruments of the new rural paradigm constitute de-
centralized and community based measures that contribute to the development 
of rural areas by facilitating the provision of local public goods. If this hypothesis 
can be found true, the welfare economics theory, from its traditional point of view, 
will find it challenging to provide a comprehensive understanding of how rural 
development measures of the new rural paradigm work. This is because the latter 
theory falls back to governmental intervention as the only remedy for lacking public 
goods provision. However, this would further imply that the normative reference 
criterion of the welfare economics theory, the perfectly competitive market, which 
was applied to analyze policy action, loses its significance. To my knowledge, con-
ceptual works that provide an analytical framework for rural development policy 
analysis, which provide a more comprehensive understanding of how those decen-
tralized measures operate, how governmental action contributes to the development 
of rural areas, and which contain normative criterion that allows us to analyze policy 
action with respect to rural development issues, cannot be found in the recent 
literature. The urgent need for a well-grounded theory on rural development is also 
revealed by VAN DER PLOEG and RENTING (2000, p. 539).  
This monograph aims to contribute to the elaboration of a rural development 
theory that focuses on local public goods provision in rural areas. The theoretical 
analysis in this study seeks to clarify the reasons for a lack of public goods in rural 
areas, as well as to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the mode of 
action of rural development measures assigned to the new rural paradigm. How-
ever, "[n]othing is as practical as a good theory" (VAN DER PLOEG and RENTING, 
2000, p. 539). In this monograph I further aim to prove my theoretical considera-
tions with empirical examples from Polish rural areas. Specifically, I seek to explain 
the reason for public goods problems in rural areas by means of an analytical frame-
work elaborated in Chapter 2, and I further aspire to illustrate the effects that policy 
measures of the new rural paradigm have on the lacking provision of public goods. 
The principle research questions that are to guide this monograph can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) Which theory is capable of explaining the role of governmental action 
in rural development policies subsumed under the new rural paradigm? Introduction 
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2) Which theory is capable of making normative statements with respect to 
policy measures that aim to solve rural development problems? 
3) What are the reasons for the insufficient provision of public goods in rural 
Poland? 
4) To the extent that public goods were provided in some regions, which insti-
tutional arrangements were responsible for this success? 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) begins with an illustration of the impact that 
different local public goods have on rural development issues. Thereupon, I present 
three different theoretical approaches and I discuss their theoretical view on 
problems with the provision of public goods. I will finally discuss the normative 
institutional economics approach, which allows me to analyze problems of public 
goods provision by means of the social dilemma heuristic. The chapter closes with 
the presentation of three different governance structures: markets, government, and 
community, which are able to overcome social dilemma problems in local public 
goods provision.  
Chapter 3 explains the empirical strategy applied to this study. Here, I will provide 
a description of the three case studies conducted in northwestern and southeastern 
Poland and I will present the different empirical research methods used in this 
work, with particular focus given to guideline interviews.  
Chapter 4 presents the results of the empirical research. In the three case studies, 
I analyze the reasons of lacking local public goods provision and I attempt to 
demonstrate whether problems in local public goods provision can be successfully 
overcome by means of institutional arrangements that combine the three governance 
structures mentioned above. 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions on the theoretical and empirical results of the study 





2 RURAL DEVELOPMENT AS PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC  
GOODS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE  
This chapter aims to clarify reasons for lacking local public goods provision in 
rural areas, and as such, begins with the taxonomy of public goods in rural areas 
before presenting four local public goods that are of importance for rural develop-
ment. Section 2.2 continues with a theoretical discussion of the reasons of lacking 
public goods provision. I confront three different economic theories (welfare eco-
nomics theory, property rights theory, and constitutional economics theory) with 
respect to their conclusions on the problem of public goods provision. I will discuss, 
from the perspective of these theories, whether governmental action is necessary 
to provide public goods and if so, what governmental action should look like in order 
to be a facilitator and not a constraint for rural economic development. Thereafter, 
the normative institutional economics theory will be presented as an offset to the 
constitutional economics theory. By means of the social dilemma heuristic, which 
constitutes the paradigmatic core of normative institutional economics theory, I 
illustrate an analytical framework for positive and normative analysis of rural deve-
lopment problems resulting from lacking public goods provision. Section 2.3 will 
then present three different governance structures, the market approach, the central 
government, and community governance, which are capable of overcoming prob-
lems of local public goods provision. Section 2.4 summarizes the chapter. 
2.1  Description of local public goods in rural areas 
In Section 1.1, I discussed different problems that strongly affect the development 
of Polish rural areas. In particular, there exists a lack of non-agricultural jobs in 
rural areas, which often leaves many agricultural family members with no other 
choice but to keep working on the family farm or to out-migrate to a bigger city or 
abroad. Figure 1-3 depicts further determinants that cause the decline of rural income 
compared to urban ones, for example educational level and facilities, the conditions 
of local infrastructure, the persistence of the small farm structure, and the conditions 
of the landscape. In Section 1.4 I have argued that there are different local public 
goods, like a well-constructed local public infrastructure, a high level of human 
capital, local cooperations and business networks, effective local service institu-
tions and a favorable image of a region, which all boost local economic activities 
by influencing the abovementioned determinants.  
However, in the last chapter I did not discuss to what extent those local public 
goods will have an impact on the determinants that cause increasing income Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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disparities between rural and urban regions. Nor did I address what the charac-
teristics are which change the latter goods to local public goods. This will be 
addressed, however, in the following five sections. First, I will present a taxonomy 
of public goods in rural areas and define the characteristics of local public goods 
more precisely. Then I will discuss four goods that all comprise characteristics of 
local public goods, and whose provision is assumed to have strong effects on the 
local social and economic development of regions. These goods are: Public in-
frastructure in good condition, human capital, cultural landscape, and favorable 
conditions for local businesses. After providing a description of these local public 
goods, the latter will be integrated in the taxonomy. Moreover, it must be mentioned 
that it is not always possible to distinguish these goods from each other. As will 
be shown below, some goods can also act as characteristics of other local public 
goods. 
2.1.1  Taxonomy of public goods in rural areas  
In this section I introduce the taxonomy of public goods in rural areas. The litera-
ture characterizes pure public goods as non-excludable and non-rival to their full 
extent (CORNES and SANDLER, 1996). That is, a good is characterized as non-rival if 
any given unit can be made available for the use of every member of the public, or 
if the individuals' consumption of the good does not reduce the amount available to 
others. Non-excludability of a good exists if it is impossible or prohibitively 
costly to prevent individuals from the consumption of the good. Public goods accor-
ding to HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE (1994, p. 295-308) can also be found in rural 
areas. These authors classify e.g. the protection of wildlife as a pure public good 
(ibid., 1994, p. 304). Also, goods provided by nature like the non-use value of land-
scapes and natural habitats may fulfill the characteristics of pure public goods. 
Residents and tourists are free to enjoy the view of a beautiful landscape without 
hindering others from doing so. However, most goods in rural areas fulfill the 
characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry only to a certain extent. That 
is, in most cases we find goods which can be seen as hybrid forms located between 
the two extremes of non-excludability and non-rivalry.  
Table 2-1 classifies different goods available in rural areas with respect to their 
degree of excludability and rivalry. There are goods such as a high level of human 
capital or effective local governance institutions which are provided within jurisdic-
tional boundaries. Since the consumption of these goods is combined with transport 
costs or residency, non-residents are more or less excluded from using these goods. 
Such goods are classified as local public goods. As we will see in the further 
course of this chapter, local public goods, once provided, benefit all residents of 
a jurisdiction and are of great importance for the development of a region. 
An intermediate stage between non-rivalry and full rivalry in consumption can 
be described as congestion, implying positive crowding costs. In the case of goods 
like the usage value of landscapes or parks and the recreation value of forests or Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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other habitats, we can find non-excludability, but positive crowding costs. The 
recreation value of a park, which can be entered free of charge by everyone whether 
visitor or resident, would be reduced if a certain number of people who stroll through 
the park or have a picnic exceeds a certain level. We categorize those goods as 
open access resources. In contrast, goods like an irrigation water system or a ground-
water recharge, which are only accessible for local residents, are categorized as 
common property or common pool resources (OSTROM, 2005, p. 79). Once any unit 
of these goods is appropriated or consumed by a resident, the amount of units 
available for consumption by others is reduced. Additionally, for those goods pro-
vided by nature or created by humans, it is difficult to exclude inhabitants of a juris-
diction from their consumption. Goods can also be non-rival and excludable. For 
example, in the case of large nature preserves, visitors are obliged to pay an entrance 
fee, whereas the preserves are often so huge that people in the park will hardly be 
restrained in their recreation activities by other visitors. In our taxonomy these goods 
are classified as toll or spite goods. If people voluntarily found a community to pro-
vide and consume certain goods, e.g. producer groups or agricultural cooperatives, 
we can classify those communities as club goods (HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE, 
1994, p. 305). Club goods are congestible and characterized by a particular exclu-
sion mechanism involving voluntary membership and/or user fees. Also, regional 
or local brands and some country clubs belong to this category.  
Table 2-1:  Taxonomy of public goods in rural areas 




Pure public goods 
¾  Landscape (non-use 
value) 
¾  Protection of wildlife 
Open access resources 
¾  Landscape  
(use value by visitors) 
¾  Parks (use value by  
visitors)  
Excludable 





siders of the 
community 
Local public goods 
¾  High levels of social and 
human capital 
¾  Effective local gover-
nance institutions 
Common property resources 
¾  Groundwater recharge 
















Toll goods/spite goods 
¾  Recreation and amuse-
ment facilities  
(Natural preserves) 
Club goods 
¾  Producer groups 
¾  Regional brands 
¾  Country clubs 
Source:  Modified from TAYLOR (1982, p. 40) and PETRICK (2007b, p. 273). Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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In the following sections I will describe four local public goods which play an 
important role for rural development processes in Poland. In Section 1.4 those 
four local public goods were assigned to the determinants affecting the develop-
ment of non-agricultural businesses and the agricultural sector in rural Poland. 
What follows is a description of the impact those local public goods may have 
on rural development processes in Poland, and rural areas in general, as well as a 
discussion of their public good characteristics. 
2.1.2 Public  infrastructure 
Many publications emphasize public infrastructure as a strong factor that stimulates 
the economic activities of a region by augmenting the productivity of private inputs 
or by contributing directly to output (EBERTS, 1990; ASCHAUER, 1989; MUNNELL, 
1990). Public infrastructure in rural areas contains local roads, bridges, water and 
electricity supply, or communication networks. Different components of rural public 
infrastructure may have a lasting impact on lacking structural change in agriculture 
and the lack of business start-ups. For example, well-constructed roads, a good water 
and electricity supply system, and good access to telephone and internet communica-
tion infrastructure provides local farmers and firms with easy access to and use of 
information, enables a better technology transfer, and lowers transport costs. Further-
more, EBERTS (1990) mentions that the enhancement of local public infrastructure 
will also attract households and new firms, whereas the latter may contribute to the 
economic development of a region and reduce unemployment. 
Public infrastructure in general has properties of pure public goods. For example, 
components of public infrastructure such as roads and bridges are characterized by 
non-excludability, whereas water or electricity supply systems are mostly acces-
sible only for local inhabitants. The benefits of these facilities can be shared by 
inhabitants up to a certain point without reducing the benefits of other users. Conges-
tion in consumption often only appears in the case of highways but not in public 
infrastructure provided in rural areas. Hence, rural public infrastructure can be 
categorized as pure public goods or in the case of a possible exclusion for non-
residents, as local public goods (see Table 2-2).  Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Table 2-2:  Integration of relevant public goods in the taxonomy of public 
goods in rural areas 




Pure public goods 
¾ Landscape (non-use value) 
¾ Cultural landscape (non-
use value) 
¾ Protection of wildlife 
¾ Public infrastructure  
(e.g. roads, bridges) 
Open access resources 
¾ Landscape (use value by 
visitors) 
¾ Parks (use value by  
visitors)  
Excludable 





siders of the 
community 
 
Local public goods 
¾ Cultural landscape  
(use value) 
¾ Public infrastructure (e.g. 
water and electricity supply)
¾ High level of human capital
¾ Favorable conditions for 
businesses 
¾ Effective local governance 
institutions  
Common property resources 
¾ Groundwater recharge 


















Toll goods/spite goods 
¾ Recreation and amusement  
facilities (Natural preserves)
Club goods 
¾ Producer groups 
¾ Regional brands 
¾ Country clubs 
Source:  Modified from TAYLOR (1982, p. 40) and PETRICK (2007b, p. 273). 
2.1.3 Human  capital 
Forms of human capital described in the literature are manifold. A common defini-
tion formulated by the OECD (2001a, p. 18) explains human capital as "[t]he 
knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facili-
tate the creation of personal, social and economic well-being." As OSTROM (2000) 
states, forms of human capital differ between college education and skills. Hence, 
on the one hand, there are personal attributes relevant to human capital such as 
communication and numeracy, which mainly result from formal education. There 
are also intra-personal skills like motivation, self-discipline or inter-personal skills 
like teamwork, organizational skills or leadership that can also be partly developed 
due to formal education and vocational trainings, but often emerge from the social 
environment and work experience. However, for the economic development of a 
region or even a country, all the abovementioned forms of human capital are 
important.  Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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As the OECD (2001a) assesses, education is positively correlated with employ-
ment, higher earnings and labor market search activities. Furthermore, it is mentio-
ned that higher education is also linked to civic participation and increases inhabi-
tants' political and social engagement. And finally, it is concluded that: "Education, 
training, and learning can play important roles in providing the basis for econo-
mic growth, social cohesion and personal development," (OECD, 2001a, p. 35). 
SKURAS et al. (2005) emphasize the importance of human capital with respect to 
entrepreneurial human capital by concluding that particularly in rural lagging 
and mountainous areas, where agricultural production is not competitive at cost 
terms, local entrepreneurship is necessary for providing employment opportunities 
and increasing local incomes. 
Human capital in COLEMAN’s (1988) perspective is seen as a private good since 
the investor is able to capture its benefits. Students who invest time and resources 
towards improving their knowledge and skills are able to benefit in terms of better-
paid jobs, more satisfying work, or a better understanding of the world around them. 
In contrast, RAUCH (1993) mentions that it is commonly believed that individuals 
are not capable of capturing all the benefits resulting from investments in their own 
human capital. This belief is also often cited when justifying government subsidies 
for formal education. An example of the external effects of human capital is seen in 
the sharing of knowledge and skills between the workers of one company or between 
the inhabitants of one community. As JOVANOVIC and ROB (1989) state, the higher 
the human capital of workers, the more rapid the diffusion and growth of indi-
vidual knowledge in formal and informal interaction. A high regional level of 
wages and a low unemployment rate as a result of a high average level of human 
capital lead to an increase in purchasing power, facilitate the start-up of new busi-
nesses, and attract firms to invest in a certain jurisdiction. Last but not least, as 
mentioned above, higher education is linked to stronger civic engagement. The latter 
can emerge in terms of associations or within honorary posts in the local government 
of a community, where local inhabitants bring their knowledge, skills or organiza-
tional competences to contribute to the local economic and social development 
of their community. These external benefits of human capital have mostly positive 
impacts on other inhabitants of a region. 
Thus, I argue that human capital comprises not only private properties, but also 
properties of public goods, which benefit more than the owner of this sort of 
capital. Local inhabitants can hardly be excluded from benefits resulting from 
the existing level of human capital. Such benefits constitute the advantages local 
businesses have from a high level of human capital or the profits local inhabitants 
gain from a high level of social or cultural involvement. In contrast, there is of 
course a rivalry between local or regional businesses for local skilled employees, 
but there is no rivalry between inhabitants regarding the benefits that emerge 
from the effective engagement of local inhabitants in social initiatives since those 
benefits are mostly, to a high degree, indivisible. Hence, a high average level of Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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human capital in a commune can to a large extent be categorized as a local public 
good (see Table 2-2). 
2.1.4 Cultural  landscape 
Cultural landscape, defined by HOVORKA (1997), is a "perceived unity of the 
spatially effective fabric of natural conditions and human influences. Cultural 
landscapes develop and change over time as a result of the interplay of socio-
economic, cultural and natural factors". Hence, cultural landscapes are seen as parts 
of earth's surface, which are, in comparison to pure natural landscapes, affected by 
anthropogenic effects (KNIERIM, 1994). Figure 2-1 shows KNIERIM’s (1994) dif-
ferentiation of landscapes between both cultural and natural landscape. Cultural 
landscapes are further subdivided into industrial landscapes, cityscapes and agri-
cultural landscapes. Particularly in Polish rural areas, the greatest share of cultural 
landscapes is constituted by agricultural landscapes, whereas pure natural land-
scapes, unaffected by humans, can hardly be found. Also, woods and wealds were 
mostly set up by humans or are already under agricultural cultivation. 






Source: KNIERIM, 1994, p. 174.  
Many authors assign cultural landscapes particular functions that are necessary 
for rural areas. For example, cultural landscapes comprise biodiversity and wildlife 
habitats (ROMSTAD, 2004, p. 56; ARL, 2004), the diversity of natural scenery and 
ecological functions like flood control, protection against erosion (HODGE, 2000, 
p. 260), waste assimilation or carbon storage (MATTHEWS and SELMAN, 2006). 
Cultural landscapes also provide recreation and aesthetic functions and display the 
historicity and cultural identity of a region (FÜRST, 2006, p). A favorable state of 
local natural resources, clean ground water reservoirs and favorable recreational 
conditions are all goods which strongly influence the local standard of living and 
contribute to the creation of a positive public image and identity of a region or lo-
cality. A positive image of a region may also have various impacts on inhabitants 
and local development. Thus, if inhabitants see their community as an attractive 
place to work and live, they will often establish bonds with their region. Such bonds 
may encourage inhabitants to undertake actions such as starting-up social or cul-
tural initiatives in order to contribute to local social and economic development. 
Due to the important impact that landscapes, and particularly cultural landscapes, 
have on developing both a sense of local pride and economic stability in a region, the 
Landscape
Agricultural landscape  Industrial landscape 
Cultural landscape Natural landscape 
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second axis of the EAFRD provides additional payments which, e.g. encourage 
farmers in mountainous areas to continue cultivating their fields. Further measures 
include agri-environmental programs, which support farmers who admit to produ-
cing beyond the relevant mandatory standards so as to achieve additional environ-
mental objectives (CEC, 2005).  
According to FÜRST (2006) a cultural landscape can be categorized as a public good 
since consumers, whether they are inhabitants or tourists, can hardly be excluded 
from enjoying its non-use value and its consumption is to a high degree non-rival. 
Therefore, the non-use value of cultural landscapes can be categorized as a pure 
public good. However, there are also different benefits provided by cultural land-
scapes which can only be used by residents. This is true with respect to clean ground-
water or different ecological functions of a landscape such as flood control. Also, 
local businesses that maintain tourist facilities profit from the favorable condition 
of the local cultural landscape. Such benefits are not accessible for non-residents. 
Therefore, in the categorization of cultural landscape in the taxonomy of public 
goods in rural areas (see Table 2-2) I distinguished between its non-use and the 
use value. 
2.1.5  Favorable conditions for local businesses 
Successful local economic development requires favorable conditions for local busi-
nesses. Indeed, favorable conditions for local businesses can encourage local in-
habitants to establish businesses or invest in existing ones. They can also lead foreign 
investors to found firms in the concerned region. According to WOODWARD (2001) 
small businesses in most advanced post-communist European countries, including 
Poland, became particularly important in the early 1990s as jobs within the 
shrinking state sector were lost. Writing about that time, Woodward stated, "the 
dynamic growth of the small business sector has not only been the chief factor 
driving economic growth since 1992, but has also served to absorb much of un-
employment […]" (ibid., p. 275). However, in many Polish regions, even though 
there were different state programs that supported small businesses, the latter did 
not appear as numerous as expected. The principle reasons for this are seen in the 
unfavorable local conditions for small businesses.  
ADY (1997), who describes different factors which influence small businesses’ 
decisions regarding investment in a certain region, categorizes these factors as fol-
lows: 1) operating costs; 2) operating conditions; and 3) quality of life. 
Ad 1) Operating costs can include, e.g. labor costs, tax costs or transportation costs. 
While labor costs often do not vary greatly between neighboring municipalities, tax 
levels could do so if municipalities were endowed with the right to constitute certain 
taxes on their own. Furthermore, local public infrastructure has an important impact 
on the operating costs of small businesses, particularly with respect to transport 
costs. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Ad 2) Operating conditions comprise, e.g. the quality of work force, access to 
credits, the attitude of local officials, existing local business networks, access to 
local institutions and services, and the local demand for products and services. 
As WOODWARD (2001) mentions, many Polish entrepreneurs, when asked about 
the development barriers they faced, complained about the shortage of skilled 
laborers despite the high unemployment rate. Hence, the local labor force’s high 
educational level and a high level of human capital in general, which were charac-
terized as local public goods (see Section 2.1.3), constitute promising conditions 
for local investors. Also, local business networks, business associations or regional 
brands facilitate the performance of local businesses by reducing information 
search and transport costs (LEE et al., 2005; PHILLIPSON et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, particularly in Poland, access to credits as well as the costs of credit 
play an important role for small enterprises’ investment decisions. As WOODWARD 
(2001) mentions, it is commonly known that Polish banks often deny credits for 
small businesses by making excessive collateral demands. In addition, the uncer-
tain market situation often leads banks to provide credits at high interest rates, 
which reduces the profitability of investments. In this context, formal and informal 
institutions like mutual loan guarantee funds or rotating credit associations can 
help small businesses overcome the collateral problem, since a group of small 
businesses can pool their resources and provide a guarantee on which lenders 
can rely on. These arrangements can enable small enterprises to access credits or 
lower their credit costs. However, local services like those which support entrepre-
neurs in preparing business plans or trainings for young entrepreneurs also enhance 
the conditions for small enterprises, since, e.g. business plans are often basic 
requirements for credit applications. Moreover, a positive attitude from local govern-
ments provides incentives for local entrepreneurs or foreign investors to invest in 
a certain community. A last important factor is the existence of a local demand for 
products or services. That is, a high average level of local purchasing power leads 
to a differentiation in demand and generates market niches for small businesses, as 
well as provides local businesses with the chance to sell their products and services. 
Ad 3) According to ADY (1997) quality of life includes cultural activities, edu-
cation capabilities, sporting opportunities or housing availabilities. These factors 
not only strengthen local entrepreneurs and laborers in their decision to stay in a 
community, they also attract new investors. A further factor already discussed above 
that improves inhabitants' individual comfort in a jurisdiction is the cultural 
landscape. Hence, individuals also appreciate, besides their working conditions, the 
favorable state of local natural resources (FÜRST, 2006) and the availability of 
housing to rent or purchase at acceptable prices. 
Naturally, local conditions for businesses cover the various local public goods 
discussed above, and whose public good properties I will therefore not describe 
again. Furthermore, local entrepreneurs also gain from effective local government 
institutions and services or the existence of high purchasing power, which cover Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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properties of public goods, as well. With respect to the latter, there is barely a rivalry 
in consumption and local businesses can hardly be excluded from its benefits.  
2.2  Theories explaining the lacking provision of public goods 
Based on a literature review, Section 2.1 discussed the contribution of four different 
local public goods to the social and economic development of rural regions. These 
goods were further characterized with respect to their properties. However, although 
studies by LEE et al. (2005) or PHILLIPSON et al. (2006) have shown that, e.g, local 
business associations or regional brands have a positive impact on the economic 
development of a region, we have seen in Section 1.1 that in Polish rural areas, 
goods like favorable conditions for local businesses or local public infrastructure 
were often provided insufficiently or were even totally absent. Why is this the case 
if every inhabitant of a municipality is able to profit from these local public goods?  
In the following, I will analyze the question of lacking public goods provision 
more deeply by addressing it through three different economic theories; the welfare 
economics theory, the property rights theory, and the constitutional economics 
theory. In so doing, I aim to answer the first two research questions developed in 
Section 1.5. The following theoretical discussion should define the role the three 
different theories assign to governmental action in problems of public goods provi-
sion, and it should further reveal which normative statements each theory is able 
to make with respect to the adequacy of policy measures of the new rural paradigm.  
Section 2.2.1 will present the basic assumptions of the welfare economics theory. 
Over decades, the welfare economics theory dominated the theoretical discussion 
on agricultural and rural development policy concepts. Indeed, it produced concepts 
and models suitable for providing quantitative assessments of policy impacts in all 
sorts of traditional agricultural policy measures. Arthur C. Pigou, an important repre-
sentative of welfare economics theory, was the first to discuss approaches of govern-
mental intervention to facilitate the provision of public goods. While the welfare 
economics theory perceives problems of public goods provision as problems of 
market failure, the property rights theory, the approach I will look at in Section 2.2.2, 
addresses the problem of lacking public goods provision as one of social interaction. 
It argues that transaction costs hamper actors from a market-based provision of 
public goods. The latter approach contributed to a new discussion on governmental 
action in public goods provision, but has often been criticized for its lacking norma-
tive significance. The third approach I present in Section 2.2.3 is the constitutional 
economics theory. The constitutional theory also regards lacking public goods 
provision as a problem of social interaction, but additionally provides a normative 
perspective on the issue in question. 
Based on a literature review of the above three theories, the various perceptions 
of problems in public goods provision will be presented. In Section 2.2.4, with 
regard to local public goods in rural areas, I will go further into the theories’ assess-
ments on governmental action in rural development policies. By examining these Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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three theories I will not only discuss whether the welfare economics theory, the 
property rights approach, or the constitutional economics theory is capable of 
investigating the mode of operation of policy measures assigned to the new rural 
paradigm, but also whether these theories can be used to analyze the necessity 
and the type of governmental action normatively. Finally, Section 2.2.5 will present 
a new theoretical approach called the normative institutional economics theory. 
The latter approach constitutes an offset to the constitutional economics theory, 
which makes use of the normative strengths of that theory without taking over 
assuming its flaws in applied analyses of empirical problems.  
2.2.1  Welfare economics theory and market failure 
According to the welfare economics theory, the lacking provision of public goods 
is a classic case of market failure. Market failures exist when real world conditions 
differ from the ideal assumptions of perfectly competitive markets postulated by 
the welfare economics theory. Before I describe cases which are regarded as market 
failure by the welfare economics theory, I will first shortly present the theory’s basic 
assumptions.  
The ideal case of welfare economics theory is characterized by perfectly competi-
tive markets – implying a market-clearing price – which force rational and profit-
maximizing individuals to exchange resources on the market in a way that spends 
the highest level of utility (ATKINSON and STIGLITZ, 1980, p. 343). That is, under 
the conditions of perfectly competitive markets, both an efficient resource allocation 
and a social welfare maximum are reached. The welfare economics theory considers 
the latter situation as Pareto-efficient. It also implies that in perfectly competitive 
markets, governmental action would be redundant since efficient resource alloca-
tion leading to a social welfare maximum would emerge due to the existence of a 
market-clearing price.  
These basic assumptions describing a Pareto-efficient resource allocation are sum-
marized in the following two theorems (ATKINSON and STIGLITZ, 1980, p. 343). 
The first theorem states: If any individual or economic entity acted perfectly com-
petitively by taking prices as parametric, and a full set of markets existed where 
complete contracts are enforced, a competitive equilibrium would be Pareto-
efficient. Hence, given these assumptions, on perfect markets the utility of each 
actor depends solely on the actions of other market participants through goods 
exchanged on the market, that is, no nonmarket interactions are possible. Or, as 
SCITOVSKY (1954, p. 144) writes: "[...] the market economy leads to a situation 
of economic optimum (in Pareto's sense), provided that every economic influence 
of one person's (or firm's) behavior on another person's (or firm's) profit is transmit-
ted through its impact on market prices." 
The second theorem states: If both households’ indifference maps and firm pro-
duction sets are convex and the conditions of perfectly competitive markets and 
perfect information are given, any Pareto-efficient allocation can be achieved as Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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a competitive equilibrium for some assignment of initial endowments. That is, if 
the citizens of a society prefer the redistribution of income, it can be achieved by 
some reassignments of property rights. Thus, a new Pareto-efficient situation would 
be reached if the conditions of a perfectly competitive market with a market-
clearing price remained. This further implies that governmental intervention does 
not have to be contradictory to the market mechanism. 
Starting from these two theorems, welfare economists ask governments only to 
intervene when the current conditions of an economy differ from the above de-
scribed assumptions of competitive markets, that is, when markets fail. Hence, it is 
the task of governments to correct markets in order to exploit the welfare surpluses, 
which remain unused in the status quo. According to ATKINSON and STIGLITZ 
(1980, p. 347-49) market failure is at hand when the price mechanism is not working 
properly due to the existence of externalities. Externalities are regarded as a reason 
for the divergence between private profit and social benefit. They emerge as 1) 
negative externalities, when the behavior of a person imposes costs on another per-
son without compensating the latter for the additional costs; 2) in public goods 
provision (positive externalities), where a person receives a benefit from the action 
of another person without paying anything for it; or 3) due to the existence of 
monopolies. Monopolies themselves can also be regarded as negative externalities, 
since the market power of the monopolist allows him to deviate from competi-
tive allocation, which results in a lower level of consumer satisfaction.  
PIGOU (1920) attempted to discover whether any improvements could be made 
in the existing institutional arrangements that determine the use of resources. He 
advises the state to impose taxes or subsidies calibrated to implement a social welfare 
maximum. After the taxes or subsidies have been implemented, each individual 
should behave as if he would take account of the effects of his actions on others. 
That is, in terms of public goods, the beneficiary is supposed to receive a subsidy 
from the state as a compensation for the positive externalities he produces, but for 
which he was not compensated on the market.  
However, according to which criterion can one decide whether and which amount 
of subsidies or taxes lead to a maximization of social welfare? Here, the welfare 
economics goes back to the Pareto-efficiency criterion (ATKINSON and STIGLITZ, 
1980, p. 337). According to the latter, policy reform in terms of a Pigou tax or sub-
sidy would only lead toward a social welfare maximum if at least one person is 
made better off due to the reform and no one is made worse off. However, strict 
adherence to the rule that only Pareto-efficient policies should be implemented 
may lead to total political standstill. This dilemma can be overcome by using a social 
welfare function which constitutes a more applied approach of the Pareto-efficiency 
criterion (ATKINSON and STIGLITZ, 1980, p. 339 et seq.). The social welfare 
function is consistent with the Pareto criterion, but goes beyond it as it compares 
individual gains and losses. In a further extension of the social welfare function, 
the gains and losses of every individual of a society are aggregated and maximized Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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to calculate a social welfare maximum. Hence, the maximization of such a social 
welfare or social surplus only makes sense in terms of a compensation test in line 
with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which allows the hypothetical compensation of 
losers by the winners of a policy change. 
In summary, we can say that the welfare economics theory blames the lacking 
provision of public goods on market failure. Since providers of a public good are 
not completely compensated for the benefits they produce (as no market price for 
the good exists or a price that exactly contains its production costs), they will not 
provide the good to an extent that is actually demanded. In such cases, according 
to PIGOU, the government has to intervene by paying subsidies to the providers, 
which persuades the latter to provide as much of the good as they would have 
under competitive market conditions.  
Critical comments on the welfare economics approach mostly address the narrow 
assumptions made with respect to the reference model of a perfectly competitive 
market, which can hardly be found in reality (CHRISTY, 1996, p. 1148; FRITSCH, 
WEIN and EWERS, 1999). DEMSETZ (1969) calls such an ideal state a 'nirvana'-
approach that describes an unattainable paradise. SUCHANEK (2000) states that 
employing such an idealist first-best in order to formulate policy recommenda-
tions must lead to normative fallacies. That is, to focus on the difference between 
reality and unreachable paradise says nothing about reality and what can be achieved 
under realistic premises (EICKHOF, 1986, p. 468). However, for evaluating policy 
reforms, taking real-world conditions into consideration, a fictitious criterion like 
the Pareto-efficiency seems unfeasible.  
Further literature strongly scrutinizes the state's capability of improving the allo-
cation of resources. Many different publications influenced by Ronald COASE (1960) 
refer to additional costs borne by the state once the latter aims to correct markets. 
Thus, there are transaction costs that have to be taken into consideration when 
governments calculate the extent to which they intervene and the instruments 
that are supposed to be applied to "correct" the concerning market. Further costs 
arrive as decision-making costs, control costs or implementation costs since the 
implementation process has to pass different bureaucratic levels. Bureaucratic 
costs are criticized by the public choice theory as well. Shortly summarized, this 
theory argues that it is not correct to assume that the state consists of a benevo-
lent dictator (social planner) who possesses all the relevant information he needs 
to correct markets towards a Pareto-optimal state. There are many authors who 
show that political actors or bureaucrats often do not search for actions leading 
to a maximization of a social welfare, but rather follow their own interests (e.g. see 
TULLOCK, 1967; KRUEGER, 1974; NISKANEN, 1971).  
Furthermore, different studies, often based on empirical results, also ask whether 
there is only a decision between market and state when it comes to the question 
of how to correct failing markets. Thus, CHANG (2002, p. 546) criticizes that in the Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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view of welfare economics, governmental intervention is the only alternative that 
can be seriously contemplated, since intermediate institutions or organizations find 
no place in the scheme. 
2.2.2  Property rights theory  
This section will present the property rights theory as a research program that 
constitutes an extension of the traditional welfare economics theory. Representa-
tives of the property rights theory see externalities as a precondition in the real 
world and analyze ways of internalizing the latter. In so doing, the property 
rights literature does not refer to the Pareto-efficiency criterion, as it denies a 
fictitious criterion that cannot be found in reality. Rather, it starts by searching 
for institutional arrangements that improve the welfare of a society starting from 
the status quo. Ronald COASE (1960), one of the founders of the research program, 
draws some fundamental criticisms against the welfare economics theory in a 
hypothetical example used by PIGOU (1920). According to PIGOU, a train drives 
on a railroad through farmland and ignites fires which cause damage to farmers. 
Here, PIGOU (1920) assesses based on efficiency grounds, that the railroad com-
pany should be liable for the damage, since the anticipation of the liability will 
force the railroad to take account of the effects and costs of its actions on farmers. 
However, COASE (1960, p. 34) argues that "it is quite illegitimate for PIGOU to 
draw the particular conclusions he does." He continues: 
"The question at issue is not whether it is desirable to run an additional train 
or a faster train or to install smoke-preventing devices; the question at issue is 
whether it is desirable to have a system in which the railway has to compen-
sate those who suffer damage from the fires which it causes or one in which the 
railway does not have to compensate them" (COASE, 1960, p. 34).  
It is mistakable for COASE to see resources only as physical entities since all that 
matters is their institutional affiliation, that is, their property rights. In his percep-
tion, the conflict between the railroad company and the farmers results from an 
obvious misunderstanding between the two acting parties, who argue about the 
legitimacy of some actions (LESCHKE and SAUERLAND, 2000, p. 185). Here, it be-
comes clear that the problem does not result from the physical damage itself, but 
rather from the existence of conflicting interests that individuals involved in the 
process possess. For example, there would be no conflict if only the farmers culti-
vated their land and no railroad company existed. The same is true for the other 
way round, that is, if the train drove through the prairie where no farmer had his 
fields. Hence, the conflict is not a problem of physical damage, it is a problem of 
social interaction (LESCHKE and SAUERLAND, 2000, p. 185), a reciprocal conflict 
that emerges from the claims that two different parties assert over one resource. 
Thus, there are cases where the person causing damage imposes additional costs to 
others without compensation. Here, the main question for COASE emerges: Based on 
which criterion shall one decide whether the claimant should receive compensation Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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or not? If we look at the possible outcomes of such a decision, we see that in 
cases where the person causing damage is excused from compensating the claimant, 
the benefits the latter receives decrease. On the other hand, if the person causing 
damage had to compensate the claimant, his/her benefits would decrease.  
A similar situation emerges in the case of public goods. Here, we attempt to il-
lustrate the property rights theory’s view of public goods with a local public good 
discussed in Section 2.1.4; the cultural landscape. Cultural landscape is for the 
most part provided by agricultural farms as a by-product of their market production. 
A farmer receives a benefit from selling the products he cultivates on his fields. 
While the farmer cultivates, he also contributes to the provision of cultural land-
scapes, since without his activities the agricultural land would remain fallow. But the 
farmer is not compensated for the additional benefits he provides for all inhabitants 
in the region in terms of nicely cultivated fields. However, when agricultural pro-
ducer prices are low or when, e.g., peasant farmers in southeastern Poland are 
not able to sell their products, this might lead to a situation where farmers quit 
cultivating or continue to cultivate but in a way that is less preferred by local in-
habitants. Hence, even in this case a problem of social interaction exists. Because if 
a farmer lived alone in a certain region and cultivated his fields, he would not think 
about compensation for the by-product he produces. On the other hand, in a region 
where people live but no farmers cultivate the land, the public good of cultural 
landscape would not be provided and nobody would assert his claims to it. Indeed, 
an interaction problem exists only because of the complementary interests of both 
parties, that is, the farmer will not orient his production toward inhabitants’ preferen-
ces concerning the local landscape without receiving compensation, and the inhabi-
tants prefer to enjoy the cultural landscape without paying compensation. But going 
back to the above question: Based on which criterion should one decide whether 
or not the inhabitants have to compensate the farmer for the additional benefits 
he provides?  
COASE answers this question by arguing that the legitimacy of compensation 
depends on the allocation of the property rights on the cultural landscape. He 
proposes that under certain conditions, a solution for the interaction problem can be 
found by private negotiations between the involved parties. COASE would continue 
by emphasizing that private negotiations depend on the existence of transaction 
costs. That is, if transaction costs were zero, property rights were perfectly as-
signed, all individuals involved had perfect information and, therefore, efficient 
bargaining was possible, it would not matter to whom the property rights belong 
since the concerned individuals would negotiate as long as an efficient allocation 
of resources was reached. Hence, all interventions undertaken by public courts or 
governmental action would be dispensable if transaction costs were zero. The 
latter thoughts can be considered as a dramatic extension of the traditional welfare 
economics approach. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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However, transaction costs in the real world are always positive (ZERBE and 
MCCURDY, 2005) and therefore private negotiations often do not take place, or do 
not lead to desirable outcomes. With respect to the example of cultural landscapes, 
the transaction costs at least emerge since no exact property rights are defined and 
the assignment of the latter is hardly possible. In order to find a solution for such 
an interaction problem, COASE would further argue that one should oppose all 
potential individual costs and benefits for the farmer, and for all other parties, 
that emerge from all potential institutional arrangements that channel the behavior 
of the two parties in a way that the positive externality becomes internalized as 
far as possible. Finally, an institutional arrangement channelizing farmers’ and in-
habitants’ behavior needs to be found which leads to the maximization of the social 
net benefit surplus in comparison to the status quo (LESCHKE and SAUERLAND, 
2000, p. 186). Coase argues according to the welfare economics approach when 
he notes:  
"Economists who study problems of the firm habitually use an opportunity cost 
approach and compare the receipts obtained from a given combination of factors 
with alternative business arrangements. It would seem desirable to use a simi-
lar approach when dealing with questions of economic policy and to compare the 
total product yielded by alternative social arrangements" (COASE, 1960, p. 43). 
Hence, according to COASE’s argumentation, an adequate institutional arrangement 
for solving the conflict on cultural landscape provision could be one which does 
not concede compensation for the farmer and instead imposes additional condi-
tions which he has to fulfill while cultivating his fields. Although the farmer 
would not agree on this policy change, since under these institutional arrangements 
he would be worse off in comparison to the status quo, COASE would approve of 
this policy change if the social net benefit surplus is maximized. 
In the tradition of COASE, WILLIAMSON (1991) proposes searching for the most 
efficient conflict-solving institutional arrangements by paying attention to the trans-
action costs that emerge from the operation of institutions. He proposes to compara-
tively evaluate only feasible forms of organization (WILLIAMSON, 1993, p. 107). 
In this regard, the most efficient institutional arrangement would be one where 
transaction costs were minimal. The state can also contribute to a reduction of trans-
action costs, as the latter is able to assign and strengthen property rights (ZERBE 
and MCCURDY, 2005, p. 28). That is, if property rights become more extensive and 
complete, transaction costs may approach zero and private bargaining will emerge 
more easily (ZERBE and MCCURDY, 2005, p. 7). In addition, the state can also 
undertake actions to ease the trade of property rights or create more efficient bargai-
ning environments e.g. due to the provision of moderators (BOWLES, 2004, p. 229).  
Furthermore, by searching for appropriate institutional arrangements for solving 
interaction problems, one has to compare the costs resulting from the operation 
of various institutional arrangements as well as the costs combined with moving 
from one institution to another. Finally, we expect to discover which institution will Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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solve the conflicts at the lowest cost regardless of whether it is due to governmental 
intervention, private bargaining or different forms of formal or informal institutions. 
Contrary to traditional welfare economics theory, where only governmental interven-
tion is assumed to correct markets according to the reference point of perfect compe-
tition, the property rights theory also acknowledges non-market interactions between 
individuals. But although the property rights approach does not refer to the Pareto-
efficiency criterion, it still adheres to the maximizing paradigm, since the property 
rights theory prefers those institutions which operate with minimal transaction costs 
and therefore maximize the social net benefit surplus. 
In summary, the property rights theory proceeds from its assumptions of real world 
conditions and negates the relevance of perfectly competitive markets as a norma-
tive criterion. In contrast to the welfare economics theory, the property rights theory 
does not assign lacking public goods provision to the divergence between perfectly 
competitive markets and real world conditions, but rather reveals it as a problem of 
social interaction. That is, since two or more parties assert their claims to a certain 
good, the provision of the latter good depends on the assignment of the property 
rights on the good to the different parties. In cases where property rights are not 
perfectly defined, a negotiation between parties for the right/duty to receive the 
benefits or to bear the costs of using and providing the good, respectively, can 
only emerge to a limited extent. A public good, therefore, which is not assigned 
to a single owner, will not be provided or will only be provided to a limited extent 
since due to its indefinite ownership, neither the benefits nor the costs of its pro-
vision can be exactly distributed. However, if private bargaining will not be suc-
cessful, the state can intervene in different manners. One method of governmental 
intervention could be the subsidization of a public goods provision, as PIGOU has 
suggested. But according to the property rights theory, the state can also act as a 
coercive power that assigns property rights, or as moderator when different parties 
bargain for the property rights of resources or goods. The state can also provide 
other institutional arrangements, such as courts that enforce property rights or 
facilitate bargaining processes. Hence, governmental action can be manifold and 
far from direct intervention on markets like the welfare economics theory proposes. 
Finally, the only criterion that is relevant for the property rights approach is that 
governmental action should lead to an allocation of resources and goods that enables 
the improvement of social welfare.  
However, the property rights theory also has many critics. For instance, it has been 
argued that the evaluation of institutional arrangements is strongly empirically-
based and entails one remaining problem: Who is able to exactly measure the costs 
combined with the search for, as well as the implementation and maintenance of, 
alternative institutional arrangements? And further, if the set of rules have to be 
changed in comparison to the status quo, who could anticipate the transaction costs 
emerging under the new set of rules? These questions lead us back to the problem 
of the benevolent and omniscient despot mentioned in Section 2.2.1. Referring Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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to normative individualism, every individual has a different subjective perception 
of costs and benefits combined with the implementation of institutional arrange-
ments, and no objective assessments on the preferability of institutional arrangement 
can be made based on the criterion applied by the property rights theory. The only 
hint that property rights theory will give is summarized by DAHLMAN (1979, 
p. 160) as follows: "[F]ind practicable ways of diminishing transaction costs by 
whatever kind of action is necessary, including governmental action." 
The property rights theory shows a further weakness. For example, DAHLMAN 
(1979, p. 158) argues that if there were transaction costs and differences between 
traders, then it would very well matter to whom liabilities and rights are assigned. 
BOWLES (2004, p. 230) alludes to this by using the COASE theorem, which states 
that we have to distinguish between efficiency arguments and distributive justice 
arguments. The suggestion that the distribution of property rights does not influ-
ence allocational efficiency can hardly be verified. There are many impediments 
and constraints, such as the lacking access to credits or other financial sources, 
as well as the distribution of wealth, which limit individuals' access to resources 
needed for the bargaining process. This consideration was also the initial point 
for BROMLEY's and HODGE's (1990) publication dealing with a reconsideration 
of the premises of rural policy. Those authors emphasize that it does matter in 
the real world to whom the property rights belong, since the latter provide the 
owner with the legal ability to ignore the wishes of those without such rights. In 
their perception, the existing distribution of property rights in rural areas, a remnant 
from an earlier time, now leads to a situation where the state needs to bribe the 
farmers to adopt a set of agricultural practices that do not violate the general interests 
of rural or urban inhabitants. However, if property rights would be owned by the 
state or rural collectivities, farmers would need to bribe the state in order to un-
dertake production activities that do not coincide with the common interests of 
the collectivities. 
2.2.3  Constitutional economics theory 
The following section presents the constitutional economics theory as an alternative 
approach to the abovementioned theories. Although constitutional economics regards 
individuals as rational and profit-maximizing and refers to normative individualism, 
the latter theory tries to take the flaws of the welfare economics and the property 
rights theories into consideration. Before I discuss the constitutional economics 
view of public goods, I will provide an overview on the research program and its 
assumptions, which differ fundamentally from the approaches described above. 
Constitutional economics is strongly influenced by James M. BUCHANAN (see 
e.g. BUCHANAN, 1975 [2002]; 1987a [2002]; 1987b; 1990 [2002]). In his works, 
BUCHANAN (1959; 2003) refers to the flaws of the welfare economics approach, 
namely the assumption of perfectly competitive markets as its reference model, 
the social welfare function, and the depiction of the state as a benevolent dictator. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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BUCHANAN (1962) starts his argumentation by illustrating that a comparison between 
a theoretical ideal of perfect competition and reality will neglect relevant alter-
natives (PIES, 1996). Here, BUCHANAN also argues in line with COASE, as he pro-
poses to focus more strongly on the comparison of relevant alternatives starting 
from the status quo. Other critics turn against the calculation of a social welfare 
maximum by means of a social welfare function. By calculating a social welfare 
maximum, BUCHANAN assesses, the economic assumption of rational, profit-maximi-
zing individuals has been transferred from the individual level to the level of col-
lective organizations (VANBERG, 2005). The society then becomes a single choosing 
entity and economists are regarded as omniscient and able to read, to aggregate, 
and to maximize individual preference functions. Thus, the maximization of utility 
aggregates by means of a social welfare function is inconsistent with normative 
individualism. Here, BUCHANAN (1959) does not criticize the rational choice 
perspective of individuals, but applies it on the level of social aggregates
5. Accor-
ding to BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962) the individual is the only decision-
making unit and the only one who knows his individual utility function. Hence, 
according to these authors, there is no objective observer who can accurately 
predict what individuals would choose if confronted with different alternatives, and 
there is no objective social value scale. That is, a normative evaluation of situations 
or institutional arrangements can solely be based on the assessment of the actually 
affected persons. In this regard, BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962) also argue against 
the criterion employed by COASE (1962), who argues that an institutional arrange-
ment would be preferable if it led to the maximization of a social net benefit sur-
plus in comparison to the status quo. As discussed in Section 2.2.2 regarding the 
example of cultural landscape, the implementation of an institutional arrangement 
resulting in a situation where some individuals are worse off, might possibly lead 
to a social net benefit surplus compared to the status quo, but will never be based 
on the assent of all individuals involved. Hence, the COASE criterion is inconsistent 
with the assumption of normative individualism, as it does not accept the veto 
rights of individual persons. 
Furthermore, BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962) criticize the welfare economists’ 
perspective on governmental action. Their objections relate to the problem of 
consistency that emerges when individuals on markets are regarded as rational 
and profit-maximizing, but politicians are, in contrast, seen as benevolent and 
omniscient despots. Therefore, in their monograph BUCHANAN and TULLOCK not 
only apply homo economicus to private market decision-making, but also to the 
political sphere. Based on this perception a new economic sub-discipline emerged, 
which became known as public choice theory (BUCHANAN, 2003). However, in 
                                                 
5  "My strictures are directed exclusively at the extension of this basic maximizing paradigm 
to social organization where it does not belong. This is the bridge which economists should 
never have crossed, and which created major intellectual confusion," (BUCHANAN, 1975 [2002], 
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the 1970s BUCHANAN realized that public choice became, by analyzing the be-
havior of political actors like voters, politicians and bureaucrats, a set of theories of 
governmental failures as an offset of the welfare economics theory of market failure 
(BUCHANAN, 1987a [2002]). Hence, just as welfare economics confronts real-world 
actors with the ideal of perfectly competitive markets to identify market failures, 
the public choice confronts political real-world actors with a theoretical ideal in 
order to identify governmental failure. As a consequence, the efficiency-criterion 
loses its normative orientation function. Regarding this, BUCHANAN (1987a [2002], 
p. 585) argues that: "Any positive analysis that purports to be of use in an ulti-
mate normative judgement must reflect an informed comparison of the working 
properties of alternative sets of rules and constraints."  
Based on his fundamental criticisms against the efficiency-criterion, BUCHANAN 
introduces a different perception of markets and politics. Thus, he turns against 
the maximizing paradigm that considers markets only as a mechanism of social 
welfare maximization and introduces, in contrast, a perception of markets as in-
stitutions of exchange (BUCHANAN, 1975 [2002], p. 80). According to this percep-
tion, individuals on markets are seen as market participants who exchange products 
or services driven by their rational, profit-maximizing behavior, while the market 
order coordinates the interaction between market participants. Markets, therefore, 
realize exchange processes that coordinate individual maximizing efforts. Based 
on game theory, BUCHANAN (1975 [2002]) tries to explain his suggestions in more 
detail. He shows that the solution (outcome) of a theoretic game model is not a 
maximum, since an external observer would not operate directly on solutions to 
improve the game. The external observer would, instead, try to change the rules 
to improve the game, while he uses the observed outcomes as information input 
in his evaluation of the game. Outcomes, therefore, cannot be chosen directly by 
the observer – they only result from the individual behavior of the players, who are 
constrained by a certain set of rules. The observers can merely suggest changes to 
the rules of the game. On markets we see the same setting. There are individual 
actors who behave rationally and self-interested, as well as a market order con-
straining their behavior. Hence, the outcomes on markets only emerge from the 
rational, self-interested moves of individuals within a certain set of rules. 
But BUCHANAN goes further. He argues that with respect to the exchange process 
markets are analogous to politics. As BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962) mention, 
both markets and politics are devices through which the individual maximizing 
efforts are organized and made possible. As BUCHANAN (1987b) explains, like 
persons enter markets to exchange one thing for another, "[p]olitics is a structure 
of complex exchange among individuals, a structure within which persons seek 
to secure collectively their own privately defined objectives that cannot be efficiently 
secured through simple market exchange" (ibid., p. 246). Hence, both markets and 
politics can be understood in the same two-stage structure. On the one hand, indi-
viduals choose a market order or constitutional rules that shape competition on Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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markets or in politics. On the other hand, market entrepreneurs as well as political 
entrepreneurs who behave self-interestedly are constrained, respectively, by the 
market order and by constitutional rules (PIES, 2000). This similarity between 
markets and politics allows us to analyze both in an analogous and consistent matter. 
Neither market nor political analysis should focus on how rational agents seek to 
be more successful in playing a given game, while the existing rules of a game 
are seen as a datum. Analysis should identify superior rules that enable the concerned 
individuals to play better games (VANBERG, 2005, p. 27) or as BUCHANAN assesses 
solely for politics: "The ultimate objective of analysis is the choice among insti-
tutions within which political agents act," (BUCHANAN, 1987a [2002], p. 4). 
However, based on which normative criterion should one choose between alter-
native institutions or institutional arrangements? BUCHANAN proposes searching 
for acceptable, Pareto-superior institutions. Starting from the status quo, an insti-
tutional change would only result in a Pareto-superior situation if all individuals 
involved agreed on such a change. Only the agreement of every single individual 
assures that all individuals are better off after policy change. Therefore, BUCHANAN 
proposes replacing the fictitious Pareto-efficiency criterion with the consensus crite-
rion. As discussed above, BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962) perceive both markets 
and politics as a particular form of exchange for realizing mutual gains from col-
lective action (BUCHANAN and TULLOCK, 1962). Thus, on markets, individuals 
choose to constrain or to limit their potential consumption of apples in exchange 
for the expanded opportunity of consuming oranges. Similar processes take place in 
politics. Individuals in the political arena choose to constrain their own behavior 
as part of an exchange. That is, political actors sacrifice restrictions on their own 
actions in return for benefits anticipated from reciprocal restrictions on the ac-
tions of others with whom they interact along the boundaries of public spaces 
(BUCHANAN, 1990 [2002], p. 380-81).  
With the distinction between rules and moves the constitutional economics gives 
way for institutional analysis in a positive and a normative manner. The positive 
analysis regards the individuals’ behavior (moves) within a certain set of institu-
tions (rules), whereas the normative part analyzes the choice among institutions 
based on the consensus criterion (BUCHANAN, 1987a [2002], p. 5). 
These fundamental assumptions of constitutional economics also throw a new 
light on externalities and, hence, on the problem of public goods provision. With 
respect to externalities BUCHANAN (1984, p. 177) claims to focus on the process 
(exchange) rather than applying an outcome criterion to the results of the exchange 
process. By going back to market processes, we realize that exchange would only 
take place if market participants were better off after exchange. Market exchange, 
therefore, is always combined with agreement between both market participants. 
However, externalities exist "whenever the behavior of a person affects the situa-
tion of other persons without the explicit agreement of that person or persons," 
(BUCHANAN, 1971 [2002], p. 16). Here, BUCHANAN argues similarly to COASE Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
 
36 
(1962), as he refers to externalities as a problem of social interaction. However, 
BUCHANAN (1971 [2002]) argues further that in exchange or trade, individuals 
are fully compensated for all costs that were suffered and that they had to pay 
for all the benefits they received, respectively. Therefore, trade is always a recipro-
cal exchange. In contrast, an externality implies that one suffers costs or receives 
benefits by not entering into exchange. Hence, in the case of externalities there 
is always an opportunity of mutual gains from exchange that is not exploited in 
the status quo. Considering the distinction between rules and individual moves, 
it becomes clear that externalities do not result from individual behavior, but from 
the institutional framework in the status quo, which prevents exchange between 
individuals involved in an externality problem. That is, the problem of negative 
externalities like in the example of the railway company and the farmers mentioned 
in Section 2.2.2 would be solved if institutional arrangements existed that would 
determine the behavior of all individuals involved in the process. However, the 
improvement of all individuals involved in comparison to the status quo requires an 
exchange on the level of institutional arrangements. Only if all individuals agreed 
on the implementation of an institutional arrangement that determined individual 
behavior would it be guaranteed that the former benefit from the institutional 
change. Hence, only consent on rules complies with an exchange and enables the 
individuals involved to exploit the mutual gains from trade. 
BUCHANAN’S opinion, by comparison, differs from COASE regarding institutional 
arrangements that enable individuals to overcome interaction problems. While 
COASE proposes searching for any institutional arrangement leading to a social 
net benefit surplus in comparison to the status quo, BUCHANAN (1968) returns to 
individual assent. For BUCHANAN, the only way of overcoming an interaction 
problem is to bring those individuals involved to agreement on institutional arrange-
ments determining individual behavior and, therefore, facilitate exchange processes. 
Referring to the example of cultural landscape mentioned in Section 2.2.2, COASE 
would approve an institutional arrangement that imposes additional cultivating 
standards on farmers without compensation. In contrast, for BUCHANAN such a 
policy change would not lead to a Pareto-superior situation since farmers will not 
benefit from it and therefore never agree on it. Hence, a policy change leading to 
a Pareto-superior situation requires at least farmers’ factual compensation.  
In summary, the constitutional economics theory considers markets to be places 
of exchange. Participants exchange goods and services under a certain market 
order to improve their individual utility. Exchange, therefore, only takes place if 
both sides are better off afterwards. Only the latter fact allows mutual agreement on 
market transfer. With respect to public goods, the constitutional economics theory 
argues that individuals benefit from other individuals’ actions without compen-
sating the latter for the benefits they receive. That is, no exchange takes place and 
gains from trade remain unexploited. In such a case the egoistic behavior of indi-
viduals does not prevent exchange, but rather the lack of institutional arrangements Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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hampers the latter parties from entering into exchange. However, an institutional 
arrangement that facilitates the sufficient provision of public goods and services 
requires the agreement of all individuals involved in the public goods problem 
on the latter institutional arrangement. Therefore, an institutional arrangement is 
needed that determines the behavior of all parties involved. Finally, for BUCHANAN, 
governmental action is not supposed to compensate one party or sanction the 
other (although it can) or to solely minimize transaction costs (although it also can), 
but rather the incentive of governmental action shall be to facilitate exchange 
between all parties involved in a public goods problem by means of forcing the 
implementation of institutional arrangements which find overall agreement.  
However, there are also critical comments on the constitutional economics theory, 
as the latter are dominated by objections against the consensus criterion. SEN (1970), 
for example, accuses BUCHANAN of giving no assessment of the legitimacy of policy 
changes that are not made unanimously. He argues that: "Even a single person 
opposing a change can block it altogether no matter what everybody else wants. 
Marie Antoinette’s opposition to the First Republic would have saved monarchy 
in France, and the world would have seen very little change. Clearly there is some-
thing grotesquely unsatisfactory about a social decision rule like this" (ibid., p. 25). 
KOLLER (1987, p. 229) also assesses that the consensus criterion definitely leads 
to the apologia of the existing conditions. Even BUCHANAN (1968 [2002], p. 90) 
agrees that it is a natural objection to say that the consensus criterion would result 
in few, if any, decisions being made. Here, a modification of the scheme seems to 
be necessary to allow for some decisions’ departure from complete unanimity. Policy 
reforms can be guided by a general procedure that finds the assent of all individuals. 
This general procedure is established by a system of institutions, i.e., a constitution 
(PETRICK, 2005, p. 93; HOMANN and SUCHANEK, 2000, pp. 194-197). In constitu-
tions, individuals unanimously agree to decision procedures that are not based on 
universal consent, since it is too costly to find a consensus in every single case. Con-
sensus, therefore, remains the normative idea, which nevertheless includes sub-
constitutional decisions made by decision procedures deviating from universal 
consent. However, applying the consensus criterion only to constitutional decisions 
does not repeal the abovementioned objections. It remains doubtful that based on 
the consensus criterion, decisions on any constitutional or sub-constitutional level 
can be made. 
I will come back to the latter problem in the next section of this monograph, where 
I present a confrontation of the three discussed theories. The following section will 
also discuss the applicability of the three theories to the problem of lacking local 
public goods provision in rural areas using the example of cultural landscapes.  Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
 
38 
2.2.4  Confrontation of the three theories 
Table  2-3 summarizes the view of the discussed theories regarding problems with 
public goods provision. Welfare economics theory starts its analysis of public 
goods by using perfectly competitive markets as a reference model. For the welfare 
economics theory, the problem of public goods therefore constitutes an exception. 
PIGOU was the first who referred to situations where somebody produces benefits in 
terms of public goods without receiving any compensation; his underlying diagnosis 
was market failure since actions were undertaken external to the market exchange 
and the production costs of the external benefit were not compensated by a market 
price. According to PIGOU, the only one who is able to fix markets is the state, by 
providing subsidies to compensate the producer of the positive externalities. Finally, 
if the subsidies are in the amount of the costs, the provider of the public good suffers 
from producing these external benefits, the market will be corrected according to the 
model of perfect competition and the public good will be provided according to 
market demand. 
COASE, in contrast, does not use any idealistic case as a reference model. Rather, 
he starts his analysis from real world conditions. For COASE the lacking provision 
of public goods results from a problem of social interaction between all involved 
individuals. In his view, all individuals are in charge of the underlying situation, 
since they all assert their claims to the same scarce resource. The reason for the 
latter interaction problem thus lies in the imperfect allocation of property rights. 
That is, in a world with well-defined property rights, those problems of public goods 
provision would not exist. This states the COASE theorem, as it assumes that in a 
world with well-defined property rights and no transaction costs, externalities and, 
hence, problems of public goods provision will not occur. However, since trans-
action costs are not zero in the real world, institutional arrangements are needed 
that reduce transaction costs. Here, the state may undertake actions to reduce trans-
action costs, for instance, by defining property rights. Well-defined property rights 
also allow a market-based provision of public goods. In cases where the privati-
zation of public goods provision is combined with high costs, the state may be 
able to provide the latter to lower costs by means of governmental services. Finally, 
institutional arrangements, regardless of whether they are formal or informal, 
should be chosen which improve the social net benefit in comparison to the status 
quo. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Table 2-3:  Confrontation of the theories on the problem of public goods 
provision  









- Producer of a public 
good does not receive 
compensation for 
benefits he provides 
due to market failure 
- Problem of social  
interaction  
 





- Market price does 
not comprise all  
produced benefits  
- Market is not able to 
solve the problem 
- Transaction costs 
prevent internaliza-
tion of externalities 




ments prevent the 
exploitation of  




- Benefactor should 
include the positive 
externalities in his 
individual maximi-
zation calculus 
- Search for institu-
tional arrangements 
that enable a social 
net benefit surplus in 
comparison to the 
status quo 





- Based on consensus 
of all individuals 
involved 
Method of  
resolution 
- Pigou subsidies  - Any kind of  
institution 




- Nirvana approach 
- Governmental inter-
vention as only  
possible method of  
resolution 
- Benevolent dictator 
- Searching for a social 




- Consensus in large 
societies often  
unrealizable 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
BUCHANAN, in line with COASE, refers to interaction problems as the principle 
reasons for lacking public goods provision. He also perceives individuals as 
profit-maximizing actors, but due to his distinction between moves and rules, he 
emphasizes the importance of rules as institutions channeling individual behavior. 
According to BUCHANAN, lacking public goods provision results from institu-
tional incentives that hamper individuals from cooperation. That is, individuals 
would contribute to the provision of public goods if they were sure that all other 
affected persons would also contribute. However, certainty about other inhabitants’ Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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behavior can only be ensured by way of institutional reform. Thus, only an institu-
tional arrangement which forces all inhabitants involved to contribute brings the 
latter into exchange in terms of swapping the individual contribution for the indi-
vidual contribution of all others. Hence, what matters for BUCHANAN is to focus 
on institutional arrangements which facilitate exchange processes by channeling 
individuals’ behavior; he therefore proposes to search for a criterion that can be 
applied to institutional analysis. This criterion can only be the consensus of all 
individuals involved on the concerned rules. Because it assures that all individuals 
will improve their situation by entering into exchange under the rules they agreed 
on, only the consensus provides an adequate incentive for all individuals involved 
to enter into exchange and, hence, to exploit mutual gains from trade. Finally, 
starting from the status quo, any set of rules has to be found that is approved by 
all individuals involved. 
In the following, I will discuss the various suggestions the welfare economics 
theory, the property rights theory, and the constitutional economics theory provide 
with respect to the problem of lacking provision of cultural landscape. Figure 2-2 
depicts changes in farmer’s utility and the utility of all inhabitants involved resul-
ting from policy changes. To simplify the illustration, I subsumed inhabitants’ prefe-
rences, although it is assumed that a comparison of utility functions between in-
dividuals is not possible.  
Point A in Figure 2-2-1 describes a situation of liberal agricultural policy, where 
a farmer cultivates his land and contributes to the provision of cultural landscape as 
a by-product of his production activities. Here, the farmer only obtains his income 
from selling his products without receiving any subsidies from the state. There-
fore, in his production decisions, the farmer only acts upon the market price for 
potential crops he is able to produce on his fields. Additionally, the farmer con-
tributes to the provision of cultural landscape in the region, but not to the extent 
that is preferred by most of the local inhabitants. The latter would prefer a change 
in crops in terms of an increase of rape seed and lupine production instead of 
wheat and barley, as well as an increasing amount of hedges surrounding the fields 
rather than huge fields without any natural barriers. However, since cultural land-
scape is not a marketable product, the farmer does not receive any compensation 
for additional cultivating activities on his fields. Starting from point A, all persons 
involved, the farmer and the inhabitants, could improve their utility by means of 
market exchange, but this is only possible if cultural landscape becomes a mary 
which are not exploited in point A. Hence, PIGOU would propose subsidizing the 
farmer. The subsidy should encourage the farmer to cultivate his fields in a way 
he would have done were the preferences of the regional inhabitants covered by 
the product price he receives or if there was a market for cultural landscapes. 
However, while all points in the northeast direction starting from the dashed lines 
in Figure 2-2-1 constitute Pareto-superior situations in comparison to point A, 
welfare economists would only focus on point B, since it assures that all social Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective  41
welfare surpluses would be exploited. Point B constitutes the point of tangency 
of the utility possibility frontier and the social welfare function. While the utility 
frontier indicates all points of Pareto-efficient resource allocation, the social welfare 
function comprises the aggregated preferences of all individuals involved. The 
intersection of both functions constitutes the point where, due to the existence of 
perfect competition, a Pareto-efficient resource allocation is provided and the 
preferences of all individuals involved are satisfied. Hence, according to PIGOU,
the state has to intervene in a way that, by means of PIGOU subsidies, B will be 
reached as the only point where the market failure is completely cured and the 
market is once again able to fulfill its allocational functions of obtaining a social 
welfare maximum. 
Figure 2-2:  Problem of lacking provision of cultural landscape from the 
perspective of welfare economics, property rights theory, and 
constitutional economics
Source:  Author’s depiction modified from BESLEY (2006, p. 54-55). 
The agricultural input and output price support of the CAP during the 1970s and 
80s also acted to some extent as PIGOU subsidies. Although the main focus was to 
improve agricultural income and supply security, those subsidies were also supposed 
to encourage farmers to continue their cultivation activities and to keep their fields in 
good conditions. However, since the price support was linked to different crops and 
inputs, they were not oriented to regional inhabitants’ preferences, but rather to po-
litical issues. Furthermore, subsidized crops and input prices led to an increased and 
to some extent naturally harmful input of fertilizers instead of an improved pro-
vision of cultural landscape and the situation that was actually reached can be 
depicted as B’. That is, since there was no change in the institutional arrangement 
channeling the farmer’s behavior according to the preferences of local inhabi-
tants, the former benefited the most and intensified production according to the 
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the intensified production was not preferred by local inhabitants since it led to a 
degradation of the local cultural landscape rather than to its improvement.  
Starting from point A as the status quo, the dashed area in Figure 2-2-2 located 
northeast from the straight line crossing point A depicts all policy changes that 
would lead, according to COASE, to situations which improve the social welfare 
in comparison to A. COASE is aware of the interaction problem inherent in a public 
goods situation. Therefore, as a classic solution he would propose defining property 
rights on cultural landscapes and bringing all individuals involved into bargaining 
for those property rights to secure a resource allocation that spends a higher level 
of utility in comparison to the status quo. Hence, he does not propose influencing 
the behavior of the farmer by means of subsidies without taking account of the 
other side, namely the inhabitants. At first glance, all that COASE asks for is to bring 
both parties into bargaining discussions over cultural landscape property rights. 
However, since cultural landscape property rights are hard to define, a COASE 
solution might also be to invite all inhabitants of a region to participate in round 
table talks, where the latter should negotiate the level of cultural landscape pro-
vision, as well as the way of provision. Such talks could be initiated by the state. 
If both parties, namely the farmer and the inhabitants, attended the talks, a solu-
tion for cultural landscape provision might be found that enables all attendees to 
improve their utility in comparison to the status quo. Such a solution would be 
located in the Pareto-superior area. However, the latter solutions are often com-
bined with high decision-making costs. This is particularly true for large or highly 
populated regions. In those cases, according to the property rights approach, other 
solutions would be preferable. For instance, point C. Here, the property rights theory 
would also approve of methods of resolution which improve the inhabitants’ 
situation at the expense of the farmer, under the premise of a social net benefit sur-
plus in comparison to A. This could be true with respect to the implementation 
of cultivating standards any government might impose on farmers. Such conditions 
could be formulated in a way that inhabitants’ preferences concerning the cultural 
landscape in terms of the field size or the selection of crops might be considered, 
but farmers do not receive adequate compensation for the additional costs they 
have to bear, and therefore the farmers’ utility shrinks. 
The latter solution would be rejected by the constitutional economics theory since 
its approach applies strictly to the consensus of all individuals involved. As shown 
in Figure 2-2-3, the consensus criterion approves only Pareto-superior solutions, 
that is, solutions that are located in the northeast direction of the dashed lines. 
Hence, a solution based on the consensus of all involved individuals requires an 
improvement of all individuals and, therefore, not only a hypothetical compensa-
tion but also a factual one. If forced to alter their crop structure or obliged to plant 
hedges in order to meet inhabitants’ preferences, farmers, would need to receive ade-
quate compensation. Exemplary measures which might cause policy changes towards 
the Pareto-superior area are CAP agri-environmental programs (see CEC, 2005). Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Agri-environmental programs compensate farmers who admit to producing beyond 
relevant mandatory standards to achieve additional environmental objectives. Further 
measures are compensatory payments for farmers who produce under certain obli-
gations in water protection areas. 
In conclusion, using the example of cultural landscape, both the property rights 
theory and the constitutional economics theory consider problems of lacking public 
goods provision in rural areas to be interaction problems. In contrast to the welfare 
economics theory, they neither adhere to the state as the only method of resolution 
nor do they neglect the importance of institutional arrangements in coordinating 
individuals’ behavior. In particular, the latter fact constitutes a necessary precondi-
tion for analyzing rural development policies of the new rural paradigm. As dis-
cussed in Section 1, policy measures of the new paradigm often cover decentralized 
forms of coordination and participation between many different actors, from local 
governments, local associations, enterprises, and farmers to individual persons. 
Hence, the welfare economics theory, which only distinguishes between markets 
and state, and does not include institutions in its theoretical framework, will not be 
adequate to analyze the multifaceted, formal and informal institutional arrange-
ments which facilitate local and regional interaction between rural actors aiming 
to provide different public goods.  
However, the weakness of the property rights theory lies in its avoidance of norma-
tive assumptions: the theory, which has a strong positive, explanatory power on 
interaction problems, avoids elaborating a normative criterion, which allows a more 
theory-guided evaluation of institutional arrangements or policy reforms. By recur-
ring on the criterion of social net benefit surplus, COASE builds on the possibility 
of the hypothetical compensation of individuals. This, however, is inconsistent 
with normative individualism, which assumes that any evaluation of a situation 
or institution can only be made based on the assessment of single individuals 
themselves. Hence, constitutional economics seems to be the most capable theory 
for analyzing lacking public goods provision in rural areas. Due to the distinc-
tion between rules (institutions) and moves (individual behavior) the impact of 
institutional arrangements in the status quo on the concerned individuals can be 
analyzed positively. In addition, the consensus criterion enables a normative analy-
sis of institutional arrangements. Policy reforms, therefore, would only be regarded 
as preferable if all individuals involved approved the latter. Hence, the analysis 
should focus on Pareto-superior rules instead of Pareto-efficient outcomes.  
However, as the critics above illustrate, the factual consensus of all involved 
individuals is often combined with high decision-making costs and might lead in 
some cases to the continuation of the status quo. Therefore, BUCHANAN mainly 
applied the unanimity rule to meta-rules regarding constitutional decisions in a 
society. In rural development issues, however, mainly regional and local decisions 
in formal or informal bodies are relevant. Can we also apply the consensus criterion 
to such local institutional arrangements in rural areas? Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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The normative institutional economics theory, which is to a large extent an offset of 
the constitutional economics theory, aims to make the consensus criterion appli-
cable to sub-constitutional decisions. The next section introduces the normative 
institutional economics theory and presents its heuristic – the heuristic of the social 
dilemma – as a methodological framework to illustrate and analyze interaction 
problems in public goods provision in rural areas.  
2.2.5 Normative  institutional  economics theory and the social dilemma as 
a method of analyzing local public good problems in rural areas 
Normative institutional economics, the main representatives of which are HOMANN 
and SUCHANEK (2005) and PIES (2000), is in line with BUCHANAN (1990 [2002]) 
on the distinction between rules and moves. Institutional analysis of the normative 
institutional economics theory also proceeds on the basis of positive and normative 
analysis. The positive portion still regards actors as rational, profit-maximizing 
agents and analyzes their behavior under certain rules, mainly with recourse to 
methods applied in the new institutional economics theory (NIE) such as the prin-
cipal-agent approach, moral hazard or adverse selection (for publications with 
applied examples, see PETRICK and PIES, 2007, p. 263-269 and PIES, 2000). Norma-
tive analysis is strictly based on the unanimity rule of the constitutional economics 
theory. However, normative institutional economics not only focuses on constitu-
tional rules, it also attempts to apply the consensus criterion to sub-constitutional 
decisions.  
According to PIES (1996, p. 28) the consensus criterion can always be applied to 
decisions if the chosen level of reconstruction is abstract enough. This is because 
"[i]n every society its very existence meets general agreement" (ibid., p. 28). The 
foundation of a society is always based on exchange processes which are made by 
implicit consensus. That is, in their efforts to escape from the Hobbesian jungle, 
individuals choose to constrain their own behavior as part of an exchange. Hence, 
as explained previously, individuals sacrifice restrictions on their own actions in 
return for benefits anticipated from reciprocal restrictions on the actions of others 
with whom they interact in a society. However, only the unanimous agreement 
on rules enables individuals to exploit mutual gains from social cooperation. Or, to 
put it another way, without paying the cost of accepting restrictions on my own 
behavior (in terms of approving different formal or informal rules), I cannot 
benefit from social cooperation. 
Apart from this abstract level, according to normative institutional economics, 
the consensus criterion can always be applied to situations genuinely resulting from 
interaction problems. For this purpose it is necessary to focus on relevant alter-
natives that emerge for all individuals kept in an interaction problem. This can be 
done by the social dilemma heuristic, which constitutes the paradigmatic core of 
the normative institutional economics theory.  Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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The literature describes social dilemmas as situations in which individual rationality 
leads to collective irrationality (KOLLOCK, 1998, p. 183). The social dilemma is 
an archetypical example of the disjuncture between individual and group rationality, 
where individual rationality leads to a strictly Pareto-inferior outcome (SNIDAL, 
1985, p. 926). That is, an outcome which is preferred by every individual less than 
at least one other outcome (TAYLOR, 1987, p.18). DAWES (1980, p. 170) emphasizes 
two important characteristics of social dilemmas: First, the social payoff to each 
individual for defecting behavior is higher than the payoff for co-operative behavior 
regardless of what the other society members do. And second, all individuals in 
the society receive a lower payoff if all defect compared to the situation where 
all cooperate.  
Figure 2-3 illustrates the lacking provision of local public goods as a social  
dilemma situation. Members of a rural community plan to provide a local public 
good. The good is characterized by joint supply and consumption and there is no 
possibility of excluding single community members from consumption. An inhabi-
tant A has the choice of whether to not-contribute to the good's provision, which 
would lead to an absence of the good if every inhabitant does not contribute. A’s 
payoffs are given on the left-hand side of each quadrant in the matrix, whereas 
the payoffs of the other inhabitants are given on the right-hand side. The best case 
for individual A emerges if all other inhabitants contribute to the public good's 
provision and he does not (quadrant IV). In contrast, all other contributors prefer 
quadrant I, whereas individual A would be in the worst position. However, since 
each inhabitant anticipates that other inhabitants will not contribute, the public 
good will not be provided (quadrant III). This situation is equivalent to the Nash 
equilibrium of low returns for all. Otherwise, were every inhabitant to have con-
tributed to the good's provision, a Pareto-superior outcome for all might have 
been possible (see quadrant II). However, this is not individually rational. That 
is, the individual is caught in a social dilemma by the nature of the situation.  
Figure 2-3:  Public goods provision as a social dilemma 
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Source:  Author's depiction.  
Let us now look at the above described situation explicitly by way of positive 
analysis. Within the positive analysis it should be identified whether and to what 
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of the actors to social cooperation (PIES, 1996, p. 27). As discussed above, indi-
viduals caught in a social dilemma behave rationally by choosing that move which 
from the individual perspective provides them with the highest benefits. For a better 
understanding, let us look at the difference between a private good trade on markets 
and the situation in Figure 2-3. In a private good trade the explicit agreement bet-
ween two persons, a buyer and a seller, is required to enable exchange. But exchange 
will only take place if both market participants were better off after the exchange 
than prior to it. Hence, the expected profits from exchange, in turn, enable the com-
mon agreement on that exchange.  
If we consider a situation where two or more persons bargain for their individual 
contribution to the provision of a good they plan to use in common (see Figure 2-3), 
there are many inhabitants who are all interested in the provision of a certain public 
good. Although each person of the group may recognize that he would benefit 
from the public goods provision, the good is not provided. The reason for this 
behavior lies in the free-rider problem. As in the two-person market trade where 
an individual would only offer a good if he can rely on the other’s offering due 
to a common formal or informal agreement, in the situation depicted in Figure 2-3 a 
common agreement on rules channeling the exchange is also needed. However, in 
this situation one could always benefit more if the other inhabitants contributed to 
the public goods provision while he enjoyed a free-ride at their expense (quadrant I 
and IV). However, just the fact that potential free-riders could exist in the com-
munity may dissuade others from contributing voluntarily (BUCHANAN, 1971 [2002], 
p. 13). Even a person who might not himself consider taking a free-ride may defect 
by refusing his contribution if others are observed doing so. Hence, nobody will 
provide any contribution and all inhabitants are worse off, as the good will not be 
provided. 
Here we come to the normative part of the analysis. We must ask: How can poten-
tial gains from cooperation be realized by way of institutional reform (PETRICK 
and PIES, 2007, p. 256)? Or considering the problem of public goods provision, 
how can institutional arrangements be modified by way of institutional reform to 
persuade all individuals involved to jointly contribute to the public goods provi-
sion?  
With respect to the social dilemma in Figure 2-3 we ask the involved inhabitants, it 
does not matter if they are a potential free-rider or not, whether they would prefer 
the common defection of all inhabitants, which would lead to the absence of the 
local public good over a common cooperation where every inhabitant is forced to 
contribute? Of course nobody would prefer the first case, as free-riders also depend 
on others’ contribution to the public good. That is, all inhabitants, including the 
potential free-riders, would be worse off in the first case (quadrant III) compared 
to a situation where everyone can rely on the individual contribution of every 
inhabitant (quadrant II). Hence, all individuals involved, since only the common 
contribution to the public goods provision would leave everyone better off, have Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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an interest in an institutional arrangement that prevents free-riding. That is, there is 
a unanimous acceptance of institutions which make exchange possible between the 
individuals involved in order to commonly exploit gains from trade. Exchange 
in this manner means that every inhabitant pays his contribution, as he can be 
sure that all the others will do so as well. Only based on the exchange of all in-
dividuals’ contribution can mutual gains from trade be exploited. Or, as PETRICK 
(2005, p. 93) maintains: "…the opportunity of mutual improvements creates a 
basis for consensus and a common interest in regulation."  
The conceptual contribution of the social dilemma heuristic should be summarized 
as follows (PETRICK, 2005, p. 92-93): 
•  The rational behavior of individuals prevents a Pareto-superior solution. 
In a social dilemma the behavior of actors is always mutually dependent and, 
therefore, the latter have only partial control over outcomes. Mutual advantage 
can only be realized by way of cooperation.  
•  In a social dilemma there are unexploited gains from cooperation. To facili-
tate cooperation, the interaction of individual behavior has to be analyzed. 
It is the lack of information about other peoples’ willingness to cooperate 
which leads to free-riding behavior and therefore an exploitation of moral 
behavior. 
•  The exogenous variables in the social dilemma heuristic are the individual 
payoffs, which serve as control variables for policy action. Attainable institu-
tional arrangements have to be identified, which allow the realization of 
gains from cooperation. 
•  The opportunity of mutual improvements due to exchange creates the basis 
for consensus on rules, which facilitate such exchange. Hence, individuals 
must in fact gain from an institutional arrangement and must rely on the co-
operation of all others. 
To conclude, in Section 2.2 I have shown, by means of constitutional economics 
theory and the property rights theory, that the lacking provision of local public goods 
can be ascribed to interactional problems between all local inhabitants involved in 
the provision and consumption of their goods. In contrast to the welfare economics 
theory, both theories take the existence of institutions into consideration. The con-
stitutional economics theory, however, is the only theory which builds on a distinc-
tion between rules and moves. The latter fact allows a recurrence to a normative 
criterion for policy analysis, which is in accordance with normative individualism, 
whereas the property rights theory still refers to the offsetting of commonly received 
benefits and commonly shared costs, and disregards individual assent.  
However, although the constitutional economics theory is well-equipped for the 
analysis of constitutional rules, the consensus criterion can hardly be applied to all 
decisions made on a local or regional level regarding rural development initiatives. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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The factual consent of inhabitants on all local decisions made on local public 
goods provision will often lead to enormous decision-making costs and an absence 
of those decisions. Here, the normative institutional economics theory builds on 
the same foundations as constitutional economics but provides a more application-
orientated use of the consensus criterion. By using the social dilemma heuristic, 
normative institutional economics attempts to make the consensus criterion not 
just applicable to constitutional decision-making but also to interaction problems 
that hamper individuals from exploiting gains from cooperation in everyday life. 
All relevant individual incentives are taken into account, even those resulting from 
institutional arrangements in which the concerning individuals operate. Therefore, 
the social dilemma heuristic allows us to break down local public good problems 
into relevant alternatives that can be unanimously chosen by all the involved 
individuals. Relevant alternatives will find consensus between the involved indi-
viduals if they enable the latter to overcome the concerning interaction problem by 
facilitating mutual gains from exchange. Hence, the social dilemma heuristic not 
only extracts the conflicting interests of the agents involved but shows, in particular, 
their common interests. Based on the common interest in mutual gains from trade, a 
consensus on the relevant rules (institutional arrangements) which facilitate ex-
change between all parties is possible. However, by means of the social dilemma 
heuristic, the number of individuals involved in the decision-making process is 
reduced to the number of persons who are affected by the public goods problem. 
Due to the limited focus on the individuals affected by the decisions made con-
cerning the public goods problem, the objections made by SEN (1970) and KOLLER 
(1987) discussed above would not apply, since they focus on situations where all 
inhabitants of a society need to make decisions based on individual assent. 
Based on the social dilemma heuristic, the normative institutional economics 
theory provides an analytical framework capable of analyzing interaction problems 
of local public goods provision in rural areas. Rural development problems are 
not perceived as allocational problems; they are reconstructed as coordination 
and interaction problems. Institutions as mechanisms of coordinating individual 
behavior come to the fore. Thus, it is now possible to analyze rural development 
problems from an institutional perspective that focuses mainly on situational 
incentives that individuals face in certain institutional arrangements. The social 
dilemma heuristic allows us to analyze the incentives that different institutional 
arrangements in rural areas provide and which simultaneously prevent and facilitate 
cooperation among local inhabitants. Policy reform, which aims to overcome 
interaction problems, is designed to explicitly seek the assent of all individuals 
involved. However, consensus implies that all parties involved obtain a factual 
improvement of their situation, which is solely possible due to an exploitation of 
mutual gains from trade. Through its use of the unanimity requirement, the norma-
tive institutional economics theory avoids a comparison of individual utility 
functions, as it regards individual preferences as the only source of values. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Finally, in the empirical analysis of rural development problems I will investigate, 
from the perspective of positive analysis, which institutions/institutional arrange-
ments or the lack of institutions/institutional arrangements, hamper rural inhabitants 
from contributing jointly to the provision of certain local public goods. From the 
perspective of normative analysis, I will analyze whether policy measures of the 
new rural paradigm will find individual assent. That is, individuals would only 
agree on the implementation of those policy measures if it leads to a situation 
where all individuals involved in a public goods problem are able to improve 
their benefits. Thus, policy measures of the new rural paradigm will be analyzed with 
respect to its capability of facilitating the creation of institutions/institutional arran-
gements which provide local public goods based on the joint contributions of all 
individuals involved in the public good problem. Joint contributions are here simi-
lar to exchange between all involved individuals, since an individual exchanges 
his/her contribution in return for benefits anticipated from all other members’ 
contributions. Hence, policy measures can be assessed as preferable if the latter 
contribute to the implementation of institutional arrangements which enable in-
habitants to exploit gains from cooperation/exchange. The individual improvement 
of all inhabitants involved meets with the agreement of all parties involved in the 
public good problem. However, what do these institutional arrangements look like? 
Answering this question requires an analysis of mechanisms that avoid interac-
tion problems. That is, institutional arrangements which facilitate the provision of 
local public goods based on joint contributions must consist of elements capable of 
coordinating individual interaction. BOWLES (2004, pp. 473-501) presents three 
governance structures which constitute the basis of economic interaction among 
individuals and which all provide elements that are capable of coordinating:  
exchange/interaction between individuals; the privatization of goods and resources 
leading to a market-based allocation; governmental action via legal regulation or 
taxation; and community management based on close local relationships among 
inhabitants of a certain region. If these three governance structures characterize 
the basic elements of successful individual interaction, they must also constitute 
the basic elements of institutional arrangements that facilitate the joint provision 
of local public goods in rural areas. Therefore, before I can go into the empirical 
research to analyze institutional arrangements capable of coordinating individual 
interaction in public goods problems, I have to examine the three governance 
structures mentioned above. This I will do in the following section. 
2.3 Three  governance  structures facilitating exchange among  
individuals 
"In modern terms, there could be coordination failure, where individual’s failure 
to coordinate complementary changes in their actions leads to a state of affairs 
that is worse for everyone than some alternative state of affairs that is also an 
equilibrium. The obstacle to achieving the better state of affairs is not a matter Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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of technological opportunities (or even knowledge of those opportunities), nor 
resources of preferences, but only of coordination," (HOFF, 2000, p. 147). 
What HOFF (2000) terms coordination failure are interaction problems between 
individuals that I have analyzed more closely based on the social dilemma heuristic 
in the last section. As discussed above, interaction problems can be overcome by 
means of institutions or institutional arrangements that channel individual behavior 
to make exchange and, hence, the exploitation of gains from exchange/cooperation 
possible. However, what do these institutional arrangements which facilitate ex-
change between individuals look like? In the last section I mentioned three gover-
nance structures which assist, according to BOWLES (2004) and others (see e.g. 
KIKUCHI, FUJITA and HAYAMI, 2001), individuals in coordinating their individual 
behavior.  
In the following, I will present both advantages and disadvantages of the three 
governance structures with respect to their impact on individual interaction prob-
lems. Furthermore, in the real world and especially in rural development processes, 
we often find institutional arrangements that are not purely based on only one of 
these governance structures. Thus, as we will see in Chapter 4, rural development 
initiatives often comprise characteristics of markets, governmental action, and 
community governance, and they particularly benefit from the co-action of these 
three structures. However, first I will describe the three governance structures’ 
characteristics and discuss their impact on public goods provision.  
2.3.1  Market approach and privatization 
In a market-based relationship, the interaction of rational, profit-maximizing in-
dividuals is coordinated by the price mechanism. Prices assure all participants on 
competitive markets that the terms of exchange are equitable (OUCHI, 1980, p. 130). 
Competitive markets induce individuals to express their preferences, as the price at 
which they are willing to purchase a good reveals what would otherwise be private 
information, namely, the value the individual attaches to the good (BOWLES, 2004, 
p. 485). The same is true for producers. On competitive markets, producers have 
no incentive to misrepresent their productive capabilities since the provision of 
their products on the market at prices not equal to the marginal costs offers them 
lower profits than other producers, whose prices reveal the actual production costs. 
Hence, as von HAYEK (1945, p. 521) asserts in the tradition of Adam Smith, the 
competitive market reveals private information that every individual possesses 
and whose use would be beneficial for all individuals of a community, region or 
even nation
6. 
                                                 
6  "[P]ractically every individual has some advantages over all others in that he possesses 
unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only 
if the decisions depending on it are left to him or made with his active cooperation," (HAYEK, 
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The market order on competitive markets further provides an effective mechanism 
to impede collusion between actors in situations where those voluntary agreements 
are not socially beneficial. Furthermore, markets also offer what biologists call 
selection pressure. That is, due to their decentralized and relatively incorruptible 
disciplining mechanism, market competition "punishes the inept and rewards high 
performers" (BOWLES, 2004, p. 486; PIES, 2001, pp. 155-176). 
Since markets are able to coordinate the profit-maximizing efforts of individuals, 
one means of overcoming the abovementioned interaction problems in public 
good matters is through market-based provision resulting from privatization. In a 
market-based provision of a public good, the price mechanism forces the providers 
to respond to the individual consumer preferences and to sell the good according 
to its actual production costs. However, privatization of public goods also requires 
a detailed definition or redefinition of property rights on the concerned resources 
or goods. In cases where property rights are not defined and contracts between 
market participants are incomplete or hard to enforce, market-based exchanges 
will also exhibit some weaknesses, as AKERLOF (1970) and WILLIAMSON (1985) 
show. Furthermore, in some cases a detailed definition of property rights is not 
possible or even desirable. For example, with respect to different classical public 
goods like external defense or internal defense and law enforcement, BUCHANAN 
(1971 [2002]) shows that simple property rights regimes can be inefficient com-
pared to collective action, since it would cost a single individual much more to 
pay a security service to watch over his property than to find a solution based on 
collective action. 
There are also various other cases where pure privatization may not solve the con-
cerned interaction problems. One example is the public education system, where 
the privatization of public schools might reduce equal opportunities in education 
for children of different social classes. However, competition between schools 
could still be improved by a voucher system. That is, the state could implement a 
system which provides parents with financial support for the private purchase of 
education vouchers applicable to all schools meeting public standards (OSTROM 
and OSTROM, 1977, p. 31). Thus, the voucher system would increase competition 
between schools without reducing the children’s right of equal opportunities. 
Furthermore, in other sectors it might also be favorable to improve competition 
when privatization itself does not lead to commonly desired results. This is true with 
respect to the privatization of enterprises that produce natural monopoly products or 
services. Privatizing those enterprises would enable private owners to charge higher-
than-competitive prices, which may lead to results that are not commonly desired 
(for an overview, see, e.g. VICKERS and YARROW, 1991 or WARNER and HEFETZ, 
2003). Hence, VICKERS and YARROW (1991, p. 118) conclude that competitive con-
ditions and regulatory policies are as important as the ownership of an enterprise. 
However, rules and regulations necessary to enforce and maintain competition Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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can only be enforced by the state or other forms of collective action responsible 
for a certain area or sector. 
TIEBOUT (1956) introduces the further possibility of implementing competition, 
namely the idea that jurisdictions compete for individuals. In his opinion, individuals 
are free to choose their jurisdiction, whereas the latter offer them various tax and 
local public goods packages. The mobility of residents, therefore, is the mechanism 
which should guarantee that public service outcomes closely match individual 
preferences and local taxes are supposed to act as market prices (OSTROM et al., 
(1993, p. 183). Hence, by "voting with their feet," persons or firms can select that 
jurisdiction which best serves their preferences. However, according to BARDHAN 
(1996) and OSTROM et al. (1993) these assumptions hardly match real-world 
conditions. As they argue, most residents who plan to change their jurisdiction, are 
confronted with problems like selling their recent properties. OLSON (1969, p. 483) 
also discusses the problem of spillover effects; he assesses that the provision of 
different local goods also requires different sized institutions that produce local 
public goods efficiently. Thus, it is already difficult to define a certain size for 
jurisdictions before bringing them into competition. Further limitations are seen 
in finding adequate public choice mechanisms and ways to provide local taxes for 
funding local public goods, as well as its implications for housing and rental markets 
(PETRICK, 2007b). WARNER and HEFETZ (2003, p. 715) also argue that competi-
tion between jurisdictions will have its limits. They argue that rural and urban 
jurisdictions exhibit strong structural differences, which can hardly be overcome 
without some sort of redistribution on the regional or national level.  
However, although TIEBOUT’s (1956) model contains great problems, it provides 
an opportunity to discuss approaches that do not necessarily require a redefinition 
of property rights, but which nevertheless increase competition between producers 
of local public goods regardless of whether the producers are private persons or 
common local initiatives. 
2.3.2 Government  regulation 
In contrast to private individuals, governments are able to attenuate interaction 
problems between actors "by their ability to allow and often compel individuals 
to interact cooperatively in situations where non-cooperative interactions are 
inefficient," (BOWLES, 2004, p. 486). Hence, regulation often occurs when contracts 
are incomplete and difficult to enforce, as seen in the case of information asymme-
tries
7. To solve interaction problems by facilitating exchange, collective action is 
                                                 
7  Insurance markets are often cited as an example of market failure due to information asym-
metries: "An example involving the availability of some kinds of insurance illustrates this 
principle. Before they have learned the capacities, health status, and the special risks they 
face as individuals, all members of a population might prefer to purchase insurance. But after 
they have learned their own special position, those with a low probability of collecting on Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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often needed to: (1) ensure competition on markets; (2) establish and protect 
property rights; (3) enforce quality standards for products and evaluate and audit 
the latter; and (4) provide a market order which regulates exchange between indi-
viduals. These tasks can best be accomplished by institutions or institutional ar-
rangements which possess some legitimate coercive power. In a democratic society 
this coercive power is incumbent upon the state (AOKI and HAYAMI, 2000, p. XVI).  
Causes for public intervention can also lead to more efficient outcomes in the 
case of what OSTROM and OSTROM (1977) call the "problem of regulating patterns 
of use". For example, when multiple uses of a certain public good or a common 
property resource occur, one pattern of use may drive out other patterns of use. 
Particular situations appear in association with the use of public places or state-
owned resources in rural areas where the contamination of those resources caused 
by a resident may reduce or prohibit the possibility of other inhabitants using the 
resource for recreational purposes or for tourism activities. Hence, the contami-
nation of the resource by a single resident can reduce the efforts of other residents 
to cultivate and maintain the resource significantly, since recreational usage is no 
longer possible. Finally, the resource will be deteriorated as the parties affected by 
the contamination are not authorized to enforce sanctions against the contaminator. 
Therefore, "[j]ointness of use under conditions of partial subtractability may require 
rules for ordering patterns of use so as to reduce potential conflicts among different 
uses […]" (OSTROM and OSTROM, 1977, p. 32). Here, the state has comparative 
advantages in the production of rules to reduce potential conflicts due to the imple-
mentation of regulations (BOWLES, 2004, p. 486).  
Governmental action also has advantages over markets with respect to the provi-
sion of public infrastructure. The market-based provision of public infrastructure is 
often combined with free-riding, which eventually leads to the absence of such 
facilities. The state, in contrast, is allowed to collect taxes and can therefore provide 
those facilities out of its own budget. Furthermore, the state often has easier access 
to the scientific knowledge needed to plan and construct public facilities, or it may 
shoulder some larger investments that are impossible to fund solely on the commu-
nity level. Also important is the state’s ability to coordinate in the face of spillovers 
across several jurisdictions and mobilize people due to financial or other incen-
tives to take part in local development processes (BARDHAN, 2002, p. 203).  
However, governmental action also contains some flaws. Thus, in some cases 
public-financed infrastructure beneficiaries are unable to directly influence certain 
budget decisions. Hence, bureaucrats or politicians who decide on the budget for 
                                                                                                                                                          
the insurance will not be willing to purchase it since they would be subsidizing those with 
a high probability of collecting. Thus the low-risk people would drop out of the market and 
the price of the insurance would be too high for the high-risk people. […] By providing the 
insurance and compelling all agents to pay for it, the state overcomes this market failure," 
(BOWLES, 2004, p. 487). Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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a certain public good often do not meet the optimal level of expenditure due to the 
lack of knowledge of local circumstances. OSTROM et al. (1993, p. 50) emphasize 
that knowledge of local social and physical environment characteristics, human 
and physical capital or existing institutional arrangements are necessary to respond 
to local needs and existing conditions. Information on local circumstances are cate-
gorized by von HAYEK (1945, p. 524) as knowledge of time and place. Indeed, the 
availability of information may have an immense impact on the costs of public 
goods provision. BARDHAN (1996, p. 140) claims that: "Local information can 
often identify cheaper and more appropriate ways of providing public services, 
apart from getting a better fit for locally diverse preferences." 
A further problem with respect to governmental action in public good provision 
lies in the separation of individual costs from individual benefits. Beneficiaries 
often do not feel the actual costs and may therefore use the public good inade-
quately or do not contribute to its maintenance as much as needed to realize an 
adequate economical life of the good. Furthermore, governmental authorities who 
decide on the quality and quantity of public goods often depend on voting mecha-
nisms. However, voting mechanisms do not automatically translate diverse citizen 
preferences into a well-defined preference order for a variety of public goods in 
a community, and citizens also usually vote for officials who make many decisions 
regarding the provision of different goods and services. 
Another problem of particular importance for transition and developing countries is 
rent-seeking behavior
8 (HAYAMI, 1989, p. 10). Rent-seeking behavior could emerge 
if decisions were made by national, regional or local governments concerning 
the kind of public services or the nature and location of public facilities. "Rent-
seeking makes the productivity of any particular investment secondary to the 
private gains of the rent seeker," (OSTROM, et al. 1993, p. 96).  
One problem associated with governmental action is commonly known as the burden 
of bureaucracy. BUCHANAN (1971, p. 33) mentions that there is often a large barrier 
between collective decisions and final governmental or collective actions. The 
reason for this delay often lies in the fact that bureaucrats also act in a self-interested 
manner and try to preserve their own carrier prospects. Since power or prestige 
tend to be directly related to the size of the workforce a bureaucrat supervises, 
bureaus or departments are often larger than what is necessary to fulfill their tasks 
and public sources are not always used to implement collective decisions as fast 
as possible (NISKANEN, 1971).  
There is also a large body of literature analyzing public goods provision by means of 
public enterprises (see e.g. SPANN, 1977; ALCHAIN and DEMSETZ, 1972; MEGGINSON 
and NETTER, 2001; VICKERS and YARROW, 1991; SHLEIFER, 1998). According to 
SPANN (1977), private companies often provide public goods more efficiently 
                                                 
8  For a more detailed discussion on rent-seeking behavior, please see KRUEGER (1974). Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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and closer to consumers’ needs than public enterprises do, since managers of pri-
vate enterprises face incentives that differ from managers of public enterprises. 
MEGGINSON and NETTER (2001, p. 330) mention that while managers of private 
companies mostly follow clearly defined goals like profits or shareholder-wealth 
maximization, managers of public enterprises often lack clearly-defined business 
objectives. This is why they are often confronted with bundles of political objec-
tives like securing high wages or a high level of employment, which can quickly 
change from one administration to the next and which are often not influenced 
by consumer demand but rather by political interest groups (SHAPIRO and WILLIG, 
1990). Furthermore, while privatized enterprises are forced to perform under cer-
tain budget constraints, public enterprises are often subsidized by governmental 
sources. In cases where the latter face bankruptcy, the state intervenes and there-
fore reduces managers’ willingness to constantly search for the most efficient means 
of production (MEGGINSON and NETTER, 2001, p. 331). Also, in order to maximize 
citizens’ votes, political decision-makers are able to enforce low prices for goods 
produced by public enterprises. Such prices, if they do not recover production costs, 
could in the long run lead to under-investment in public facilities (VICKERS and 
YARROW, 1991, p. 114). 
Finally, public provision may also drive out private contributions to the provision 
of public goods. ANDREONI and PAYNE (2003) found that private organizations 
which provide public goods would have significantly reduced their fundraising 
activities if they had received government grants. 
2.3.3 Community  governance 
A third governance structure capable of attenuating social dilemma situations is 
the community (AGRARWAL and GIBSON, 1999; OSTROM et al., 1993). As recent 
literature shows, interaction problems that emerge due to the joint consumption 
of public or commonly owned resources have often been overcome by community 
governance (BOWLES, 2004, pp. 489-93; BOWLES and GINTIS, 2002; OSTROM, 2005; 
SCOTT, 1998). AGRARWAL and GIBSON (1999, p. 634) posit that, "[i]f top-down 
programs to protect resources failed because of the inability of governments to 
exercise authority at a distance […] then decentralization of those social formation 
that are located near the resource might work better". A similar assessment is made 
by BOWLES (2004, p. 490): "Communities sometimes solve problems that both 
states and markets are ill-equipped to address, especially where the nature of the 
social interactions or the goods and services being transacted preclude complete 
contracting." 
A community, as HAYAMI (2004, p. 3) defines it, "is a group of people tied by mu-
tual trust based on intense personal interaction." While markets organize interaction 
between individuals through competition under market price signals, communities 
organize their interaction mainly on close personal relationships and mutual 
trust. Due to the repeated interactions of community members, rules or norms have Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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been endogenously generated which help the former to coordinate their activities 
(AOKI and HAYAMI, 2000, p. XVI). Community norms or rules are informal institu-
tions that guide community members toward achieving voluntary cooperation, 
e.g. in managing a common pool resource or in supplying local public goods. 
There are different aspects that favor communities in solving interaction problems.  
First, local residents interact regularly and more frequently with each other. They 
share the same geographic space (AGRARWAL and GIBSON, 1999, p. 634) and often 
have similar beliefs and values (TAYLOR, 1982, p. 26). This can strengthen coope-
ration and helps to build trust locally
9. Community governance also fosters and 
utilizes the incentives that people have traditionally deployed to regulate common 
activity, e.g. solidarity, reciprocity, reputation, personal pride, respect, vengeance, 
and retribution (BOWLES, 2004, p. 490). These local properties enable communities 
to overcome free-riding problems in terms of people who want to benefit from vio-
lating agreements or contracts which emerge on commercial markets (HAYAMI, 
2004, p. 3). COLEMAN (1988) further mentions norms emerging in collectivities as 
being institutions that lead actors to forgo self-interest and act in the interest of 
the collective. Those norms, reinforced by social support, status, honor, and other 
rewards, are often necessary to encourage people to work for public or collective 
matters or within social initiatives.  
Due to the common knowledge about the past behavior of community members, 
information asymmetries between local contractors can be attenuated. Communities 
are more apt to wield a range of positive and negative sanctions with great effec-
tiveness against free-riders, which might even boost cooperation
10. This gives 
AOKI and HAYAMI (2000, p. XVII) reason to assess that community relationships 
are often an important basis for market development, as they help community mem-
bers enforce contracts. To illustrate, Figure 2-4 displays the outcomes resulting 
from the sanctioning of non-co-operative behavior in local public goods provision. 
Here, non-cooperation is fined with four pay-off points. Because of these sanctions 
the pay-offs of individual A for non-contribution when all other inhabitants con-
tribute (Quadrant IV) are lower than the pay-offs he would have received if all 
inhabitants and he himself had contributed to the public good (Quadrant II). The 
same is true for all other inhabitants, since they would individually earn lower 
pay-offs if they defected and inhabitant A were to cooperate (Quadrant I), compared 
                                                 
9  D ASGUPTA (2003, p. 313) emphasizes the importance of regular interactions in terms of the 
constitution of trust between individuals: "You don't trust a person (or an agency) to do 
something merely because he says he will do it. You trust him only because, knowing what 
you know of his disposition, his available options and the consequences of his various pos-
sible actions, his knowledge base, ability, and so forth, you expect that he will choose to do it." 
10   TAYLOR (1988, p. 67) assesses that: "Community is important because it means that individual 
behaviour can more easily be monitored and because a strong community has at its disposal an 
array of powerful, positive and negative sanctions which are highly effective in maintaining 
social order."  Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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to the case, where all inhabitants cooperated with each other (Quadrant II). This is 
because the members of a local community can predict other inhabitants’ behavior. 
Here, every inhabitant constrains his behavior by acknowledging the sanction sys-
tem as a part of exchange in return for the benefits anticipated from reciprocal 
restrictions on the actions of others with whom he interacts in the community. 
Furthermore, that knowledge of other actors’ behavior in an interaction process and 
the existence of sanction mechanisms encourages people to cooperate and to main-
tain cooperation is also shown in different experimental studies (PAGE, PUTTERMAN 
and UNEL, 2005; FEHR and GÄCHTER, 2000).  
Figure 2-4:  Overcoming the free-rider problem regarding the provision of 
a local public good due to a mechanism of sanctions 
All other inhabitants:  





-1; 4 (-4) 
II 
3; 3  Inhabitant A: 
Contribute  
to the public good? Defect 
III 
 0 (-4); 0 (-4) 
IV 
4 (-4); -1 
Source: Author's  depiction. 
Second, public goods provision or common pool resource management on the 
local level relies on dispersed private information, which is unavailable for the state 
or large formal organizations (BOWLES, 2004, p. 490). Community management 
of a common pool resource or of public goods supply also eases access to infor-
mation about local preferences. This may lead to a precise response to local needs 
(OSTROM et al., 1993, p. 85). Close interactions often enable residents to monitor 
their own behavior and to make collective decisions on low costs. OSTROM et al. 
(1993, p. 78) mention that: "In very small groups those affected are usually able 
to discuss their preferences and constraints on a face-to-face basis and to reach a 
rough consensus." 
Third, community governance increases the accountability of actors for failures 
in public goods provision. Also, representatives of the local government, which are 
often involved in community activities, have strong incentives to keep some of their 
constituents (in order to secure their re-election) and will therefore try to provide 
public goods and services for local inhabitants as adequately as possible. Further-
more, local representatives attempt to keep themselves informed about changing 
preferences in their community (OSTROM et al., 1993, p. 181). 
In addition to these unique capacities of community governance, there are limits 
and disadvantages of community management. For example, community manage-
ment is based on personal and durable contacts that require a relatively small group Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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(BOWLES and GINTIS, 2002; GREIF, 2000, p. 4; AOKI and HAYAMI, 2000, p. XVIII). 
In general, strong and intense relations between community members also build 
strong entry barriers, and this smallness and homogeneity might hamper communi-
ties from exploiting gains from trade and economic diversity (BOWLES, 2004, p. 491). 
On this topic, AOKI and HAYAMI (2000, p. XVIII) mention that an outcome from 
competition within a small group is naturally inferior to that evolving in a market 
with a large number of participants. Moreover, mutual trust among community 
members often provides a basis for collusion, which suppresses competition even 
within the group. And finally, the small size of communities will also, to some 
extent, prevent municipalities from realizing large investments in certain public 
goods
11.  
As many different studies show, it is difficult to find communities that comprise 
just one group of individuals. This fact implies a need for institutions that enable 
different interest groups to discuss their various points of view. An absence of such 
institutions often results in conflicts between different interest groups, which may 
constitute developmental barriers for small municipalities (AGRARWAL and GIBSON, 
1999; STREECK and SCHMITTER, 1985). Additionally, in small communities local 
political elites can also achieve monopoly or monopsony positions that enable the 
latter to profit at the expense of poorly organized groups. 
2.3.4  The three governance structures as complements in institutional  
arrangements 
All three governance structures are endowed with different elements capable of 
attenuating interaction problems in public goods provision. In three different ways 
markets, the state, and communities enforce exchanges between individuals that 
enable the latter to realize gains from cooperation. The three modes of exchange 
enforcement are depicted in Table 2-4. Exchange on markets is mostly linked to 
contracts between market participants, whereas the formality of contracts depends 
on the availability of a legal (market) order. The market price has two purposes. 
On the one hand, it is a precondition for the exchange itself, since without the 
possibility of negotiating a market price or the existence of a market price, indi-
viduals would have no incentive to exchange. On the other hand, it provides 
relevant information that market participants use to decide whether they enter into 
an exchange or not. In exchange processes where market prices are difficult to 
arrive at, e.g. in the case of public goods, the state is able to enforce contracts by 
its coercive power. In situations where the price does not reflect the actual value 
of the good, the individuals involved in the exchange make their decision about 
                                                 
11  This is especially true for many Eastern European Countries. As NAM and PARSCHE (2001, 
p. 161) assess, the small size municipalities, which were created, e.g. in Poland in the early 
1990s, "quite often limited the expansion of local economic base for generating own revenues 
and hindered the realization of economics of scale in collecting municipal tax revenues and 
providing public goods and services." Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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entering it depending on the availability of formal rules, regulation and standards. 
The latter rules enable the concerned individuals to anticipate the behavior of the 
exchange partner before the exchange has taken place. Exchange between commu-
nity members, in contrast, is strongly embedded in intense relationships or even 
networks. Community members exchange goods or resources based on informal 
contracts, whereas the handover of a good from, e.g. exchange partner I to ex-
change partner II does not require an immediate response from exchange partner II. 
In this situation, exchange partner I can be sure that exchange partner II will re-
spond to his action in the near or not-too-distant future. The certainty regarding 
the response of exchange partner II results from the existence of social control 
and trust between community members. Only because of the fact that the exchange 
partners are subject to an informal social control system and are concerned about 
their reputation in the community can the exchange be enforced. However, to make 
these exchanges take place, trust, social, and local proximity, shared values or 
informal rules are basic requirements that will enable exchange partners to an-
ticipate the behavior of others.  
Table 2-4:  Enforcement of exchange between individuals 
  Ways of enforcing  







Market (Formal)  contracts  
depending on the avail 
ability of a legal (market) 
order 
Market price   
State   Coercive power based 
on legitimate authority 
Rules, regulations,  
standards 
 
Community Social  control   Social/local proximity, 
trust, shared values,  
informal rules 
 
Source:  Author’s depiction, modified from OUCHI (1980, p. 137). 
Finally, as the last column shows, from markets to state to community, the ano-
nymity among exchange partners continuously decreases. In a globalized world 
(we take the most liberal case) individuals from countries all over the world, with-
out showing their identity, are able to contract only on the basis of a market price that 
reflects the value of the good. Governmental enforcement in exchange processes 
requires a citizenship of the concerned exchange partners, whereas their personal 
characteristics or their social background do not matter at all since all citizens should 
be treated the same. Exchange between community members, in contrast, strongly 
depends on personal characteristics, their social background, their local reputation, 
et cetera.  Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Table 2-5 summarizes the disadvantages and advantages of all three governance 
structures. The depiction is based on a strong distinction of the three approaches, 
as was often proposed in the literature. The contradictions between markets and state 
or governments (for discussion, see CHRISTY (1996) and OSTROM (1990, p. 17-19)) 
or between markets and communities (for discussion, see GREIF (2000) and AOKI 
and HAYAMI (2000)), can be found in many different publications. However, all the 
mentioned authors also reach the conclusion that these governance structures, 
whether it is market and state or market and community, should not be seen as sub-
stitutes, but rather as complementary. For example, markets would only be able to 
reach commonly desired outcomes if a market order existed that was reached by 
non-market decisions (OSTROM, 1990, p. 19). And solutions for interaction prob-
lems based on market relations would only emerge if commonly accepted property 
rights were established by the coercive power of the state. But on the other hand, 
bureaucracies would work more efficiently if (market) competition between dif-
ferent administrations or jurisdictions existed. 
Communities, in contrast, often constitute a precondition for functioning markets. 
As GREIF (2000, p. 5) assesses, communities enable the operation of markets, or 
as AOKI and HAYAMI (2000, p. XV) argue,: "[…] markets and community norms 
may sometimes be complementary rather than substitutes, in that the presence of 
the latter may facilitate the development of markets, just as the state may some-
times enhance the ability of the private sector to coordinate through markets." 
This is, e.g. the case in farmers’ associations as well as farmers’ access to credits 
from local money lenders. Here, due to personal relations between farmers and 
the moneylender, as well as the existence of a social control system, contracts 
between the latter parties were enforced. HAYAMI (2004, p. 15) further asserts 
that it is also necessary and a basic condition for the effective use of community 
relationships to maintain contestable markets, since otherwise community rela-
tionship could provide a mechanism for developing a monopoly that would only 
benefit local political elites. Communities can also benefit from the state. The 
latter, e.g. may encourage community development by contributing to larger 
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As we have seen, markets, the state and communities should be treated as comple-
mentary with respect to the development of institutional arrangements capable of 
attenuating interaction problems between individuals. That is, the interaction prob-
lems which often lead to a lacking provision of local public goods cannot in most 
cases be solved solely through the impact of one of these three governance struc-
tures. A successful provision of local public goods in rural areas requires institutional 
arrangements which constitute a synergy of market approaches, government regu-
lation, and community management. Only a joint action of elements from these 
three governance structures may force individuals to contribute to the provision 
of the concerned goods.  
2.4 Summary 
This chapter aimed to make some contributions to the elaboration of an analytical 
framework for analyzing rural development policy measures of the new rural 
paradigm. In Chapter 1, I hypothesized that rural development problems result, 
to a large extent, from a lacking provision of various local public goods, which 
lastingly influence the social and economic development of rural regions. In 
Section 2.1, after presenting the taxonomy of public goods in rural areas, I illus-
trated four local public goods to demonstrate their importance for local eco-
nomic growth in rural areas.  
In Section 2.2 I presented the welfare economics, the property rights, and the con-
stitutional economics theory with respect to their suggestions on public goods pro-
vision. In these theoretical considerations, the problem design each theory applies 
to the lacking public goods provision was shown and the normative criterion each 
theory uses to decide about the desirability of different methods of resolution of 
public good problems were discussed. The theoretical concept of the welfare eco-
nomics theory seems to be unfeasible for analyzing rural development policies, 
as it neglects the existence of institutions in principle. But in particular, rural deve-
lopment measures of the new paradigm strongly focus on the implementation of 
formal and informal institutions and participative approaches, which coordinate 
individual efforts in rural development issues. The property rights theory, in contrast, 
approves the coordination capacity of institutions, as it refers to the interaction 
problems inherent in public good problems, but it fails to elaborate a normative 
criterion capable of evaluating the impact of policy changes on local public goods 
provision. Constitutional economics theory, by distinguishing between rules and 
moves, throws a different light on the capacity of institutions to solve interaction 
problems. However, the latter theory strongly focuses on the consensus of all 
individuals on institutions coordinating individual behavior. As a factual consensus 
between all individuals seems to be unfeasible in most cases, or combined with 
high decision-making costs, constitutional economics generally applies the consen-
sus criterion to the constitutional level, whereas rural development institutions, 
for the most part, are located on the local or regional level. Rural development as provision of local public goods: A theoretical perspective 
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Because of that, I presented the normative institutional economics theory, as it 
builds on the constitutional economics theory, but aims to apply the consensus 
criterion to situations genuinely resulting from interaction problems. As shown 
on a general model of public goods provision in Figure 2-3, the social dilemma 
heuristic, as the paradigmatic core of the normative institutional economics the-
ory, seems to be feasible for analyzing interaction problems of local public goods 
provision. In this regard, rural development problems are not conceived as allo-
cational problems, but are rather reconstructed as coordination or interaction 
problems. Institutions as mechanisms of coordinating individual behavior thus 
come to the fore. Therefore, rural development problems have to be analyzed from 
an institutional perspective that focuses mainly on situational incentives that in-
dividuals face in certain institutional arrangements. Based on the social dilemma 
heuristic as an analytical framework, even conflicts of interests between local 
inhabitants can be analyzed. This will allow us to look more closely at the incen-
tives that different institutional arrangements in rural areas provide, incentives 
which both prevent and facilitate cooperation between local inhabitants, regard-
less of whether they have a governmental, entrepreneurial or agricultural back-
ground. Policy reform, which aims to overcome interaction problems, is designed 
to explicitly seek the assent of all individuals involved in order to be considered 
as legitimate and incentive compatible (PETRICK, 2005, p. 101). However, consen-
sus can only be found if all involved parties obtain a factual improvement of their 
situation, which is solely possible due to an exploitation of mutual gains from trade. 
The normative institutional economics theory, because it regards individual 
preferences as the only source of values, avoids a comparison of individual utility 
functions by using the unanimity requirement. 
Section 2.3 presented three governance structures, the market approach, govern-
ment regulation, and community, which all cover elements that facilitate the co-
ordination of individual behavior in interaction problems of lacking local public 
goods provision in rural areas. However, since these governance structures are 
not themselves able to solve the complexity of interaction problems of local public 
goods provision in rural areas, it is the synergy of elements of these three struc-
tures which composes institutional arrangements capable of attenuating interaction 
problems by bringing local inhabitants to the position of taking advantage of the 
mutual gains from cooperation. 
In Chapter 4 I will apply the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 to 
rural development problems in three regions of Poland. However, before I go 
into the details of the empirical research results, I will first present the research 
methodology in Chapter 3. 
 
   
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
The following chapter presents the empirical research strategy of this study. A 
methodology must be elaborated which is capable of applying the theoretical con-
siderations made in Chapter 2 to the real world problems discussed in the first 
chapter of this monograph. In Section 1.5, I developed two questions for empirical 
research: 1) What are the reasons for the insufficient provision of public goods in 
rural Poland; and 2) To the extent that public goods were provided in some regions, 
which institutional arrangements were responsible for this success? 
To answer these questions, the analytical framework for rural development policy 
analysis elaborated in the last chapter has to be applied. This analytical frame-
work allows the empirical research process to differentiate between positive and 
normative analysis. Both parts of the analysis approach the object of investigation 
from an institutional perspective and focus mainly on situational incentives faced 
by inhabitants that behave in certain institutional arrangements. In the positive 
analysis I will analyze, in three different case study sites, whether certain local 
public goods were not provided because of interaction problems that hampered 
cooperation among inhabitants in the past. That is, I will analyze which institu-
tions (or the absence of institutions) persuaded inhabitants to not contribute to the 
provision of local public goods, although inhabitants would have benefited from 
the provision of these goods. Then, for regions where certain local public goods 
are now successfully provided, I investigate which institutional arrangements facili-
tated this successful provision and whether market-based relations, government 
regulation and community relations attenuated interaction problems that formerly 
prevented the successful provision of those local public goods. Thereafter, in the 
normative part of the analysis, institutional arrangements can be assessed as prefer-
able if exchange in terms of a successful joint provision of local public goods is 
realized and mutual gains from exchange/cooperation are exploited. Finally, if policy 
measures of the new rural paradigm facilitate institutional arrangements capable 
of coordinating individual interaction so that inhabitants contribute jointly to the 
provision of certain public goods, they can be assessed as preferable.  
Such an empirical analysis requires in-depth case studies in Polish rural areas 
that provide an understanding of which local public goods are only provided to a 
slight extent in a particular region, as well as which barriers hamper local com-
munities from providing the concerned local public goods. With respect to the 
second question mentioned above, case study regions need to be analyzed that 
have already implemented initiatives which go back to the main ideas of the new Methodology 
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rural paradigm. That is, they have to be based on local partnerships consisting of 
members of local NGOs, local governments and local entrepreneurs. Further-
more, it has to be investigated whether these initiatives, due to governmental 
support, facilitated the provision of certain local public goods, and which institu-
tional arrangements made successful provision possible. 
Section 3.1 provides insight into the two research paradigms and introduces the 
research strategy applied in this study. Section 3.2 presents the case study research 
as a basic structure for combining different qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. Section 3.3 introduces the three case study regions analyzed in this mono-
graph. In section 3.4, I then discuss the guideline interview technique and other 
qualitative and quantitative methods which were used in the case study research. 
Finally, I will expound on the content analysis, i.e., the qualitative method that 
guided me through the interpretation of the interview results. 
3.1 Research  paradigms and strategy 
Reality is always approached from certain perspectives and a researcher is there-
fore obliged, in order to select adequate empirical research methods, to define his 
perspective on the object under investigation. In this regard, empirical research 
methods constitute a link between theoretical considerations and real world phe-
nomena (THEESFELD, 2005, p. 95). Particularly in social sciences, the researcher 
must clarify for himself whether he looks at the object under investigation as a 
collective phenomenon or he ascribes phenomenon to the actions of single indi-
viduals (SCHNELL, HILL and ESSER, 1999, p. 104). Furthermore, the researcher 
also needs to be certain whether he attempts, on the one hand, to explain a real 
world phenomenon by testing hypotheses on the object under investigation to deduce 
objective principles or, on the other hand, he aims to comprehend and interpret 
individual actions while also being aware of his subjective perspective (LAMNEK, 
1995a, p. 219). 
Values, perceptions and individuals’ purposes are subjects of constant changes and 
can hardly be ascribed to certain objective principles or models (LÜTTEKEN, 2002, 
p. 157-160; LICHTENBERG, 2003, p. 110). The sole application of quantitative re-
search methods, which comes from natural sciences, would thus be deficient, as the 
latter do not regard a social scientific interpretation of social phenomena (LAMNEK, 
1995a, p. 219). Qualitative approaches which proceed inductively, rather than 
following a deductive logic, seem to be more adequate. That is, theories were gene-
rated and developed by proceeding from empirical observations (THEESFELD, 2005, 
p. 96). 
However, a polarization of the two paradigms of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods seems to be misleading. As THEESFELD states, "It hampers method integra-
tion and with this it unnecessarily constraints empirical social inquiry" (THEESFELD, 
2005, p. 96). A quantitative research approach, for instance, does not necessarily 
exclude the application of qualitative methods. On the contrary, qualitative data can Methodology  
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even help the researcher develop a better understanding of the quantitative data he 
collected, and qualitative methods may guide the researcher in his efforts to collect 
significant quantitative data. LAMNEK (1995a, p. 223) further argues that qualita-
tive research approaches do not refuse the testing of hypotheses. The qualitative 
research approaches only criticize the restriction on testing hypotheses and thereby 
neglect the development of new ones. A researcher cannot approach an object of 
investigation without a theoretical concept or hypotheses. Indeed, he should remain 
open and prepared to constantly test his hypotheses during the data collection 
process. 
The main object of analysis is the individual in interaction with other individuals. 
The individual is always influenced by actions or even the absence of actions of 
other individuals, whereas those actions can be formalized or not, and may be 
desirable or not. Hence, empirical research methods appropriate for investigating 
interaction problems in local development issues need to go back to the individual 
and the incentives influencing his behavior, and they need to discover what impact 
the individual behavior of many different actors in a single region has on the deve-
lopment of common initiatives facilitating local public goods provision. A very 
complex context needs to be analyzed. This further implies that although the exis-
tence of interaction problems between rural inhabitants are presumed, analyses of 
single individuals’ behavior forces us to remain open to developing new hypotheses 
regarding the reasons influencing individual behavior in certain situations. That 
is, in preparing the empirical research strategy it is impossible to pre-estimate the 
incentives which hamper local inhabitants in their efforts to commonly provide 
local public goods. 
Figure 3-1 aims to simplify the latter considerations on linking theory with empiri-
cism using the example of lacking cooperation between farmers in a region. 
Starting from the first hypothesis that was theoretically defined with recourse to 
empiricism, I proceeded deductively as I analyzed the individual reasons peasants 
cited for co-operating with other peasants, or not co-operating based on the propo-
sition of finding interaction problems between individuals. Then, based on the em-
pirical results I inductively defined a hypothesis to describe the link between indi-
vidual behavior and the collective phenomenon of lacking cooperation. However, 
as discussed in Section 2.3, interaction problems can be overcome by three gover-
nance structures. Based on the latter theoretically guided hypothesis I had to go 
back to the empiricism to test whether lacking cooperation between peasants can 
be facilitated by institutional arrangements that comprise properties of markets, 
government regulation, and community management. Methodology 
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Source: Author’s  depiction. 
The empirical research strategy developed for the purpose of this study is a dynamic 
approach. It is guided by the case study research approach that combines different 
research methods to elaborate a comprehensive image of a situation that can be ob-
served in reality. The empirical part of this study aims, on the one hand, to discover 
interaction problems which led, in Polish rural areas, to a lacking provision of local 
public goods and, on the other hand, to analyze institutional arrangements which 
enabled inhabitants to overcome the latter problems of local public goods provi-
sion. First, three case study regions were selected in three different areas in rural Po-
land. All of these regions have shown a lacking provision of one or more of the local 
public goods defined in Section 2.1, but could also recently implement institutional 
arrangements that allowed the latter communities to provide those public goods 
Theoretically guided hypothesis 1:  
Interaction problems hamper the 
establishment of agricultural producer 
groups. 
Research question: 
What are the reasons for the absence of 
agricultural producer groups from the 
perspective of the individual farmer? 
Theoretically guided hypothesis 2:  
Governance structures based on 
market relations, central government, 
and community relations may over-
come lacking cooperation.  
Empiricism:  
The following reasons for lacking coopera-
tion were identified: Individual reservation 
against cooperation; fear of contributing 
capital to organizations since the money 
can be gone afterwards; uncertain business 
environment.  
Empiricism:  
Producer groups or other forms of coope-



























Empirically guided hypothesis 1: 
Lack of agreements and sanctioning 
systems lead to possibility of free-
riding and hamper peasants’ contribu-
tion. Inflexible decision-making 
procedures foreclose agreements. 
Research question: 
How could a lack of cooperation between 
farmers - mainly resulting from organiza-
tional problems - be overcome by the 
impact of the three governance structures? 
Empiricism: 
Interaction problems between farmers could 
be overcome by utilizing institutional com-
plementarities between government, com-
munity and market by means of public-
private partnerships. Methodology  
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jointly. In the case study regions, the inhabitants’ individual perceptions had to 
be analyzed in order to understand those incentives which hampered inhabitants 
from contributing, or forced them to contribute, to the local public goods provision. 
In order to identify these individual perceptions, guideline interviews were con-
ducted. The empirical results I received from the guideline interviews were then 
reassessed and completed by participant observation, document analysis, and a 
small quantitative survey conducted in one of the three case study regions. The 
interpretation of the empirical data was done in accordance with the content 
analysis by MAYRING (2000). 
3.2 Case  study  research and data collection 
Case study research is not a single method but rather a research approach (LAMNEK, 
1995b, p. 5) which analyzes the interaction of different factors. Case study research 
aims to develop a holistic and realistic impression of social reality. Thus, the case 
study as a qualitative research approach differs from other quantitative approaches 
as depicted in Table 3-1. A common concern about case studies is that they provide 
little basis for scientific generalization since they often comprise a few or even 
only one case. YIN (2003, p. 10) shortly comments on this objection, "that case 
studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes". A case study will not represent a sample, rather, it aims 
to expand and generalize theories in terms of an analytic generalization and not 
the enumeration of frequencies like in statistical generalizations (ibid., p. 10). 
Hence, with the case study approach I attempt to test whether the analytical frame-
work developed in Chapter 2 would apply to the analysis of rural development 
problems or not. 
According to the different case study designs discussed by YIN (2003, p. 39-53), 
the design selected for the purpose of this study is a holistic multiple-case type. 
Yin distinguishes between holistic and embedded case studies with respect to the 
existence of different subunits which are available in embedded case studies but do 
not exist in holistic cases. An example of an embedded case study is the evaluation 
of a program which coordinates different projects as sub-units (YIN, 2003, p. 42-43). 
In this study, each case study represents a region, whereas in these case study 
regions, different individuals live and work. Further, these individuals can be cate-
gorized as e.g. farmers, entrepreneurs, local authorities, etc. However, all individuals, 
regardless to which subgroup they belong, will be analyzed according to the same 
theoretical considerations. Hence, from the theoretical point of view there are no 
logical sub-units since the theory underlying the case study is of a holistic nature. Methodology 
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Table 3-1:  Confronting characteristics of the case study approach and 
quantitative research approaches  
Case study approach  Quantitative research design 
Few cases  Many cases 
Much information  Much information 
Profound information  Broad information 
Multiple methods  One method 
Holistic perspective  Particular perspective 
Source: LAMNEK, 1995b, p. 8. 
In addition, more than one case study site was selected because none of the  
requirements for single-case studies (i.e., cases must be rare, unusual or critical) 
applies to the objects of investigation. But it was further decided to limit the number 
of case studies to three, since every single case study, not least due to the different 
empirical methods applied to obtain a profound knowledge, is a very time-extensive 
process. According to YIN (2003, p. 47), each case study must be carefully selected 
so that it either predicts similar results (a literal replication) or contrasting results, 
but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). In this study the focus was 
on theoretical replication. I presumed that initiatives in all three case study regions 
would not show the same results in social and economic matters as they arose 
from more or less different social and economic starting points, e.g. being endowed 
with different capabilities. Hence, the case study served to test whether a generali-
zation to theory is possible or not.  
3.3  Selection and description of the case studies 
3.3.1 Selection 
Above all, the theoretical background of this study requires a very careful selec-
tion of the case study regions. As mentioned previously, this study not only aims to 
discover (according to the theoretical considerations in Section 2.2) interactional 
problems as reasons for lacking local public goods provision, it also attempts to 
analyze whether institutional arrangements starting from a market, a central govern-
mental or a community background are able to overcome such interactional prob-
lems or not. Therefore, the selection favors regions that formerly faced lacking 
cooperation in local public goods provision but could overcome internal or external 
hurdles towards a better cooperation between rural inhabitants by means of policy 
measures assigned to the new rural paradigm. For this reason I looked for regions 
where local rural partnerships of the LEADER-type already started initiatives that 
sustainably influenced the social and economic development of the concerned re-
gion. LEADER-type partnerships were chosen since the LEADER program belongs 
to policy measures of the new rural paradigm. However, by the time the case study Methodology  
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research was conducted, no LEADER groups existed in Poland. LEADER+ 
started in Poland as a pilot project in 2005. Hence, I searched for LEADER-like 
partnerships which followed the idea of cooperation between local authorities, 
local entrepreneurs, and associations. Besides a LEADER-like organizational struc-
ture, the following selection criteria were taken into account by reviewing different 
existing partnerships:  
-  Areas are located in a predominantly rural region; 
-  Cooperation exists between local authorities, entrepreneurs and NGOs;  
-  Local economy has an agricultural background; 
-  Areas are from multiple Polish regions and have a different agricultural 
farm size structure; 
-  All areas are confronted with similar problems in terms of lacking non-
agricultural job opportunities, low average income, and negative net-
migration rate. 
The case studies were selected from different areas to make the study results more 
robust against objections intended to ascribe the success or failures of the case 
studies to conditions or capabilities that apply to particular wider areas (districts 
or voivodships) of Poland. There were, however, no requirements prepared regarding 
the initiatives undertaken by the partnerships. Here, it was assumed that the local 
initiatives which built on the unique conditions of the small rural community would 
always differ between villages, because to some extent every village or commune is 
a unique unit.  
The three case study areas were selected from 90 small regions, because at least one 
rural development partnership was active in these regions. These 90 partnerships 
were registered in the database of the Polish Rural Forum (Forum for the Ani-
mation of Rural Areas – FAOW)
12. The database provided basic information on 
the year of foundation, the main objectives, and the initiatives of the partnerships. 
However, it did not provide any assessments concerning the success of the part-
nerships’ initiatives. That is why expert interviews were conducted with the ex-
ecutive staff of the FAOW and a scientist of the Institute of Rural and Agricultural 
Development from the Polish Academy of Sciences (IRWIR PAN) to select case 
study areas that would fulfill the above discussed requirements. 
                                                 
12 FAOW is the national platform of cooperation for rural organizations in Poland. The Forum 
comprises different rural partnerships which work together towards the more effective 
functioning of Polish rural communities. Therefore, the forum organizes trainings for local 
actors and promotes rural areas in national and international committees. Methodology 
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3.3.2  Description of the case study regions 
The selected case studies
13 are located in southeastern (Bałtów and Dolina Strugu) 
and northwestern (Dębrzno) Poland (see Map 3-1). The case study in Bałtów and 
Dębrzno was conducted on the area of one commune. Dolina Strugu, in contrast, 
is a coalition of four communes which initially founded a partnership together.  
Map 3-1:  Geographical position of Bałtów, Dolina Strugu and Dębrzno  
 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
Table 3-2 shows different characteristics of the case study regions. The local econo-
my of all three regions is strongly related to agriculture. Bałtów and Dolina Strugu 
are characterized by very small and partly semi-subsistence farms, whereas in 
Bałtów, in addition to peasant farmers, larger farms also exist. Farms in both south-
eastern regions are poorly equipped and generally endowed with a fragmented land 
structure. As a result of the low farm mechanization and the lack of non-agricultural 
job opportunities, there is still a high level of agricultural employment. In Dolina 
Strugu, e.g. agricultural employment amounts to two-thirds of the economically 
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active population. Although the local economy in Dębrzno is strongly related to agri-
culture as well, agricultural employment is lower compared to the southeastern 
regions. Farms in Dębrzno generally emerged from former state-owned farms and 
are both larger and better-equipped. Agricultural laborers in Dębrzno mostly lost 
their jobs due to the shutdown of the state-owned farms and a military base located 
in the town in the early 1990s. The latter development, plus the fact that in Bałtów 
and Dolina Strugu hidden unemployment in agriculture is still present, together 
constitute the main reasons for the higher unemployment rate for Dębrzno com-
pared to the southeastern case studies. 
Table 3-2:  Data on case study regions 
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rate (2002)  -1.4 -1.9 -4.1 -1.1 
Source: CROSS BORDER FRIENDSHIP DATABASE (2006); GUS (2005); STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE 
OSTROWIECKI DISTRICT (2006). Methodology 
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The lack of non-agricultural job opportunities is a characteristic of the labor market 
in all three case study regions. In the southeastern region, the shutdown of the 
rural industrial companies at the beginning of the transformation process led to a 
tremendous layoff of workers, forcing many rural inhabitants to return to their small 
family farms. In the northwestern case study area, the situation was quite different. 
Agricultural workers, who moved to where state-owned farms emerged during so-
cialist times, were mostly low-skilled and poorly endowed with entrepreneurial 
skills. These people often could not find new jobs after the state-owned farms 
disappeared. Additionally, due to their age and their low job prospects, these people 
were often highly unmotivated, which resulted in a low level of social capital. The 
high unemployment rate in all three case study regions further led to a low level of 
wages, which, combined with the lack of job opportunities, forced younger inhabi-
tants to emigrate. Furthermore, there is a lack of small businesses in all three study 
regions.  
3.3.3  Further preparations for the case study 
The further process of preparing and conducting a case study has been shortly 
summarized in the time schedule in Table 3-3. After selecting the three case 
study areas with the help of the experts from FAOW and IRWIR PAN, first con-
tacts with the partnerships in the case study regions were made. During the same 
time, interview guidelines for different groups of inhabitants in the case studies 
were also formulated. The interview guidelines were tested in a pilot case study 
consisting of a German LEADER-partnership called "Naturpark Duebener Heide", 
located in Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony. A German pilot case study was chosen due 
to the immense expenses of a pilot case study located in Poland. Although there 
were some characteristics which differed between the German case and the Polish 
case studies
14, there were also many similarities between, for instance, the high 
unemployment rate, the negative net-migration, and the increase of workers laid-
off in the early 1990s due to the shutdown of state-owned companies. The pilot 
case study served to answer the following questions: 1) What is the relevant data 
to collect; 2) Are the interview guidelines adequate to gain significant informa-
tion; 3) How does cooperation between local authorities, local entrepreneurs and 
NGOs proceed? 
                                                 
14  The largest difference was seen in the farm size structure. The agricultural sector of the German 
case study region is characterized by a large farm structure, whereas in the southeastern Polish 
regions mainly small farms exist. Methodology  
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Table 3-3:  Time schedule of the dynamic research process 




-  Literature review on Polish rural development and Polish rural 
partnerships 





-  Expert interviews with members of the FAOW and a member of 
IRWIR PAN concerning the selection of three partnerships out of 
the 90 
-  Expert interviews on the development of rural partnerships in 
Poland, as well as the progress made regarding the implementation 
of LEADER+ in Poland 
March- 
May 2005 
-  Contacted partnerships and arranged the period of case study re-
search 
-  Drafted the interview guidelines in cooperation with the experts 
from FAOW 
-  Conducted a pilot case study in the rural partnership "Naturpark 
Duebener Heide" (Germany) to test the relevance of interview 
guidelines 
-  Revised interview guidelines 
June- 
July 2005 
-  Arranged accommodation and translation of the interview guide-
lines into Polish 
-  Final preparations for the case study 
August- 
October 2005  -  Conducted the case studies 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
After conducting the pilot case study, the interview guidelines were revised, finali-
zed and translated by means of the executive staff of the Polish Rural Forum and 
a Polish intern who assisted me in preparing the case studies. Final preparations 
for the field work were undertaken in June and July and the case studies were 
conducted from August to October 2006. 
3.4  Empirical research methods 
As YIN (2003, p. 57) asserts, the quality of case study results increases with respect 
to the number of different empirical research methods applied (methodological 
triangulation), as well as with respect to the different data sources that were used. 
In the following, after providing some insights into the research team, I will present 
the different techniques used in the data collection process, the content analysis, 
and the method that guided me through the interpretation of the data. Methodology 
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The research team mainly consisted of the researcher and a translator. The latter 
changed for each case study. Three months before the case studies were conducted, 
a Polish student assisted me (due to his language skills) in contacting the partner-
ships, arranging the research stay and translating the interview guidelines into 
Polish. For conducting the three case studies, in each case I received assistance from 
a Polish student. These students not only facilitated the research stay as transla-
tors, but also contributed with their cultural knowledge, their knowledge on the 
Polish agricultural sector and rural development issues. The students were also 
valuable in arranging the interview contacts in each location. In particular, their 
communication skills and their co-operative personalities eased the case study 
research immensely. 
All three Polish students were trained immediately before the case study stay 
started. The students received a general introduction to the research topic and were 
provided with the theoretical knowledge necessary for conducting the research 
study. Another training session was taken on interviewing skills and finally the 
interview guidelines were extensively discussed with the students.  
3.4.1  Guideline interviews 
A focal empirical research technique for our case studies is the guideline inter-
view. The advantage of guideline interviews over interviews which are based on 
structured, standardized questionnaires lies in its ability to generate open discus-
sion with the respondent (SCHNELL, HILL and ESSER, 1999, p. 355). In guideline 
interviews, the interviewer conducts the interview according to thematic guidelines. 
These guidelines provide the interviewer with flexibility because he can easily add 
new questions during the interview to draw new information out of the interviewee. 
In comparison to standardized questionnaires, the interview partner is therefore 
able to emphasize the relevance of the information he provides in his answers. 
But guideline interviews are often more time-consuming, the quality of the in-
formation extracted from the interviews depends more strongly on the inter-
viewer and the interviewee, and there is sometimes limited comparability of the 
extracted information. However, for the purpose of this study the guideline inter-
view was more appropriate since we aimed to discover individual incentives which 
can strongly vary between individuals. In this context, the interviews inter alia were 
supposed to discover the individual perspective on local developmental problems 
and chances, as well as the inhabitants’ individual incentives to cooperate or not 
cooperate in local development initiatives. 
As mentioned above, qualitative research does not generalize. That is, qualitative 
research does not focus on the frequency of actions, but rather aims to reflect as 
many different individual behavioral models as possible for a certain situation 
(LAMNEK, 1995b, p. 92). Hence, in the three case studies, interview partners were 
not selected according to the random principle, they were chosen because of their 
ability to identify as many different individual behavior models as possible in the Methodology  
 
76 
study region. But to have some orientation, I divided the interview partners into 
five subgroups: 1) representatives of regional or local authorities; 2) members of 
the local development partnership; 3) local farmers; 4) local entrepreneurs; and 
5) local villagers in general
15. These subgroups, however, only provide some orien-
tation. They do not represent the behavioral model of all respondents comprised 
by the subgroups. This is true, e.g. for the subgroup of local farmers. Here, the 
opinions of small farmers often differed from those of big farmers, from those of 
agro-tourism farmers, or even between small farmers themselves. 
For each subgroup, different guidelines were formulated in the preparation period 
of the case studies. The general structure of the interview guidelines is depicted in 
Table 3-4. The interview guidelines, of course, changed slightly and in a few cases 
strongly with respect to the interview partners. Members of the local developmental 
partnerships were additionally questioned regarding the organization, initiatives, 
financing, and cooperation between members of the partnership. Farmers, on the 
other hand, were interviewed more deeply regarding agricultural development in 
the region, and interviews with entrepreneurs also comprised the conditions for 
local enterprises. Furthermore, the perception of the local social and economic 
development often varied between interviewees. While local farmers, local entre-
preneurs and villagers in general mostly focused on their own villages, representa-
tives of local authorities made their assessments with respect to the concerned com-
mune. Members of the local developmental partnerships, in contrast, often looked 
at local developmental processes from a perspective that went beyond the com-
mune’s borders. 
Table 3-4:  General structure of the interview guidelines 
1   General questions and questions on local development  
2   Assessments of local inhabitants 
3   Local developmental partnership 
4   Impact of the partnership on local development 
5   Agriculture and agricultural development in the region 
6   Entrepreneurship in the region 
7   Economic cooperation in the region 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
For all three case studies, 104 guideline interviews were conducted. The listing 
of the interview respondents according to the different subgroups is shown in 
Table 3-5. In general, the interviews lasted from one and a half to two hours, but 
this varied between interviewees. For instance, some interviews with villagers 
                                                 
15  Further details on the background of the interviewees can be found in the Appendix. Methodology 
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were finished after half an hour and others, e.g. with members of the development 
partnerships, lasted four to six hours (though the latter interviews were conducted 
over two or more sessions). 
Since no random principle was used for the selection of respondents, we had to use 
informal contacts to choose the concerned persons. In each case study region we 
had different contact persons who helped us arrange the interviews, introduced us 
to the local circumstances and existence of village institutions, as well as provided 
us with insider information. In all case studies these local informants were manifold. 
They were members of the local development partnerships, representatives of the 
local authorities, or owners of the agro-tourism farms where we found our accom-
modation. Most of the interviews were arranged with the help of these local contact 
persons. In other cases, the snowball principle was also used, that is, persons pre-
viously interviewed were asked for further potential interview partners. Finally, we 
also approached people we met in the villages as they were working in their front 
garden or went to shop owners while they were working and asked them for an 
interview. Information was also extracted from short discussions on the village 
road, at local village festivals as well as from longer talks during dinners in the 
agro-tourism farms. Those discussions often enabled us to collect additional de-
tails on local political issues and provided us with additional cultural knowledge 
and stories that took place in the case study regions during the socialist era. 
Table 3-5:  Listing of respondents according to subgroups 
Subgroups of inter-
view respondents  Bałtów Dolina  Strugu  Dębrzno 
  Number of interview respondents per subgroup 
Representatives of 
the region/local  
authorities 
(Of these, representa-














Members of the local 
development partner-
ship(s) 
9 9  11 
Local farmers  5  6  6 
Local entrepreneurs  3  10  9 
Local inhabitants  7  4  3 
Total 35  34  35- 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
Additionally, it was a challenge to direct or lead respondents during the inter-
views to talk about the local social and economic conditions in the case study Methodology  
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region during the early 1990s and to compare the situation at that time with the 
current situation. In this context, we had to prevent respondents from only answering 
shortly and generally on that question and not to provide their individual perspec-
tives on the issue. Therefore, at first we asked them to explain their job situation 
as well as the social and economic situation of their family in the early 1990s. After 
having asked about their personal experience with the past, we could also address 
some more general questions about the socio-economic conditions of other villagers, 
as well as about social and economic initiatives and associations that existed during 
the first period of the transformation process. Based on the personal experiences 
we gleaned from the interviewee, we could then ask for specific changes that might 
have taken place in his/her everyday life and the everyday life of his/her family 
nowadays compared to the situation 15 years ago. After that, we addressed some 
questions about the general conditions that have changed in the case study region 
during the same period of time. However, this procedure enabled us to discover 
the individual incentives that influenced the respondent to contribute or not con-
tribute to the common social or economic initiatives which have taken place in the 
region during the last 15 years.  
The locations where the interviews were conducted were manifold. Interviews were 
held in the house or yard of the respondents, in the offices of the local authorities 
or the development partnerships, on benches beside the village road, or in small 
shops. We also often invited respondents to come to the agro-tourism farm where 
we were accommodated. Our aim was to choose a location which was most con-
venient for our interview partners.  
Furthermore, in order to build confidence between local villagers and the research 
team it was very useful to stay in the same village overnight, to attend local festi-
vals, and to participate in partnership initiates. We further assured interviewees 
that we would keep their information confidential and anonymous. Moreover, at 
the beginning of every interview, we attempted to answer all open questions of the 
interview partner regarding our research team and our research study. Then, inter-
view partners were asked whether we were allowed to record the interview to ease 
the translation afterwards, which was granted in most of the cases. We further 
assured the interview partners that we would use the recording only for translation 
and not give it to others.  
All interviews were conducted in the presence of the investigator and the trans-
lator. First I asked the question in English, which was then translated into Polish 
by the translator. The answers were then translated from Polish into English. The 
continuous translation of the answers and questions was necessary to keep the inter-
view flexible. While I made notes during the interview, I was always able to skip 
or adapt some questions or to introduce new ones in order to draw some more 
detailed information out of the respondents. The detailed translation of the inter-
views was done in the time between the interviews or particularly in the evenings 
on our agro-tourism farm. Here, by listening to the recording, the translator again Methodology 
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gave a detailed translation of the interview. The translation was often followed 
by a discussion between the translator and myself on the interview content. Those 
discussions often led to new questions on the object of investigation. Such ques-
tions were then included in the upcoming interviews. The latter discussion on the 
interview results also motivated the translator to become more involved in the 
research process. The latter fact can be illustrated by the following quote made 
by one translator: "In doing the interviews with those people here in […], I feel 
more and more like an inspector who attempts to investigate a crime."  
At the end of every case study we always had a concluding discussion with our main 
contact persons in the villages. In these final discussions, any remaining open 
questions were clarified and a short summary of the research stay was given by 
the research team.  
3.4.2  Other qualitative and quantitative techniques used for data collection 
A further qualitative method applied in the case study research stay is the partici-
pant observation. In participant observation, the investigator is not merely a passive 
observer. Instead, he actually participates in the events being studied (YIN, 2003, 
p. 93-96). Based on this, the investigator expects to observe objects which are 
inaccessible for people who, for instance, do not belong to a certain community 
(MAYRING, 2002, p. 79-84).  
In this study the observations correspond to a level of more passive participation. 
Passive participation means that the investigator was present at the scene and 
interacted with people to various degrees (THEESFELD, 2005, p. 114). For instance, 
as mentioned previously, the research team participated in village festivals or 
public informative meetings on the Community Initiative LEADER+. During such 
events the research team mostly attended rather passively and had discussions 
with other participants in small gatherings during the breaks. More difficult to access 
were association meetings, city council meetings, and receptions of local associa-
tions. Here, we were invited and took part in the discussion as guests. Participation 
in the latter events enabled us to particularly observe the performance of local 
leader personalities as well as their acceptance in the local community. This ob-
servation inter alia also served to check the meeting attendance and to notice the 
length and the frequency of participants’ statements as an indicator characterizing 
the activity of local associations. 
With respect to case study research, YIN (2003, p. 99) emphasizes, in addition to 
methodological triangulation, the importance of triangulating data from multiple 
sources of evidence. For example, the latter data triangulation comprises in our 
three case studies the oral material received from different interview partners, the 
written notes I made during and after the interviews, and observations on local 
community or partnership initiatives. It further includes documents I received 
from the local development partnerships regarding local and regional initiatives, the 
history of the village/town, and the history of the partnership. Further documents Methodology  
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concerning statistical information at the community and district level, as well as 
brochures promoting the commune as a tourist attraction and/or a place for business 
investments were also provided by the local authorities. All these various sources 
of information were considered during the preparation of the three case study reports, 
which were finalized after the research stay. 
The only quantitative technique applied during the case study research was a stan-
dardized questionnaire. The latter served as a survey to determine the confidence 
level that local inhabitants have in different governmental and state institutions in 
comparison to local persons like the mayor or the members of the local develop-
ment partnership. The survey was only conducted in one of the case study areas to 
quantitatively confirm assessments which had already been made by inhabitants 
in the qualitative interviews. Twenty-eight local inhabitants were surveyed, whereas 
it was assured that the latter do not belong to the local authority or development 
partnership.  
3.4.3  Qualitative content analysis 
The qualitative content analysis consists of a bundle of techniques for systematic 
text analysis (MAYRING, 2000). For the purpose of this study I applied the quali-
tative content analysis according to MAYRING (2000, 2002, 2003) to analyze the 
guideline interviews conducted in the three case study regions. In general, content 
analysis aims to investigate any kind of material that represents human behavior 
or social interaction (LAMNEK, 1995b, p. 172). As a method, it objectively and 
systematically describes the linguistic characteristics of a text in order to draw 
conclusions on the non-linguistic characteristics of actors or social aggregates 
(ibid., p. 172). The qualitative content analysis facilitates analyzing interviews in 
a way that, based on the respondents’ assessments on local development issues, 
conclusions with respect to their behavior and their previous actions can be drawn. 
The subject of qualitative content analysis can be all sorts of recorded communi-
cation (e.g. transcripts of interviews, protocols of observations, documents, etc.) 
(MAYRING, 2000).  
The center of the qualitative content analysis is defining its categories. MAYRING 
(2003, p. 74-76) distinguishes here between inductive category development and 
deductive category development. The aim of inductive category development is 
to define categories as closely as possible to the material, that is, categories should 
be developed only based on interview transcripts. In contrast, deductive category 
development proceeds with previously formulated, theoretically derived aspects 
of analysis that have to be applied to the transcript. In this context, the deductive 
definition of the categories results mainly from theoretical considerations made 
before the transcript was perused, whereas the inductive definition is rather based 
on the content of the transcript. For the purposes of this study it seems to be mis-
leading to develop categories based on this strong distinction. It would be more 
productive to include both approaches in the derivation of the concerned categories. Methodology 
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There are two reasons for the latter consideration. On the one hand, the interview 
transcript results from guideline interviews, and the guidelines were already 
formulated according to the theoretical approach discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, it 
would be misleading to not involve the theoretical considerations within the process 
of category development. On the other hand, different information discovered during 
the interviews was not anticipated at the time the interview guidelines were pre-
pared. Hence, for determining the categories it makes more sense to involve both 
theoretical considerations and the interview content. 
Figure 3-2:  Model of category development 
 
Source:  Modified from MAYRING (2000) and MAYRING (2003, p. 75).  
The whole process of categorization is illustrated in Figure 3-2. In a first step, the 
object that should serve as the basis for developing categories needs to be deter-
mined. In this study only the interview transcript constitutes the basic raw material. 
In a second step, first categories are defined based on the theoretical background. 
Additionally, the level of abstraction for the categories, which needs to be devel-
oped based on the interview transcript, must also be formulated. Then, in a third 
step, we can start to peruse the interview transcript. In so doing, every passage of 
the transcript needs to be assigned to a category. If no such category exists, a new 
one has to be formulated. The fourth step is the revision of the categories. Here, 
after reading 10-50 % of the interview transcript, it is helpful to again revise the 
categories and to define, if necessary, the level of abstraction for the categories. 
In the fifth step, the whole transcript can be perused. Finally, based on the re-
sulting material, different forms of analysis and interpretation can be under-
taken. For example, the frequency of categories can be calculated or main cate-
gories can be formulated to structure the interview transcript. For the purpose of 
Perusal of the transcript; developing new  
inductive categories based on the transcript;  
subsumption of old categories 
Revision of categories after 10 – 50% 
of the transcript is perused 
Interview transcript, theoretical background
Determining definition of category and levels of 
abstraction for inductive categories 
Final perusal of the interview transcript
Interpretation and/or analysis
Check of 
reliability Methodology  
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this study, categories were defined to compare the assessments of different inter-
view respondents with each other on, e.g. local development issues. The formulation 
of the categories, therefore, was done by considering content-related aspects more 
than formal ones. Table 3-6 shows two examples of categories formulated while 
perusing the interview transcript and also provides some examples of passages 
from an interview transcript.  
Table 3-6:  Examples of categories and exemplary passages from an  
interview transcript 






-  Assessments dealing with 
common input purchase or 
common market sale of agri-
cultural farms 
-  Assessments on formal or  
informal cooperation between 
farmers 
-  "Fruit farmers are not doing 
very well, and there are two 
reasons for the weakness of 
the soft fruit market in this  
region: First, the producers 
are not organized, and second, 
there is no processing com-
pany here." 
-  "I think a characteristic of 
Polish farmers is that they are 
individualists." 
Entrepreneu-
rial skills of 
inhabitants 
-  Assessments describing entre-
preneurial skills of inhabitants 
(willingness to take risk, crea-
ting ideas for personal or local 
development, etc.) 
-  Self-assessment on personal 
background regarding having 
a business, previous tries in 
starting-up a business, or labor 
background  
-  "People in this rural area are 
at the moment more passive 
and more against everything. 
They do not believe that they 
are able to reach their desti-
nies with their own hands." 
-  "They [people from the case 
study region] are more inter-
ested in finding a job in other 
bigger cities, where they get 
paid and do not have to take 
the risk." 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
Preparing the case study reports also benefited from additional information I re-
ceived from different sources external to the interview transcript. However, for 
gaining a better understanding of different interview passages, other passages of the 
same interview transcript were primarily used (narrow and wider context analysis 
(see MAYRING, 2003, p. 77-82)). Within these efforts additional information about 
the interview respondent, as well as passages of the same category from other 
interview transcripts were also included. Further along in the preparation of the 
case study report I referred to additional documents like, for instance, brochures, Methodology 
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texts, reports and applications I received from the local development partner-
ships or the local authorities, and different notes I made myself during the inter-
views and the participants’ observations. Finally, based on the transcripts of the 104 
conducted guideline interviews, as well as on the additional documents mentioned 
above, the respondents’ perceptions of local development issues, common local 
initiatives, social and economic cooperation, as well as regional developmental 
chances and problems were compared, discussed, and summarized in the case 





4 RURAL DEVELOPMENT AS PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC 
GOODS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN RURAL POLAND 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical investigation of local development 
initiatives in rural areas of Poland. While the applied empirical methods and the 
case study regions were discussed in the previous chapter, Chapter 4 will provide 
detailed insights into the local public goods that were initially lacking in the case 
study regions. Thereafter, I discuss the institutional arrangements which have been 
implemented in those regions to provide these goods by means of local cooperative 
initiatives. In so doing, the focus of the empirical analysis will be placed, on the one 
hand, on the barriers which hampered local inhabitants from cooperating and, on 
the other hand, on the institutional changes which brought inhabitants into exchange 
in terms of a joint contribution to the provision of the concerned local public goods.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: The first section, 4.1, presents the creation of a 
local telephone co-operative in Dolina Strugu as part of the local public infra-
structure. Section 4.2 analyzes a public-private marketing partnership in Dolina 
Strugu which provides local peasant farmers with access to markets as a form of 
favorable conditions for local businesses and contributes to the preservation of the 
local cultural landscape. In Section 4.3, I discuss a local non-profit organization 
and a regional partnership which serve inhabitants with facilities to improve the 
local level of human capital and provide local businesses with access to markets 
and capital. The last section, 4.4, presents the results of the case study in Bałtów, 
where favorable conditions for local businesses in terms of an improvement of local 
infrastructure facilities and natural conditions, and an increase in demand for tourist 
offers, were provided by means of local development associations. 
4.1  Local public infrastructure – A telephone cooperative in 
Dolina Strugu 
This section presents the joint provision of a telephone network in the case study 
region of Dolina Strugu. After a short introduction on the importance of com-
munication systems for rural development (Section 4.1.1), I will describe crucial 
barriers which hampered local inhabitants from constructing a telephone network 
jointly before the cooperative was founded in 1992 (Section 4.1.2). Section 4.1.3 
presents the founding process of the local telephone cooperative. In Section 4.1.4  
I will discuss the success factors and the limitations of the approach before I draw 
some conclusions in Section 4.1.5.  An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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4.1.1  Telecommunication systems and rural development 
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, public infrastructure in terms of local roads, bridges, 
water supply systems or communication networks contributes to the sustainable 
economic and social development of rural areas. In this respect, communication 
infrastructure like telephone lines, and since the middle of the 1990s Internet access 
as well, is of the utmost importance. The impact of information and communica-
tions technologies (ICTs) on rural enterprises is emphasized by many different 
publications (MALECKI, 2003; CHAPMAN and SLAYMAKER, 2002; OECD, 2001b; 
GRIMES, 2000; MITCHELL and CLARK, 1999). Indeed, MITCHELL and CLARK (1999, 
p. 447) state that: "ICTs encompass an extensive range of telecommunications and 
computing services and applications, which enable improved communications,  
increased business efficiency and wider access to suppliers and customers […]. 
Such benefits, […], are of particular value to rural firms which are disadvan-
taged by distance and the small and scattered nature of local supply and demand." 
MALECKI (2003, p. 201) also assesses that: "[t]elecommunication technologies and 
the internet diminish, if they do not entirely erase, the tyranny of space and dis-
tance." 
In recent decades, the provision of communication infrastructure in urban and rural 
regions was generally undertaken with governmental support. Telephone compa-
nies that were subsidized or even owned by the state provided telephone networks 
and connections to private and public customers. However, as in other economic 
spheres, the predominant role of the state also entails various flaws in the telecom-
munication sector. For communication infrastructure, such flaws are often seen in 
an enormous underutilization of networks since the companies often did not corre-
spond to potential users’ expectations and abilities (GRIMES, 2000). As GRIMES 
(2000) states, technological determinism has given rise to false expectations, waste 
of funds, and increased skepticism about the potential of ICTs. Only a greater 
emphasis on enhancing the human dimension will bring more rural inhabitants and 
enterprises to the position of benefiting from those technologies. 
Inefficiencies, combined with governmental provision of communication infra-
structure, were supposed to be reduced by deregulation efforts in the telecommuni-
cation sector and by further privatization of governmental telephone companies. 
The market-based provision of telephone networks thus aimed to respond more 
closely to customers’ needs. Indeed, the deregulation of telecommunications often 
led to a more efficient provision of ICTs, but on the other hand it also diminished 
the likelihood of universal service for advanced services such as Internet access "in 
favor of letting the market determine what goes where," (MALECKI, 2003, 
pp. 201-202). Thus, deregulation in the telecommunication sector has in some cases 
even led to under-investment in rural communication infrastructure, as the fol-
lowing example from Dolina Strugu will show. An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
 
86 
Polish rural areas are poorly equipped with communication infrastructure. As 
Figure 4-1 shows, the number of telephone lines per 1,000 rural inhabitants, at 
roughly 195, was far below the average figure for Poland. In contrast, rural areas 
of the former EU-15 were equipped with more than 470 telephone lines per 
1,000  inhabitants (SOP, 2004). With respect to Internet access the situation 
looks quite similar. In 2004, only 15 % of Polish rural households had access to 
the Internet (NSP 2007). For rural areas in the EU-15 member states, this indica-
tor was 62 % (MARD, 2006b). 




















































   
Source:  GUS (various years). 
As depicted in Figure 4-1 the number of telephone lines per 1,000 rural inhabitants 
in the Podkarpackie voivodship is even below the Polish average for rural areas, 
and increased only slightly between 2000 and 2004. During the deregulation process 
of the state-owned telephone company in the early 1990s, the company refused to 
invest in telecommunication networks for many rural communes in the concerning 
voivodship, as they expected tremendous investment needs due to the mountainous 
topography of these regions. This was also true for the case study region of Dolina 
Strugu, which is located in the center of the Podkarpackie voivodship. In 1990, 
only 900 subscriptions were being provided to the 38,000 inhabitants of Dolina 
Strugu, and the national telephone company declared it would not undertake any 
investments in the local telephone network. 
4.1.2  Barriers hampering inhabitants from a joint provision of a telephone 
infrastructure  
In the early 1990s, private provision of a local telephone network in Dolina Strugu 
was hardly possible due to the enormous investment requirements and a lack of 
businesses that were willing to invest in the region’s telecommunication system. 
During socialism the state provided, although not to a level that satisfied all  An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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inhabitants’ needs, a telecommunication network by means of governmental funds. 
And since the state refused to undertake further investments, the provision of the 
local telephone network depended solely on the initiative and cooperation of local 
inhabitants. 
However, although all inhabitants would have benefited from the provision of such 
a telephone network, it was not constructed based on joint contributions. This is 
because the inhabitants’ joint investments in a local telephone network would entail 
free-riding options. That is, even if a group of local inhabitants decides to con-
tribute its own shares in terms of funds or working time to the construction of a 
local telephone infrastructure, none of the contributors can be sure that single in-
habitants do not take advantage of these investments by retaining their shares 
while others contribute. Hence, simply the availability of the free-riding option keeps 
local inhabitants from contributing to those common investments. Therefore, 
inhabitants are caught in a social dilemma where they are not able to exploit the 
gains of cooperation. From this it follows that the telephone network will only be 
provided when an institutional arrangement is implemented which assures contribu-
tors that only those who deliver their individual shares to the common pool will 
be able to benefit from the network. The interaction problem, which resulted from 
the absence of an institutional arrangement that coordinates inhabitants’ contribu-
tions to the local telephone network and which sanctions non-contributors, became 
even more difficult because of the following reasons interviewees from Dolina 
Strugu gave for not founding an initiative that would have jointly provided a local 
telephone network when the state company declared it would withhold further 
investments: 
1) The thinking that "the government is supposed to provide a telecommunication 
infrastructure" was deeply rooted in local inhabitants’ minds. Interviewees 
mentioned that local inhabitants did not agree to invest in the telephone net-
work, as they felt that the public sector has to do it. One respondent stated that: 
"People are saying, ‘I pay taxes and the state should do something’. There were 
many situations where people came to the local authorities and said: ‘I need a 
road in front of my yard, why don’t you come and build it. I paid taxes, so you 
have to do it’." (DS-12). The same interviewee further mentioned that local in-
habitants always felt separated from governmental decisions and even from 
decisions made by local administrations. He assessed: "People in this region 
were thinking that the state is on one side and inhabitants are on the other side. 
[…] They always depended on the administration. The administrations could 
really change your life if they wanted to. The local administrations were the 
ones who could give you a passport if you wanted to go somewhere. There was 
no connection between them and us. They were always on the other side. And 
old people here are still thinking like this" (DS-12). Due to this separation be-
tween the local population and authorities, inhabitants were not involved in the 
planning and the provision of local public infrastructure and, therefore, were An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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lacking scientific knowledge and management skills for undertaking actions in 
order to install a new telephone network on their own. 
2) Lack of local leaders that manage local initiatives. Initiatives on the local provi-
sion of public infrastructure also need local leaders who take responsibility, 
encourage local inhabitants to cooperate, manage common activities, and are 
trusted by the local community. Interviewees mentioned that during socialism 
and in the early 1990s, voluntary initiatives in villages in the Dolina Strugu 
region were mainly conducted by the local churches and aimed to improve the 
church or church facilities. In those cases the local priest distributed different 
tasks among local inhabitants, as a respondent stated: "When the priest said 
he needs someone to clean up or to build something, he called a house number 
and one person of the household had do the work" (DS-20). Another inter-
viewee assessed: "When you work for the church, your work will stay in the 
village and you do not have to give your money for something that you cannot 
see," (DS-09). However, with respect to non-church activities there was a lack 
of local leader personalities who were authoritative and who had a local repu-
tation for leading local inhabitants in voluntary cooperative activities. 
Finally, the implementation of institutional arrangements that coordinate inhabi-
tants’ contributions to a common telephone network is further hampered by a lack 
of local leaders who would monitor the process, as well as by the lack of know-
how concerning how those institutional arrangements have to be constructed.  
4.1.3  Founding a telephone cooperative in Dolina Strugu 
In 1992, the local authorities of the four communes belonging to the Dolina Strugu 
region, together with local inhabitants, founded a telephone cooperative to provide 
local inhabitants with access to telephone subscribers. The seed capital for the coope-
rative was taken from membership fees every inhabitant who joined the company 
had to pay, and credits for which the four local governments of Dolina Strugu acted 
as guarantors. The initial concept was consistent with a local telephone co-operative 
located in rural areas of the USA. The concept also worked out successfully for 
the region of Dolina Strugu. Within a short period of time the telephone coopera-
tive made profits and was able to operate without any additional financial support. 
As Figure 4-2 shows, from 1991 onwards, the number of telephone subscribers in 
Dolina Strugu increased continuously and amounted to more than 9,800 in 2003. 
During the same period more than 6,500 households signed up for membership 
in the cooperative. In 2003, due to the telephone cooperative, the number of tele-
phone lines per 1,000 inhabitants in Dolina Strugu exceeded, with 258, the national 
average for rural areas (199 telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants) and the average 
of rural areas in Podkarpackie (168 telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants) even more 
so. Furthermore, since 1995 the local telephone co-operative also started to provide 
Internet access to local inhabitants. In 2003, 3,150 households in Dolina Strugu, 
39 % of the total number of households, had access to the Internet, which also An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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exceeded the average number for Polish rural areas. In addition, the telephone 
cooperative provides local calls for free and has created more than 50 new non-
agricultural jobs. 
Figure 4-2:  Access to telephone and access to Internet provided by the  
















4.1.4  Success factors and limitations 
The successful development of the local telephone cooperative depended on various 
factors mentioned by different interview partners. In the following, I will present 
three success factors that strongly facilitated cooperation among local inhabi-
tants in the telephone cooperative. At the end of this section, some limitations of 
the approach will also be discussed.  
1) Integrated organizational structure overcomes free-riding. "The co-operative 
is really integrated. People really feel like being part or even like being an 
owner of the cooperative," (DS-22) a respondent stated. The telephone coopera-
tive can be regarded as a club good according to the taxonomy discussed in 
Section 2.1. Beneficiaries were obliged to join the cooperative and to pay a 
monthly fee as well as a single fee per subscriber. The latter fact also excluded 
free-riding since only contributors were provided with services. The coopera-
tive employs a management team which is monitored by the general assembly 
consisting of one representative per 100 cooperative members and the members 
of the local governments. This organizational structure gives members the oppor-
tunity to influence decisions made in the cooperative. Additionally, the whole 
management of the telephone cooperative is of local provenance and keeps 
everyday contact to local inhabitants. This facilitates trust between management 
and customers and makes a response to local needs easier. Furthermore, the or-
ganizational structure of the cooperative also comprises market aspects, as it is a 
commercial entity on a national market for telecommunication. In the late 1990s, 
with increasing investments in the national telephone networks, other telephone An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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companies also tried to attract customers from the Dolina Strugu region. How-
ever, its quick response to customers’ needs, as well as its good value for services 
enables the cooperative to compete successfully against other providers.  
2) Capital given by the communes facilitated start-up investments. The majority 
of the local inhabitants did not join the cooperative right from the beginning. 
Many of them were skeptical and intended to join the cooperative only in case 
of its success. Hence, the first seed capital was not taken from membership 
fees. Rather, it came from credits borrowed by the local communes. After the 
initial investments were undertaken and the first successes were realized, the 
number of memberships started to grow and, thus, the budget of the telephone 
cooperative also increased. Although the money spent on the cooperative was, 
to a large extent, not from governmental sources, the involvement of local 
governments was necessary to fund the start-up investments.  
3) Local leaders developed the vision, coordinated collective activities, and estab-
lished the contact between local inhabitants and local authorities. As men-
tioned above, the inhabitants needed to be convinced by the concept of the 
telephone cooperative. Therefore, local leaders were needed who followed their 
vision of a local telephone cooperative and who could encourage others to 
join. In all four communes of Dolina Strugu there were local commune leaders 
who were elected in the first free local elections after the socialism era. These 
local leaders were enthusiastic and willing to improve the local conditions in 
the region. One of these leaders stated in the interview: "At the beginning we 
knew, if we cooperate we can do something. And once we start to cooperate, 
other people will follow us," (DS-33). Another former member of the local 
governments gave a similar answer: "As we started this cooperative, we used 
to be about 100 members. However, as inhabitants realized that the co-operative 
is working successfully, they joined and said: ‘Oh, I want a telephone, too.’" 
(DS-02). These local leaders also elaborated on the first concept of the coope-
rative and went to every local household and asked household members to 
join the cooperative as well as to come to the initial meetings. Among these 
leaders there was one person, Mr. J., who was the mayor of one commune and 
strongly headed the initiatives. He was also the one who convinced the regional 
bank to provide credits for the telephone cooperative. A local inhabitant men-
tioned: "There is this story about Mr. J.: It says he went together with the 
priest to the bank to ask for a credit. He stayed there until they agreed to pay a 
credit for the telephone co-operative" (DS-11). Another interview respondent 
emphasized the role of Mr. J. within the first initiatives as follows: "Most 
people of the area did not believe that this [telephone cooperative] will work. 
They thought they won’t have the money. And we needed him [Mr. J.] to con-
vince the local population. Without Mr. J. the telephone cooperative would 
not exist" (DS-02).  An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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However, small sized telephone cooperatives like the one in Dolina Strugu com-
pared to telephone companies that operate nation-wide do also entail disadvan-
tages. Thus, although those small sized cooperatives may work more efficiently 
with respect to problems of bureaucracy, they will not be able to exploit economies 
of scale as well as be in the position to participate on the latest technological pro-
gresses. Additionally, since customers of the cooperative are to the same time mem-
bers of the latter, there are also emotional bonds that prevent them from reacting 
as fast to changes in the quality of the services as they would if they solely had the 
status of customers of a large telephone company. Furthermore, it has to be empha-
sized that the telephone cooperative is strongly based on special local features 
like the strong involvement of Mr. J., who headed the initial steps, or the willing-
ness of the four local communes to cooperate beyond local administrative boarders. 
As other telephone cooperative projects in rural Poland have shown, if those fea-
tures are not locally available, similar efforts like the ones made by inhabitants 
from Dolina Strugu may, somehow, not show similar successful results.  
4.1.5  Conclusions and prospects for further initiatives 
As mentioned above, in the early 1990s the joint provision of a local telephone 
network in Dolina Strugu was hampered by the existence of free-riding options 
among contributors. An institutional arrangement had to be found, which excluded 
free-riding and thus encouraged inhabitants to contribute jointly to the telephone 
network in order to exploit gains from cooperation. Such an institutional arrange-
ment is the telephone cooperative. As shown in Table 4-1 the foundation and the 
performance of the telephone cooperative was influenced by all three governance 
structures discussed in section 2.3.  
The interaction between members of the telephone cooperative is first of all market-
based. That is, inhabitants join the cooperative and pay a regular fee as well as a 
single fee per subscriber and receive in return a subscriber, access to the local tele-
phone network and local calls for free. Exchange among inhabitants in terms of a 
joint contribution, hence, is coordinated by the market mechanism and the member-
ship of inhabitants constitutes inhabitants’ approval for this institutional arrange-
ment. Free-riding in the latter arrangement becomes negligible. The cooperative 
also operates as a commercial entity on the national market for telecommunication 
networks and is, therefore, forced to serve its customers with competitive and good 
value services. To remain on the market the telephone cooperative has to operate 
efficiently so that it can stay attractive for its customers and to keep its credit-
worthiness. 
A successful implementation of the telephone cooperative had not been possible 
without the impact of the four local governments. In order to join the cooperative 
inhabitants needed to be encouraged. This was solely possible due to first successes 
the cooperative had to boast. In this respect, although public funding was negligible 
for the creation of the telephone cooperative, local authorities does play an important An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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role in the initial stage as they funded initial steps of the cooperative based on 
credits borrowed by the communes. The creditworthiness of the four communes is 
achieved due to their public status. That is, the communes are funded by tax money 
allocated by the state (governmental regulation) which assures their creditworthi-
ness compared to many small local enterprises lacking any kind of collateral. Hence, 
also governmental action played an important role with respect to the implemen-
tation of the telephone cooperative as public credit guarantees encouraged inhabi-
tants to continue investments in the local telephone network. 
However, as discussed in section 2.3.2 public investments alone, can often lead 
to inefficiency as they miss to take local preferences and conditions into considera-
tions. In this regard, community governance played an important role as it con-
tributed to a successful performance of the telephone cooperative, too. First of all 
the local provenance of the main initiators of the cooperative allowed the latter 
to orientate the services of the cooperative closely to the local customers needs 
and to spend profits on projects, which are of public interest like the provision of 
local schools with internet access or further investments in new telecommunica-
tion technologies. Furthermore, due to their local provenance it was easier to call 
the main initiators of the cooperative to account if credits for which the communes 
guaranteed were not spent on projects which were publicly desired. In addition to 
the public interest, the main initiators were also encouraged by their local reputa-
tion. As mentioned above, most of the initiators were members of the local govern-
ment and had a strong interest in becoming re-elected in the next local election. 
This is in particular true for one local leader, Mr. J, mentioned above. He, as the 
mayor of one of the four communes, was interested in developing the region. Due 
to his relations to rural telephone cooperatives in the USA he was able to acquire 
the basic know-how necessary to implement such a telephone cooperative. Com-
munity relations between local inhabitants had also an important impact on the 
development of the cooperative. As mentioned above, inhabitants had to be  
encouraged to join the cooperative and this was often done through talks be-
tween inhabitants on the road, discussions with neighbors over the fence etc. 
However, due to these community relations local trust in the cooperative increased 
and the joint investments could be realized.  An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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Table 4-1:  Success factors of the telephone cooperative distinguished  
by market, governmental, and community background  
Market approach  State  
(Governmental levels)  Community 
- Telephone cooperative 
enabled a joint contri-
bution to the telephone 
network based on 
market relations 
- Members of the co-
operative still remain 
customer, what en-
courages the coopera-
tive to provide the  
latter with good value 
services  
- Use of commercial 
credits compared to 
public funding pro-
vides incentives for  
efficient business 
management  
(see section 2.3.1) 
- Communes acted as 
guarantor for com-
mercial credits that 
were essentially used 
as seed capital for the 
cooperative  
- Coordination and co-
operation between the 
four communes was 
foremost possible due 
to local government 
relationships 
- Local provenance of 
initiators enable the 
cooperative to respond 
to local needs and 
forced the initiators to 
take responsibility for 
their decisions 
- Local provenance of 
the initiators eased to 
create trust between  
the cooperative and  
local customers  
- Due to community  
relations inhabitants 
encouraged each other 
to join the cooperative 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
The outcomes of the local telephone cooperative are not only seen in the tele-
phone network, the access to telephone subscribers and internet. The cooperative 
also strongly contributed to the strengthening of local capabilities like local trust. 
An interview respondent, who did not belong to the initiators of the telephone co-
operative, stated: "But one thing that still consolidates local trust is the telephone 
cooperative. People worked together to create the telephone network and still coope-
rate in the telephone company. And they communicate through their telephones 
and the internet access is important to provide them with new information" (DS-07). 
Furthermore, the experience of successful cooperation also encouraged local inhabi-
tants to undertake further common initiatives in Dolina Strugu. A member of the 
telephone cooperative assessed: "After we were successful, we still wanted to coope-
rate and wanted to change something in the region. That is why we started further 
associations to find solutions for the problems of this region" (DS-19). One of these 
initiatives, a local agricultural marketing cooperative, will be discussed in the next 
section (Section 4.2). The following section will also present further outcomes, 
which can, to some extent, also be ascribed to the impact the telephone coopera-
tive had on the local economic development in general. An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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4.2  Improving market access for peasant farms and preserving  
local cultural landscape – A public-private marketing  
partnership in Dolina Strugu 
This section presents a public-private marketing partnership that provides local 
peasant farms with access to markets and contributes more than 400 non-agricultural 
jobs to the local labor market. After describing the situation of local peasant farms 
prior to when the public-private partnership was founded (Section 4.2.1), I will 
discuss different barriers which hampered local farmers from founding producer 
groups or similar agricultural associations in Dolina Strugu (Section 4.2.2). In 
Section 4.2.3 I will then present the local public-private marketing partnership. 
Section 4.2.4 discusses the success factors of the marketing partnership and also 
mentions different barriers that could not be overcome. Section 4.2.5 provides insights 
into the partnerships’ impacts on the local economic development. Section 4.2.6 
concludes.  
4.2.1  Lacking market access for peasant farms and an increasing neglect of the 
cultural landscape of Dolina Strugu  
Agricultural production in the case study region of Dolina Strugu is dominated 
by peasant farms. About two-thirds of the total working population work on the 
8,000 individual farms located in the region. Younger farmers often have additional 
employment in Rzeszow, the next bigger city. The majority of farmers, however, 
are between 50 and 70 years old and worked in industrial companies in Rzeszow 
until the early 1990s. The average farm size is slightly above 3 ha, with moder-
ate soil and climate conditions, but the cultivation of land is limited by the hilly 
topography. As a result, nearly the whole area is classified by the EU as a "less 
favored area." Agricultural production is dominated by plant production, espe-
cially cereals, potatoes, soft fruits, feed and root plants. Animal production plays 
a lesser role, with only a few farmers specializing in the production of pork and 
beef. 
Farming in Dolina Strugu is strongly affected by a fragmented land structure, the 
hilly landscape, and the often outdated machinery used by farmers. Further problems 
mentioned by local peasants were seen in the increasing agricultural input prices
16 
and the decrease of producer prices. As Figure 4-3 shows, in 2005 prices for wheat, 
barley and rye amounted to only 70 % of the prices from 2001 and the producer 
prices for soft fruits varied strongly during the same period of time. Furthermore, 
because of their small farm size and their outdated machinery, farmers from Dolina 
Strugu are often not able to fulfill the newly implemented EU quality requirements 
and do not hold any bargaining power in negotiations with wholesalers. In many 
                                                 
16  In 2005, prices for agricultural inputs were more than twice as high as in 2000 (MARD, 2006, 
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cases, local peasants were even left with their crops because they were unable 
to find a wholesaler. Related to that, two local farmers commented: "Agriculture 
in this area is not a very good idea. You often have no income from agriculture and 
you do not have a place, to which you can sell your products," (DS-07). "Farmers 
here have just one or two hectares and they have really big problems selling their 
crops. Because if you want to sell your crops to wholesalers, they would not take it 
or the transport costs would be higher than the price you receive for just 20 tons or 
less," (DS-13). 
Figure 4-3:  Development of producer prices for cereals and soft fruits  



























































Source: FAOSTAT,  2008. 
Thus, many peasants of Dolina Strugu have already quit cultivating and left their 
fields fallow. A local farmer assessed the situation as follows: "In the last years, 
I think most of this land here became unused. There are already lots of fields which 
are fallow. All of my neighbors do not cultivate their land anymore" (DS-30). Ac-
cording to respondents, the increasing share of fallow land has reduced the attrac-
tiveness of the regional landscape and lessens the chances for the local economy 
to develop in a more tourist-based direction. Hence, inhabitants often felt powerless 
because they appreciated the preservation of their cultural landscape and the 
quality of their locally grown products, but did not know how to maintain farming 
without access to larger wholesalers or to local or regional markets. Hence, peasant 
farms in Dolina Strugu are confronted with unfavorable conditions in terms of lacking 
access to markets. These unfavorable conditions further result in a lacking provi-
sion of another local public good, namely, the cultural landscape. An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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4.2.2  Barriers hampering farmers from common marketing initiatives  
A common solution for improving peasant farms’ market access is cooperation 
among farmers. According to BALINT (2004, p. 247) the advantages of a coopera-
tive comprise the reduction of costs "of accessing input and output markets and 
strengthening the farmers’ negotiation power." ESCOBAL et al. (2000) note that, "[…] 
small farmers lack human and organizational capital embodied in management 
skills [and] [t]hat lack creates both production and marketing inefficiencies." These 
authors regard lower input prices and lower interest rates as a result of group bor-
rowing, higher producer prices, and saving of transport costs as important advan-
tages of farmers’ service cooperatives. Particularly for southeastern Polish rural 
areas (including the Dolina Strugu region), where agricultural production is domi-
nated by peasant farms, any kind of cooperation between farmers may provide 
chances for peasants to concentrate their production on markets and to increase 
farm income due to a common price negotiation. However, as ZAWOJSKA (2006) 
mentioned, governmental efforts to create small farm associations or producer 
groups generally failed, except in a few cases. Also, BANASZAK (2005, p. 3) states 
that the latter groups currently still possess only "a very marginal share in terms 
of both volume of the goods marketed and the number of associated farmers." How-
ever, which barriers prevent local peasant farms from cooperating?  
Lacking cooperation among the peasants of Dolina Strugu is a result of a particular 
social dilemma inherent in their situation. That is, although peasants would improve 
their income and economic situation by joining a cooperative, the former continue 
the status quo, where gains from cooperation remain unexploited. In Dolina Strugu, 
reasons for the lacking cooperation among peasants were seen in the following 
barriers:  
1) Individual reservations about cooperation. Locally, this is called the "Polish 
mentality." Reservations against cooperation in general still have an ideological 
background resulting from the experiences of farmers from the south of Poland 
during the socialist era. During that time, the majority of peasants successfully 
defended their farms against governmental collectivization efforts, but were 
often discriminated by political decision-makers in the time that followed. Inter-
viewees also mentioned a further decrease in trust between inhabitants resulting 
from income disparities between rural households that have strongly increased 
in the transformation process. An interview partner stated: "Farmers do not co-
operate too much. This is because there is jealousy between people and there are 
problems we did not have 15 or 20 years ago. When we used to dug potatoes 
in the field, lots of people came and were helping and we helped them. But now, 
everybody just takes care of his own family," (DS-22). Another peasant argued 
as follows: "If the one who cooperates with me will earn higher profits from 
this cooperation than I do, I do not see any reasons to cooperate. And how can I 
trust that he does not take advantage of me?" (DS-30). Similar assessments 
were given by a respondent who owns a bigger farm: "Maybe if someone comes An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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to the region and will attempt to start a cooperative; farmers would cooperate 
in a group. That might be possible. However, you know how it looks in Poland, 
you always do not know here, whether the man who started the initiative will 
share the profits later on," (DS-25). The lack of trust can also be ascribed to 
experiences residents had in former agricultural producer groups. In the middle 
of the 1990s, as different interviewees mentioned, a soft fruit producer group 
was founded and collapsed after a few years due to a dramatic decrease in prices 
for soft fruits. As farmers realized that they would not have any profits from 
the producer group, they left the group.  
2) Inflexible decision-making procedures. Efforts to found producer groups with 
a small number of members failed because the groups were not able to gain 
enough market power. One farmer mentioned that: "In Blazowa [one of the 
villages in Dolina Strugu] there used to be a producer group for wheat […] 
and I was a member, too. But this group collapsed since there was no market 
for our production. We tried it two or three years but also in the producer group 
we could not sell our production," (DS-22). Inhabitants have estimated that 
producer groups need more than a thousand members to achieve some bargaining 
power in Dolina Strugu. However, to find a consensus and to pass decisions 
on a sanction system or other agreements in such a big group leads to high 
bargaining costs and paralyses decision-making. A farmer stated: "A further 
problem lies in the fact that there are too many farmers and it is hard to find a 
consensus with all members of a producer group. And this would be more 
complicated if farmers were not only from a single Gmina [commune], but are 
working in a wider region," (DS-06). Hence, it is difficult to bring the numerous 
peasants into exchange with respect to an agreement on a common set of rules 
that should constitute the foundation of a producer group. Furthermore, the often 
neighborly or even friendly relationship between producer group members 
also hampers the application of formal rules or sanctions against each other 
and reduces, therefore, the effective functioning of a producer group. 
3) Definition of product standards. The establishment of producer groups which 
commonly supply their products to wholesalers implies different opportunities 
for free-riding. Wholesalers often link product prices for certain quantities of 
products with certain production standards. In this respect a social dilemma 
situation emerges. Although members of a producer group force each other to 
produce to certain standards to provide the wholesaler with a quantity of equal 
quality, some members could enjoy the higher price linked to a certain product 
quality, but deliver their products without fulfilling all quality standards that 
were required, as they fear undertaking the additional investments necessary 
to deliver their products to the same high quality standards. That is, a farmer, 
since he is not able to predict how others with whom he cooperates behave, 
may not work as hard to fulfill the standards as he would if he was sure about 
the product quality others provide or/and if others were able to sanction him An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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for not producing to these standards. Consequently, if the quality of the products 
that every member delivers cannot be controlled separately, the free-riding option 
hampers peasants from joining a producer group with other farmers and from 
exploiting gains from cooperation.  
4) Principal-agent problems between management and members. Negative ex-
periences with producer groups not only resulted from external market impacts, 
but also from managerial problems. Farmers from Dolina Strugu attributed 
problems of former producer groups to a lack of trustworthy management. For 
instance, the manager of a dairy producer group embezzled money, which led 
to a collapse of the group. A local inhabitant mentioned that: "They also tried 
few times to have a common milk plant. There were two men who wanted to 
create this milk plant but finally, they cheated lots of farmers and the latter 
lost their trust again. It is not a good idea if one man gets a lot of money for a 
short period of time," (DS-09). If a management team is employed by a producer 
group, members have to be aware of opportunistic behavior. Therefore, a control 
system or a particular incentive system has to be established which will lead to 
an increase in operational costs. However, since members of agricultural coopera-
tives are, compared to shareholders of a firm, not able to buy or sell stocks of 
the organization to make speculative gains based on future flows of firm profits, 
incentives for cooperative members to monitor management will be lower 
(DEININGER, 1995, p. 1319). Hence, the willingness of members of agricultural 
cooperatives to bear additional costs for a monitoring and sanctioning system 
might be generally low.  
5) Lack of finance. Producer groups in Dolina Strugu will only succeed if they 
process and market their products on their own. However, those processing 
activities require different facilities and above all they require capital. To provide 
a sufficient amount of seed capital from membership fees is, as one interviewee 
assesses, hardly possible for a producer group consisting of peasants from Dolina 
Strugu: "Farmers in this region would maybe decide to start a producer group 
and every farmer decide to give some money of his income to this producer 
group, however, their incomes are so small that it will not work," (DS-11). In 
addition, farmers would face the decision of whether to contribute to a common 
pool of money or to keep the money and to continue working individually. If 
they decided to contribute to a common pool, other members of the group could 
decide to not pay their contributions. Thus, since peasants cannot be certain 
about other group members’ behavior, they will decide not to contribute. And 
even with regard to bank credits as founding capital, a social dilemma between 
peasants emerges. This is because although a bank agreed to give credits to a 
group of peasants, a suitable guarantor is hard to find. Here, a guarantor as a 
group member is confronted with the free-riding option for all other group mem-
bers summarized in the following question: How can the guarantor be sure that 
all members will contribute as best as possible to the success of the producer An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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group? Hence, due to these interaction problems, efforts to found producer 
groups in Dolina Strugu mostly failed at the very beginning.  
Finally, if farmers, due to a lack of market power, the high costs resulting from 
inflexible decision-making procedures, and a lack of proper and trustworthy leaders 
were not able to improve their incomes by means of producer groups, there would 
be no incentive for them to continue working in the group or even to join a co-
operative with farmers. However, the majority of the abovementioned reasons for 
the absence of farmers’ associations or producer groups in Dolina Strugu can be 
ascribed to interaction problems among local farmers themselves and inhabitants, 
respectively. Therefore, although there is an urgent need of any kind of institutional 
arrangement that allows farmers in Dolina Strugu to gain from mutual exchange 
and cooperation respectively, these reasons make the establishment of such ar-
rangements more or less impossible. 
4.2.3   "Chmielnik Zdrój" – A public-private agricultural marketing partnership  
An institutional alternative to agricultural associations that are purely based on 
farmers’ membership are public-private partnerships (PPP). As we will see below, 
PPPs combine characteristics of all three governance structures mentioned in 
Section 2.3 and are therefore able to respond to local interaction problems like the 
ones described above. The term public-private partnership covers a wide variety 
of institutional interactions (SPIELMAN and GREBMER, 2004, p. 8). With respect to 
the agricultural sector, PPPs were often found in developing countries as coopera-
tion between governments, research institutes and local businesses or farmers 
(e.g. HARTWICH, GONZALEZ and VIEIRA, 2005; SPIELMAN and GREBMER, 2004). 
In this monograph I define PPPs according to SPIELMAN and GREBMER (2004) 
and HARTWICH, GONZALEZ and VIEIRA (2005), that is, as a collaborative effort be-
tween private and governmental sectors in which each sector bears responsibility 
and risk, participates in the decision-making process and contributes in planning 
and investments to achieve shared objectives. Activities undertaken within the 
scope of PPPs should "bring together the efficiency, flexibility, and competence 
of the private sector with the accountability, long-term perspective, and social 
interests of the public sector," (SPIELMAN and GREBMER, 2004, p. 10). In the fol-
lowing, I will present the public-private partnership "Chmielnik Zdrój" (Well of 
Chmielnik), which is a commercial entity based on a bottom-up initiative of local 
governments, a local non-profit organization, and local entrepreneurs. After pre-
senting the concept of the partnership, I attempt to demonstrate why it was suc-
cessful despite the previously mentioned local interaction problems. 
"Chmielnik Zdrój" is a joint-stock company located in Chmielnik, one of the four 
communes of Dolina Strugu. Associates of "Chmielnik Zdrój" are the four local 
communes of Dolina Strugu, a local non-profit organization called "Dolina Strugu", 
and various local entrepreneurs. The roots of this initiative go back to the telephone 
cooperative discussed in the last section. Based on the successful experience of An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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cooperation, leading members of the telephone cooperative and local governments 
founded a non-profit organization called "Dolina Strugu"
17, which was supposed 
to solve communal infrastructure problems, support the environmental protection 
of the area, and stimulate economic activity in the region. As one of the first initia-
tives, "Chmielnik Zdrój" was founded with start-up funds partly from the com-
munes (especially the Chmielnik commune) and the non-profit organization "Dolina 
Strugu", as well as partly from loans secured by using local entrepreneurs’ houses 
as collateral. 
The initial idea of "Chmielnik Zdrój" was to create new jobs with the help of a 
mineral water company located in Chmielnik, to provide a marketing channel 
for local peasants, to provide people from the region with local, traditionally-
made products, and to keep the environment and fields in good and environmen-
tally-friendly condition. Since the production of mineral water requires a specific 
treatment of the local groundwater resources, the initiators of "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
decided to enter into a particular exchange with local peasants. That is, local peasants 
were obliged to produce without the input of any pesticides or mineral fertilizers, 
but received in turn the opportunity to sell their crops to "Chmielnik Zdrój", where 
the latter were processed and packed for regional customers. 
When "Chmielnik Zdrój" started in 1994, the partnership provided the regional 
population with mineral water, ordered by telephone and delivered to their homes. 
In the following years, they added further products and increased their production 
capacities very quickly. The farmers’ relation to the partnership is market-based, 
they are usually not members and do not pay any fees. In 2005, the partnership em-
ployed 400 people and bought agricultural products from more than 500 peasant 
farms of Dolina Strugu. In the region surrounding the cities of Krakow, Rzeszow, 
Tarnow and Lublin, they use 170 vehicles to provide 70,000 households with 
processed products (vegetables, fruits, honey, bread, fruit juice, soups, and pasta). 
Customers place their order by phone or Internet, and their purchases are delivered 
to their home. Farmers have short- or medium-term contracts with the partnership, 
which enables them to sell their products without having to deliver them to a distant 
wholesale company. The partnership provides them with a basic source of income 
and certainty about next year’s market situation. Furthermore, due to "Chmielnik 
Zdrój’s" strategy of direct marketing, they are able to provide peasants with higher 
than market prices. In addition, "Chmielnik Zdrój" supports farmers in applying 
for ecological certification. This certification is provided by a government agency 
and is combined with a regular control of farmers’ products. In the near future, 
this will free "Chmielnik Zdrój" from testing the quality of the delivered products. 
Farmers also receive assistance in production planning. "Chmielnik Zdrój" has 
                                                 
17 The name "Dolina Strugu", when used in quotation marks, indicates the non-profit organiza-
tion "Dolina Strugu". The name Dolina Strugu used without quotation marks refers to the ana-
lyzed region.  An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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further social tasks: It conducts and finances vocational training for local inhabi-
tants, provides 10 % of its turnovers for local "Caritas" (charity) projects, and 
supports local initiatives against alcoholism. 
The structure of the main local initiatives in Dolina Strugu is depicted in Figure 4-4. 
All three groups (local governments, "Dolina Strugu", and local entrepreneurs), 
which provided founding capital to the PPP, also hold shares of the company and 
are represented in the management board. Additionally, the management board 
authorized a manager to head the company and the various business areas. 
Figure 4-4:  Structure of the main local initiatives in Dolina Strugu 
 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
The non-profit organization "Dolina Strugu", as a further important local initiative 
in Dolina Strugu, is also closely connected to "Chmielnik Zdrój", as shown in 
Figure 4-4. They have various tasks which are supported by, among others, the 
public-private partnership. "Dolina Strugu" undertook initiatives explicitly directed 
to improve the regional labor market; they provide a labor agency for local inhabi-
tants where job applicants receive assistance to find new jobs. In particular, young 
job applicants gain knowledge concerning the proper way to prepare job applica-
tions and how to behave in job interviews. Moreover, "Dolina Strugu" provides 
farmers with information on EU programs and assistance in applying for direct 
payments or other funds free of charge. Additionally, "Dolina Strugu" organizes 
workshops for people who plan to start-up a business and for young entrepreneurs. 
In 2002, with the financial assistance of a World Bank program, an advisory 
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agency for new business start-ups was created as a further initiative. This agency 
now assists business founders and existing small enterprises in overcoming bureau-
cratic problems, finding financial sources or improving their current production. 
It also offers loans to entrepreneurs. The only requirements for access to such loans 
are the nomination of two guarantors and the preparation of a business plan. In 
this way borrowers do not have to provide any collateral. The interest rates are below 
those of commercial credits, which is supposed to ease the performance of small 
businesses in the early years of their existence. From its foundation until the 
summer of 2005, the agency provided advice to more than 400 inhabitants; this 
advice is free of charge for clients, as the costs were covered by the financial assis-
tance of the World Bank program. 
4.2.4  Success factors and limitations of "Chmielnik Zdrój"  
"Chmielnik Zdrój" is a prime example of the rule that successful cooperation 
critically depends on the initiative of the affected individuals and their willingness 
to contribute to their own development (MÜLLER, 1994). However, actively partici-
pating members are only a small number of local government representatives and 
local leaders. This makes "Chmielnik Zdrój" a public-private partnership distinct 
from traditional farmers’ service cooperatives. The approach overcomes a number 
of obstacles to cooperation mentioned earlier, but also creates problems for broader 
participation. In the following, I summarize the major success factors of "Chmielnik 
Zdrój" but also discuss some limitations of the public-private partnership. The 
success of "Chmielnik Zdrój" can be ascribed to the following factors: 
1) Market-based approach limits risk of long-term involvement for farmers. The 
partnership uses its own distribution network and has a regional marketing 
label. Thus, it successfully developed a regional niche market and is independent 
from the big retail companies. Farmers also do not have to become shareholders 
or invest their own funds, and they do not have to take the risk of setting up 
the organization. This eliminates the free-rider and moral hazard problems that 
would emerge with respect to the funding of a producer group. Due to farmers’ 
market-based relation to the partnership, there is little danger of a hold-up for 
them. Furthermore, a contract between the commune of Chmielnik and the part-
nership guarantees local farmers that they can sell their products to the organiza-
tion before it is permitted to buy products from other regions. The main risk has 
thus been taken by the communes and by local leaders who are engaged in the 
management of the partnership. In addition, the wide array of products that 
"Chmielnik Zdrój" provides limits the risk of a product failure that former 
producer groups in Dolina Strugu have already experienced. 
2) Setting up as a public-private partnership with a limited number of members 
eases decision-making and allows professional management. The principal 
agent problem between management and the associates of the partnership was 
minimized because the executive manager, who is originally from Dolina An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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Strugu, is subject to supervision by a board of trustees and was already involved 
in the telephone cooperative. However, the professional management is also 
strongly appreciated by the local peasants. As the latter assessed, the former 
producer groups were often lacking leaders since peasants generally do not have 
managerial skills and no additional funds were available for professional man-
agement. As a farmer mentioned: "It is helpful when those agricultural asso-
ciations like "Chmielnik Zdrój" have a management which takes care of farmers’ 
production, advises farmers, makes decisions, and gives also information about 
the products to the consumers" (DS-07). The associates are a small group of local 
inhabitants who already cooperated successfully within the telephone coopera-
tive. The engagement of local governments as guarantors greatly eased the 
funding problem of the public-private partnership. 
3) Complementary services offered to farmers provide incentives for a long-term 
business relation and serve as a quality control mechanism. The non-profit 
organization "Dolina Strugu" provides farmers with complementary assistance 
in applying for EU programs, which is particularly important for the high num-
ber of part-time farmers. From "Chmielnik Zdrój", farmers receive assistance in 
applying for ecological certification, which also works as an additional quality 
control system for the marketing partnership. This ecological certification frees 
"Chmielnik Zdrój" from starting negotiations with farmers about production 
standards and from having additional costs resulting from the implementation 
of a quality control system. 
4) True bottom-up approach secures the support and trust of the local population. 
The engagement of associates from "Chmielnik Zdrój" in the telephone coope-
rative served as a reputation-generating mechanism in the local community. It 
was particularly well received that the telephone company gave a share of 
their profits to the local community by offering them free local calls. Fur-
thermore, the social initiatives undertaken by "Chmielnik Zdrój" have also 
secured local trust. This trust can be recognized by the fact that the partnership’s 
vehicle drivers have the key to many of their clients’ houses or flats in Dolina 
Strugu and other regions, which allows them to deliver goods when the client 
is absent. The trust in local leaders and the non-profit organization was also 
evident in a small survey. Table 4-2 summarizes the results of the survey, 
conducted in the Dolina Strugu region, where inhabitants were asked to fill a 
questionnaire concerning their trust in various national and local institutions. 
The table shows that the trust in representatives of the local institutions 
(members of "Dolina Strugu" and the mayor) is much higher than in national 
institutions. The latter fact can be proved by a quote made by a local farmer. 
With respect to "Dolina Strugu" he assessed: "Yes, the region trusts in this asso-
ciation. They have much more problems with the state agency. They prefer to 
go to "Dolina Strugu" because they do not trust state agencies although they An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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have offices in the same village. And the second thing is, we really need those 
places, where farmers receive information," (DS-22). 
Table 4-2:  Trust of local inhabitants in different national or regional  
institutions 
  A lot  A bit  Not much Not at all  N 
President  (%)  4  50 32 14 28 
Government  (%)  0  25 40 35 28 
Local administration (%)  0  39  54  7  28 
Members of the  
non-profit org.
1) (%)  12 65 24  0  17 
Mayor  (%)  0  63 26 11 27 
Source: Author’s  survey. 
Notes:  
1) The remaining 12 respondents said they do not have enough knowledge about the non- 
    profit organization to answer this question. 
However, in addition to these factors which contribute to the sustainable develop-
ment of the region, there are still some areas left, where the public-private partner-
ship only has little positive impact or where it even hinders a broader cooperation 
between rural inhabitants. This is true with respect to the vitalization of the rural 
civil society. Here, "Chmielnik Zdrój" has shown only limited successes. Due to its 
slim management structures, the partnership has had little effect on harnessing the 
broader civil society for rural development. Besides some rural women’s groups in 
small villages, whose members tend to be older, associations or clubs contributing 
to regional identification or development are practically absent. This situation is 
worsened by a perceived myopia of local inhabitants as a result of the poor social 
and economic situation. People still do not trust their own ability to become agents 
of change and generally expect the government to initiate any development process. 
A local teacher mentioned that: "Everything depends on the mayor. People here 
have no money and no power, so they cannot do anything. The people here will not 
be against new activities. However, if they were in committees without any power 
and any money, what should they do?" (DS-12).  
Furthermore, because of the periodic change of local governments in three of the 
four communes of Dolina Strugu, there is a decline in cooperation between the 
non-profit organization and representatives of the local government. This is primarily 
a result of the frequent turnover of local government members. As some interview 
partners mentioned, the relationship between the local governments seems to be 
characterized more by competition than by cooperation. Due to the success of the 
organization and its high acceptance among local inhabitants, local government 
authorities apparently fear a loss of power. This in turn results in coordination 
problems between the local governments and the organization's initiatives. For An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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example, there is no common strategy for regional tourism development. Actions 
undertaken by the local authorities, such as creation of an artificial lake, are not co-
ordinated with "Dolina Strugu." 
Finally, the marketing problems of bigger farms also remain unsolved. Despite 
its success in developing outlets for regional products, "Chmielnik Zdrój" has been 
unable to solve the marketing problems of bigger commercial farms. One farmer 
couple reported: "They consolidate mostly small farms, which have half a hectare 
of potatoes. I remember there were some situations, where farmers had very good 
yields and then they had problems selling their crops because they ["Chmielnik 
Zdrój"] did not need that much," (DS-18). Different interviewees, therefore, ex-
pressed the need for further initiatives or producer associations. The director of the 
local bank said that: "Farmers here are waiting for another place to sell their crops. 
A small processing plant is really needed," (DS-29). However, the partnership 
might be a positive example and a promising incentive for similar cooperative ini-
tiatives. 
4.2.5  Impact of the initiatives on the local and regional development  
The telephone cooperative discussed above, "Chmielnik Zdrój", as well as "Dolina 
Strugu" had a widely perceived impact on broader rural development goals. They 
provide non-agricultural jobs, contribute to the local infrastructure development 
and thereby improve the economic situation of rural households, thereby counter-
acting out-migration of young people. In addition, consumers’ demand for regional 
and environmentally beneficial products is met and the local agricultural land stays 
under cultivation. "Chmielnik Zdrój further provides seedlings to local peasants 
free of charge to contribute to the reafforestation of the local forests, which altogether 
lastingly contributed to the preservation of the local cultural landscape.  
An indirect impact of the telephone cooperative "Chmielnik Zdrój", and a slightly 
direct impact of the non-profit organization "Dolina Strugu" can be demonstrated 
by the increased number of businesses in Dolina Strugu compared to other neighbor-
ring communes. In the four communes of Dolina Strugu, the number of businesses 
per 1,000 inhabitants increased from 22 to 51 on average between 1995 and 2001, 
whereas in other neighboring communes near Rzeszow this number increased only 
slightly, from 22 to 23 per 1,000 inhabitants in the same period of time (UNDP, 
2003). This process continued as shown in Figure 4-5. Also, between 2002 and 
2005 the number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants increased more in Dolina 
Strugu compared to other neighboring communes. In the majority of the com-
munes depicted in Figure 4-5, the number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants 
even decreased between 2002 and 2005.  An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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Figure 4-5:  Change in number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants in 
Dolina Strugu and neighboring communes between 2002  





























































































Source: CROSS BOARDER DATABASE, 2008. 
The sustainable economic development of the Dolina Strugu region in comparison 
to the Rszeszow district and to Poland in general is also visible with respect to 
employment opportunities. As Figure 4-6 shows, employment in the Dolina Strugu 
region increased between 1995 and 2001 by 12.7 %, whereas it decreased in the 
Rszeszow district by 3.7 %, and nationwide by 17.4 %.  


















Source: UNDP,  2003. 
Furthermore, local inhabitants appreciate the success of "Chmielnik Zdrój" and 
the initiatives undertaken by "Dolina Strugu". A local farmer stated that: "Chmielnik 
Zdrój is a very positive initiative and it is a good way to defend Polish products. 
Because now, all the small shops like butchers and bakeries are collapsing since 
the big supermarkets are coming from the west and provide things much cheaper," 
(DS-07). Positive assessments on the partnership were also provided by the owner 
of a peasant farm: "It is a very good idea and I am very proud of this company. It is An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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a good idea to cooperate like they do," (DS-09). Although the initiatives of "Dolina 
Strugu" are not as famous in the region as "Chmielnik Zdrój", many interviewees 
declared that they themselves, their children, or their neighbors had already bene-
fited from the latter organization. A farmer mentioned: "Yes, those associations 
are what we need. Farmers do not have enough time and not enough knowledge to 
get all the relevant information that is provided by "Dolina Strugu". They should 
keep doing this," (DS-22).  
4.2.6  Conclusions on "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
Cooperation among peasants in Dolina Strugu was hampered by different barriers. 
First, there was a general reservation about cooperation among peasants. Further-
more, peasants who planned to supply their products jointly had to negotiate about 
common product standards, how to manage a producer group, as well as how the 
latter will be financed and organized. That is, successful cooperation among local 
peasants requires an institutional arrangement that coordinates peasants’ behavior, 
e.g. with respect to production standards, financing the group, the organization 
of the group, etc. Since local farms in Dolina Strugu are very small, in order to gain 
some negotiation power a large number of peasants has to agree on an institutional 
arrangement that channels farmers’ behavior so that every farmer constrains his 
behavior as part of exchange in return for benefits anticipated from reciprocal re-
strictions on the actions of others. Neither the development nor the implementation 
of such an institutional arrangement took place in Dolina Strugu until "Chmielnik 
Zdrój" was founded. 
Starting from the engagement of local initiators, an institutional arrangement, namely 
the public-private partnership "Chmielnik Zdrój", was implemented which was 
able to coordinate peasants’ interaction in a way that the latter were able to exploit 
gains from cooperation. As summarized in Table 4-3, "Chmielnik Zdrój" consti-
tutes a synergy of all three governance structures. 
The market-based relationship between peasants, as well as between peasants and 
"Chmielnik Zdrój", improves the decision-making procedures compared to 
producer groups, secures flexibility, reduces inefficiencies combined with public 
funding, and enables a cost efficient monitoring of the management. "Chmielnik 
Zdrój’s" organizational set-up as a commercial entity coordinates peasants’ indi-
vidual efforts based on market incentives. Although there is no set of rules on 
which all peasants have agreed based on factual consensus, "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
brings local farmers into exchange so that common goals like market access, higher 
prices, or a decrease of transport costs can be achieved. Farmers who were not able 
to find factual consensus on a set of rules regarding membership fees, financing of 
the organization, or common production standards were now brought into exchange 
under the umbrella of the marketing partnership. Furthermore, due to "Chmielnik 
Zdrój", the local provenance of products as well as the provision of the local public 
good "cultural landscape" became marketable goods. That is, through "Chmielnik An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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Zdrój", farmers supply, in addition to their products, a way of producing crops that 
is preferred by local inhabitants. Local inhabitants in turn prefer to buy those 
products because they expect, in addition to the product, the conservation of their 
cultural landscape. In former times, without "Chmielnik Zdrój" such an exchange 
did not take place or did, but only to a slight extent. 
There are further impacts derived from government regulation. "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
would not exist if the four local communes had not acted as guarantors for com-
mercial credits used as seed capital, as was the case for the telephone cooperative 
as well. However, this was not done by subsidization, but was achieved by risk-
sharing between private and public borrowers. Involvement of the local govern-
ments in the management board of the public-private partnership should further 
strengthen the impact of local social interests on management decisions. Further-
more, that the governmental agency developed standards for ecological production, 
implemented a control system to secure standards, and conducted the testing of 
farmers’ products was of great importance. In this regard, exchange between farmers 
was facilitated through governmental regulation. This freed "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
from starting periodic negotiations with farmers about production standards, as well 
as from having additional costs on the implementation of a quality control system.  
Just as important as market-based relations and governmental impact was com-
munity governance. Most "Chmielnik Zdrój" associates had been politically active 
in the local government and, thus, generated an eye for local problems. As local 
politicians, they had an incentive to respond to local needs. Because of their detailed 
knowledge of local conditions, the founding members of the partnership were able 
to create an organization that provides locally viable solutions for current problems 
in agriculture and agricultural cooperation, as well as the rural economy in general. 
The local rooting of the partnership did not in the end secure the trust of local pea-
sants in the company and consumers’ trust in the products. As interviewees men-
tioned, local inhabitants combine their purchase of local products with the preserva-
tion of the local cultural landscape, the creation of local jobs, and a certainty 
they have about the product quality due to the local provenance of the products. 
Consequently, local inhabitants must have a close connection (community bonds) 
to their region to prefer local products over products from further away. 
However, the market-based strategy comes at the cost of only limited involve-
ment of the broader civil society. The majority of the rural population perceives the 
marketing partnership from the perspective of the producer or consumer, but not 
as a stimulus to become personally involved in rural development activities. The 
development barriers emanating from a widespread reluctance to become involved 
in collective action have thus been circumvented but not overcome. Furthermore, 
the involvement of local governments has become unstable over time, which has 
led to a lack of coordination within the partnership. Finally, while a marketing net-
work for peasant farmers could be established, the demand potential in the region An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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has its limits. For this reason, bigger farms must still look for marketing or process-
sing outlets beyond the regional network. 
Table 4-3:  Success factors of the public-private partnership "Chmielnik 
Zdrój" distinguished by market, governmental, and community 
background 
Market approach  State  
(Governmental levels)  Community 
- Market-based relation-
ship between peasants 
and "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
sets incentives to provi 
de peasants with com-
petitive prices and con-
tracts 
- Due to "Chmielnik 
Zdrój" local provenance 
of products and cultural 
landscape became  
marketable goods 
- Market-based approach 
of "Chmielnik Zdrój"  
secures its flexibility 
compared to producer 
groups consisting of a 
large number of members 
- Monitoring "Chmielnik 
Zdrój’s" management by 
a committee of share-
holders lowers monitoring 
costs 
- Communes acting as 
guarantor for commer-
cial credits enabled  
access to funds  
- Local government  
members brought social 
interests and long-term 
perspective into deci-
sions made by the  
management board 
- Ecological production 
standards enforced and 
controlled by the govern-
ment agency frees the 
partnership from moni-
toring and enforcement 
costs 
- Local provenance of ini-
tiators enabled "Chmielnik 
Zdrój" to build on local 
needs 
- Local provenance secured 
peasants’ and consumers’ 
trust in the partnership 
- Participation of local 
government members in 
the management board 
of the partnership secures 
social control by the local 
population as well as ac-
countability, since the 
re-election of local  
authorities is related to 
the local results achieved 
- Community bonds per-
suade local inhabitants to 
buy products from 
"Chmielnik Zdrój" 
Source:  Author’s depiction.  
4.3  Development of human capital and a favorable business  
environment in Dębrzno 
This section presents a local and a regional development association both of which 
strongly forced the improvement of human capital and the provision of a favorable 
business environment in the commune Dębrzno. Section 4.3.1 describes the situa-
tion on the labor market and introduces the local business environment of Dębrzno 
shortly after transition. In Section 4.3.2 I discuss factors which hampered local 
inhabitants from joining common initiatives to improve the qualification of the 
local labor force and also to enhance the start-up conditions for local businesses. 
Thereafter, I present a local and a regional association as important driving forces, An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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both of which facilitated local social and economic development in Dębrzno 
(Section 4.3.3 and Section 4.3.4). Section 4.3.5 then discusses different success 
factors and limitations of the development process in Dębrzno. Section 4.3.6 aims 
to show impacts the local development association had on the commune’s economy, 
and in Section 4.3.7 I draw some conclusions. 
4.3.1  Lack of human capital and unfavorable conditions for businesses in Dębrzno 
The commune of Dębrzno is located in the southwest of the Pomorskie voivod-
ship. It is a predominantly rural region, and although about 92 % of the commune's 
area is agricultural land or forest, agriculture is not the main employer in the region. 
In Dębrzno 15 % of all employed persons find their job in the agricultural sector, 
25 % work for industrial companies, and about 60 % are employed in the service 
sector. The official unemployment rate for the district of Człuchów, where Dębrzno 
is located, was 37 % in 2005. According to a representative of the local govern-
ment, the unofficial unemployment rate for Dębrzno exceeds 45 %. This high un-
employment rate is mainly a result of the immense number of workers laid-off in 
the commune in the early 1990s. During that time the state-owned farms, a local 
military base, and various other state-owned enterprises, such as a brick company, 
were dissolved and left a large share of the local inhabitants without a job. The 
loss of jobs had a strong impact on local economic development. In 2002, Dębrzno 
was characterized by a low average income equal to 78 % of the Polish average 
and a net-migration rate exceeding -4 %.  
The unfavorable economic situation and the high unemployment rate had lasting 
impacts on the social life and the social activities in the commune. A local teacher 
summarized the situation as follows: "The biggest problem in this region is unem-
ployment. After people became unemployed all the other problems appeared. 
People are poor […]"(D-05). Inhabitants from Dębrzno and the surrounding region 
strongly depend on the income they receive from employment since the govern-
mental assistance for unemployed people is very low and inhabitants of Dębrzno 
do not have small peasant farms for subsistence farming like in southern regions 
of Poland.  
According to many respondents from Dębrzno, the constantly high unemployment 
rate in the commune strongly results from two major determinants: the lack of skilled 
labor, which can be identified as lacking human capital, and the unfavorable condi-
tions for local businesses. Both determinants were presented as local public goods 
in Section 2.1. 
A high share of local inhabitants are poorly educated and thus only qualified for 
simple jobs. After the Second World War, because of the jobs and flats offered by 
the state-owned farms and the military base, people from the south of Poland moved 
to Dębrzno. Generally, those people who moved to Dębrzno were poorly trained: 
they often only had primary education and did not receive any specific vocational 
training. In the early 1990s, as those people lost their jobs they could not find any An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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other. As an interviewee stated: "… some of them went back [to the south of 
Poland]. However, many of them […] bought their flats in Dębrzno. And since 
they had their freehold flats in Dębrzno and they were not able to sell them, even 
if they wanted to go to some other places, they could not move. They were also 
not sufficiently educated to find a job somewhere else," (D-01).  
Another local public good poorly provided in Dębrzno are favorable conditions 
for local businesses. Rather, there are barriers that hamper young people or people 
with entrepreneurial spirit from starting-up their own business in Dębrzno. Above 
all, there is a lack of funding. A local shop-owner said: "People here have ideas 
but there are barriers. Capital is the highest barrier. People have not enough money 
to invest," (D-11). For the majority of local inhabitants, bank credits are not a 
viable option. An interviewee held the belief that: "Credits are too expensive and 
also the application procedures are too difficult," (D-11). Often credits are only 
available at unfavorable conditions. An inhabitant who invested in his agro-tourism 
farm said: "If you want to start a business there will be nobody whom you could 
ask for a credit. […] The only credit they offered us was a medium-term loan for 
eight years. But almost everywhere is written, that after eight years the earliest 
investments in agro-tourism will provide you with first benefits. So how should 
we repay the credit?" (D-04) The same interviewee further mentioned: "Young 
people have not yet produced anything. They are not able to provide any guaran-
tees. So how should they take any credits to start-up a business?" (D-04) Also, 
representatives of the local cooperative bank confirmed that guarantees are always 
required. A further barrier for local businesses is seen in the lacking access to 
markets. "You can try and develop but there has to be a demand for the products or 
services you offer. If there is no demand you cannot do anything, you must sell the 
products you offer," (D-23). This quote describes a major problem that existing 
enterprises in Dębrzno face.  
Hence, the situation on the local labor market can be characterized by two aspects. 
On the one hand, there is a large share of local inhabitants who are under-qualified, 
long-term unemployed, and of an older age. These people will hardly adjust to new 
challenges on the labor market. However, the lack of a qualified labor force con-
stitutes a disincentive for larger companies to invest in the region. Finally, new jobs 
stay away and the region remains poor. This will, on the other hand, reduce the 
market chances for small- and medium-sized businesses. Further, younger inhabi-
tants who are interested in opening businesses and in improving their skills are 
lacking access to capital and markets, which forces them to leave the region rather 
than to invest time and funds in new business start-ups.  
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4.3.2  Factors hampering the improvement of local human capital and local 
business conditions  
Two local public goods, a high level of human capital and favorable conditions for 
local businesses, were both poorly provided due to interaction problems that ham-
pered local inhabitants from exploiting gains from cooperation.  
Inhabitants improve their skills in order to be well-prepared for jobs that provide 
them with a sufficient income. Educational initiatives such as seminars, vocational 
trainings, etc., which assist inhabitants in improving their skills have to be financed 
jointly. However, those joint investments entail free-riding options since inhabitants 
could directly (by attending workshops, trainings, etc.) or indirectly (by benefiting 
from the outcomes of a higher level of human capital like an increase of social activi-
ties in the region without attending those workshops, etc.) benefit from investments 
in local human capital without contributing to its enhancement. Governmental 
regulations which coordinate a joint provision of education facilities through tax 
legislation attenuate the problem. In the case of Dębrzno, as assessed by respondents, 
public facilities often did not prepare the inhabitants according to the requirements of 
the local labor market. Public education programs thus were lacking knowledge 
about the conditions on the local labor market and did not respond to its needs. 
This even constituted a disincentive for local inhabitants, as they did not expect to 
find a job after they attended such vocational trainings. Therefore, they often stayed 
away from trainings, seminars or workshops. Additionally, there were no local enter-
prises which invested in the education of labor since there was a general lack of new 
investors in the region. Hence, although all inhabitants of Dębrzno would benefit 
from an improvement of the local level of human capital (since, for example, the 
attractiveness of the commune for new investors would increase), such investments 
remain absent and a large share of low-skilled inhabitants have never attended any 
workshops to improve their skills. That is, if every inhabitant had improved his/her 
skills as well as contributed to the provision of local educational facilities, the local 
level of human capital would have improved and gains from cooperation would 
have been exploited by all inhabitants. 
With respect to the favorable conditions for local businesses, a similar interaction 
problem exists. Banks do not provide credits, as local entrepreneurs often lack suf-
ficient collateral. Hence, a purely market-based provision of credits is very limited. 
However, access to capital could be facilitated with local funds funded by entre-
preneurs and other local inhabitants who pay in a regular contribution that is given, 
in whole or in parts, to each contributor in rotation so that every member of such 
a rotating credit association is able to receive some funds for investments. Local 
entrepreneurs could also commonly vouch for credits from commercial banks, 
which would also ease their access to capital. However, although all inhabitants, or at 
least all local entrepreneurs, benefit from the existence of such institutional arrange-
ments, the latter have not emerged in Dębrzno. The improvement of market access An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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for local businesses also requires collective action in terms of a joint marketing con-
cept, local labels, or a common local development strategy for businesses.  
Both access to capital and access to markets can only be provided through ex-
change. Inhabitants have to contribute their own shares in terms of working time or 
funds. However, since they are not able to anticipate other inhabitants’ contributions 
as an institutional arrangement which coordinates individuals’ contributions, and 
excluding free-riding is not an option, gains from cooperation in terms of improved 
access to capital or markets cannot be exploited. According to interviewees from 
Dębrzno, the following three reasons in particular hamper inhabitants from joining 
local common activities to improve human capital, as well as to improve access to 
capital and markets for local businesses:  
1) Lack of trust between people. "Such a thing [trust] does not exist in this town. 
It is getting worse and worse," (D-15) an interviewee assessed. According to 
the local respondents, local trust diminished as a result of the income disparities 
that have greatly increased between local households since the early 1990s. 
Regarding this issue, a respondent stated: "Basically no, they [inhabitants] do 
not trust each other. In situations with that high of an unemployment rate, people 
do not trust others who are in a better position than they are," (D-10). A local 
entrepreneur answered similarly: "With respect to trust it is a little bit more dif-
ficult in this region. Those people, who are in better positions, who have a good 
job and who have an income, they do trust each other. However, those who are 
frustrated because they are unemployed for many years already, and who are now 
in a very bad financial situation, those people do not trust in others," (D-27).  
2) Expectation that the state will provide all services. A further constraint for 
common initiatives on local public goods provision is seen in the attitude of the 
local population. During the socialist era, the state-owned farms and the military 
base provided many social services, and some people still expect government 
bodies to provide different public services. A representative of the local social 
aid center held this belief: "However, the problem is to change inhabitants’ atti-
tude. They still have this attitude from the socialist era. They still think that 
they do not have to take care of anything since everything will be provided to 
them," (D-09). Another interviewee stated that local inhabitants took for granted 
"[…] that everything will be provided to them. And now, they do not know how 
to find themselves in the new reality and on the free market," (D-32).  
3) Lack of local leaders. Some interviewees also mentioned a lack of local leaders 
as a reason for the absence of social activities. A representative of the local 
labor agency said: "Maybe they [inhabitants] would [work in social projects] 
but in this region, there is a lack of persons who can organize and manage those 
projects. There are no leaders whom people could follow. Basically, people 
have ideas and they are willing to do something, but nobody starts the initiative," 
(D-06). Another inhabitant added: "People who are associated, they undertake An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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actions. What is important is that somebody gives the idea and manages the ini-
tiative, then, people will work with them," (D-33). A short story told by a local 
entrepreneur explains the situation obviously: "During the 1970s, we had a dentist 
in Dębrzno who was very interested in boxing. He managed a club for boxers 
and promoted boxing in Dębrzno very much. So much that we even organized 
the championship for the district. However, the dentist then moved to another 
city and I told him: 'If you move out of Dębrzno, the boxing association will 
collapse.' And he answered: 'No, that won’t happen. I leave many people here 
who will take care on everything.' But one year after he left, everything was 
gone," (D-32). 
4.3.3  Initiatives to overcome developmental constraints on the local level 
Starting from the above discussed initial situation in Dębrzno, a local non-profit 
organization called "Association for the development of the city and the commune 
of Dębrzno" was founded in 1999. The association involves more than 70 local 
partners of various social and economic backgrounds. The majority of partners are 
representatives of the local or regional government, local entrepreneurs, and mem-
bers of local NGOs. In addition to these partners, other members like the local 
cooperative bank, farmers, teachers and inhabitants of the commune are involved in 
projects undertaken by the association. By means of the "Association for the 
development of the city and the commune of Dębrzno", the local government, 
together with local NGOs, aimed to conduct projects and initiatives that improve 
the local standard of living, create new jobs, and enhance the attractiveness of the 
commune as a place for recreation and tourism activities.  
The first stimulus was provided by the local government of Dębrzno in 1998. At 
that time, the local government, representatives of local NGOs, and local entrepre-
neurs elaborated a regional development strategy that defined the economic and 
social goals of the commune Dębrzno for the next decade. The principal goals were 
the establishment of a local business incubator, the support of local tourism initia-
tives, and the realization of other activities that contribute to the improvement of 
the local standard of living. While preparing this development strategy, participants 
in this elaboration process decided to found an association that is able to fulfill tasks 
that a local government is not able to do due to the lack of staff, its internal bureau-
cratic standards, or its public status. Such tasks are, for example, applying for 
funds only available for non-profit organizations or the promotion of the region. 
In addition to the local government, the newly founded non-profit organization in 
Dębrzno was also supported by the national "Batory Foundation" from Warsaw 
and the "Environmental Partnership Foundation" from Krakow. Above all, as a first 
step the partners of the local association all applied for national and international 
funds and initiated local activities.  
Some important achievements of the association after its first years of existence 
comprise projects provided to the local population within a building locally called An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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"The Incubator". These projects aim to support local entrepreneurship, to create new 
jobs, to assist unemployed people in job-seeking, and to promote the rural capabili-
ties of the commune. Important projects, amongst others, are: (a) the Canadian Loan 
Program and (b) the local labor agency.  
a) The Canadian Loan Program started in 1997 and provides small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) with loans up to an amount of 50,000 PLN [12,435 €]. 
This program is part of the Polish Entrepreneurs Foundation, which is one of the 
most successful projects of Canada's technical cooperation program in Poland. The 
budget for the Polish Entrepreneurs Foundation amounts to 57.7 million PLN 
[14.5 million €] and was established to provide loans to SMEs as well as to offer 
training and business advisory services to SMEs and participating financial insti-
tutions. Presently, the Polish Entrepreneurs Foundation is under control of the Polish 
government, represented by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy. 
The Polish Entrepreneurs Foundation cooperates with specially chosen local entre-
preneurship centers (local incubators) within the scope of the Canadian Loan Pro-
gram (CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2006). The association 
in Dębrzno also cooperates with the Polish Entrepreneurs Foundation to support 
local SMEs that are, although interested in increasing their production facilities, 
not able to receive commercial bank credits due to a lack of guarantees. The credit 
period is three years at an interest rate of 7 %. An early repayment even reduces the 
interest rate to 6.25 %. Compared to commercial bank credits, which are generally 
available in the region at an interest rate of 14 %, these loans constitute advantageous 
conditions for local enterprises. However, in addition to a clearly-stated investment 
project and a business plan with a capital flow calculation, the program also re-
quires the enterprises to exist for more than three months at the time of application. 
The Canadian Loan Program acts as a credit fund. That is, if lenders repay their 
credit, new loans for other enterprises will be available. Guarantees are not neces-
sarily needed. If a lender is unable to provide guarantees, he has to sign an agree-
ment declaring that the object of investment remains the property of the fund until 
the whole credit amount is repaid. Agricultural farms, the military sector, and sectors 
which produce in a non-environmentally friendly way are excluded from this pro-
gram. For the first nine months of 2005, about 25 local enterprises from the region 
around Dębrzno successfully applied for these loans. Applicants mainly invested 
in facilities like trucks, furniture for restaurants, or interiors for small shops. 
b) In April 2005, based on the initiative of the "Association for the development 
of the city and the commune of Dębrzno" a local labor agency was founded in 
Dębrzno. The agency basically assists inhabitants with finding employment and 
prepares job-seekers for job interviews. Inhabitants who come to the agency also 
gain knowledge about the right preparation for job applications. The job agency 
in particular tries to connect local businesses with the job-seeking inhabitants in 
the commune. This is mainly done through meetings organized by the employment 
agency where enterprises and other employers contact unemployed people from the An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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closer region. According to interview respondents, this is already well-established 
in the region and is generating first successes. The job agency also facilitates the 
job-seeking process for the local population, as it tries to reduce bureaucratic hurdles 
and transport costs for local inhabitants who otherwise would need to go to the dis-
trict’s town, which is about 20 km away from Dębrzno. Furthermore, job seekers 
will be trained in how to behave in job interviews and will be further motivated 
in their job search. These services are financed by funds from the European Union 
and, therefore, can be provided to customers for free. 
4.3.4  Initiatives to overcome development constraints on the regional level 
Aside from these local projects, the "Association for the development of the city 
and the commune of Dębrzno" also initiated different projects on a larger, regional 
level. In 1999, the association organized a first conference for representatives of 
regional and local governments, as well as NGOs. This conference was supposed to 
focus on discovering principle regional problems and to elaborate common solu-
tions for the latter problems. However, the conference became a kick-off meeting 
that eventually led to the foundation of a new regional partnership. In 2000, local 
governments, NGOs, and local businesses from thirty-two communes founded 
the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace". This partnership comprises a region 
of 450,000 inhabitants, involves twelve different districts, and four voivodships. 
The partnership’s purpose was to organize trainings for writing project proposals 
and managing development projects, among other things. They also elaborated a 
catalogue of biking and hiking trails for the region and designed a catalogue of 
regional craftwork products. In 2000, the "Association for the development of the 
city and the commune of Dębrzno" became the coordinator of the "Partnership of 
the Northern Necklace". The first steps the partnership undertook were funded by 
the "Environmental Partnership Foundation" from Krakow and the "Batory Founda-
tion" from Warsaw. In 2004, the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" registered 
and became a legal entity.  
The idea of the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" is based on cooperation 
between local governments, local businesses, and NGOs. A strong stimulus within 
the founding process was provided by the "Environmental Partnership Founda-
tion" from Krakow. The idea of a rural partnership implied that every institution or 
group of citizens in the region is eligible to become an equal partner and to contrib-
ute ideas to the partnership’s initiatives. Additionally, due to common applications 
for national and international programs, the partnership facilitates the access to 
funds for every member. In the following, the major achievements of the Northern 
Necklace’s Green Way and the local brand of the "Northern Necklace" will be 
presented.  
The main project of the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" is the Green Way. 
Green Ways are pro-ecological bike trails located in various European countries. 
Presently, Poland has seven of these bike trails, which are mainly located in the An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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south. In 1999, the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" undertook steps to 
create the first Green Way in the northwest of Poland. This project was based on 
an agreement made by all thirty-two communes that are members of the partner-
ship. The agreement covered the creation of an 870 km bicycle loop route called 
"Northern Necklace's Green Way". Besides the "Environmental Partnership Foun-
dation", the Polish government also contributed some financial means to the project. 
The Green Way goes through different national and landscape parks and leads 
tourists to many natural monuments.  
Based on another project called "Local products as a chance for additional incomes 
apart from farming for inhabitants of the Northern Necklace's area" the "Partner-
ship of the Northern Necklace" provided unemployed inhabitants of the region with 
training, workshops, and seminars to improve their skills. This program started 
in 2001 and was funded by the pre-accession program PHARE. The project’s main 
focus was supporting unemployed, poorly-educated, and poorly-skilled women. 
During workshops, attendants were taught to create handicraft products like bouquets 
of flowers, herbs and cones, ceramic products, and glass paintings. Besides these 
handicraft skills, attendants also received briefings and support on the legal and 
financial aspects of running a shop or a business, and gained skills in the marketing 
and selling of products and services. In total, 48 unemployed people attended these 
trainings. According to the attendants, another important result of these trainings 
was mentioned; they also encouraged local inhabitants to again become active 
and generated new motivation, particularly for those attendants who were already 
long-term unemployed. A representative of the local labor agency reported: "People 
often believed that they are not able to do anything. That is why it was important 
to show them that they are able to do something on their own, and often it was for 
them like a brainstorm. After these workshops, they came up with new ideas. It was 
a strong encouragement for them," (D-06). 
Additionally, in 2001, in cooperation with the "Environmental Partnership Founda-
tion" from Krakow, the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" initiated the project 
"Local brand of the Northern Necklace". In this project 25 persons were trained 
in promoting and marketing local products. Members of the "Partnership of the 
Northern Necklace", together with trainees, defined different requirements for 
local products and issued a certificate and a logo for the local brand "Northern 
Necklace". According to the project regulations, the following products and services 
can be promoted under the logo of the local brand: local handicraft products, 
other useful local products, local services, and important commune initiatives. Every 
year within an annual contest, local businesses and stores can apply for certifi-
cates which enable them to provide their products and services by means of the local 
brand "Northern Necklace". In addition, a catalogue of local handicraft products 
was prepared. Those local products will also be promoted on international, national, 
and regional fairs with the help of different representatives of the "Northern 
Necklace". An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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4.3.5  Success factors and limitations 
In this section, the most important factors that influenced the success of the "Asso-
ciation for the development of the city and the commune of Dębrzno", and the 
initiatives starting from the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" will be pre-
sented. Also, the program’s limitations will be discussed. The success of the local 
association in Dębrzno and the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" is strongly 
based on the following four factors: 
1) Close cooperation between the local government and the association in Dębrzno. 
Nearly all members of the association and the local government identified the 
close cooperation between the local government and the association as an im-
portant factor for the success of the association’s activities. An association 
member stated: "But the key element is certainly the cooperation with the local 
government. Without them, there would be no noticeable outcomes, no results," 
(D-09). Both sides provided different reasons for the beneficial cooperation. 
One reason was seen in the association’s initial task. As mentioned above, the 
association was founded to implement the regional development strategy, 
which was elaborated by the local government, local NGOs, and local entrepre-
neurs. Therefore, representatives of the local government always had a strong 
interest in a successful association and supported the latter with a building, finan-
cial contributions, and necessary information. In addition, the chairwoman of 
the association is employed by the local government and assessed the situation 
as follows: "The fact that I get paid by the commune provides me with the 
opportunity and the duty to take care of those projects and programs. So I am 
managing the strategy. This close relationship with the local government was 
very helpful for the implementation [of the strategy]," (D-01).  
Besides the chairwoman, other association members also work for the com-
mune council. After the last local elections, seven members of the association 
were elected as members of the commune council. This led to an even better 
cooperation between the local government and the association. Furthermore, 
it also emphasizes that local inhabitants appreciate the activities originating 
from the association. A respondent explained: "Here [in Dębrzno], when it 
comes to local elections, people vote for certain persons and not for political 
parties. Usually, citizens vote for people who are socially active, people who did 
something for the city or the region. A simple example is that our city council 
contains seven representatives of the association. And it is not like two or three 
months before the election somebody starts his campaign and nobody heard 
anything about him before. People are voting for people who are active all the 
time and who contribute to the development of the city or commune," (D-12). 
In this context, it is also interesting to see that voter turnout for local elections 
are higher than national elections (see Table 4-4). According to respondents, 
this is because local inhabitants expect changes due to the results of the local An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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elections and attach their votes in local elections with more importance than 
in national ones. 
Table 4-4:  Voter turnout for past elections in the Dębrzno commune 
Election  Year  Turnouts of voters 
Local election  2003  58 %
1 
Election to the senate  2005  29 %
2 
Presidential elections  2005  37 %
2 
Source: 
1 Reported by a local inhabitant; 
2 NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 2005. 
3) Organizational structure of the association. The organizational structure of 
the association constitutes a further reason for success (see Figure 4-7). In 
searching for a proper organizational structure, the association received valuable 
advice from the Environmental Partnership from Krakow. Twice a year the as-
sociation has a general assembly where all members discuss major projects 
and new directions in which the association plans to go. The operational work 
and questions are mostly handled not at the general meetings, but by the board, 
which meets once a month. The main activities of the association take place in 
thematic working groups. These thematic working groups are constituted to 
elaborate and implement the projects. Attendants of these thematic groups 
are chosen because of their occupational background and their knowledge of 
the problems in question, and it is not necessary that the groups consist only of 
association members. Often, inhabitants were also asked to take part. Association 
members appreciate this cooperation with non-members very much, as the latter 
often provide helpful comments and different views on the initiatives. An asso-
ciation member said: "They tell us for example, whether the trainings or work-
shops they took part in worked out successfully in their eyes and responded to 
their needs or not," (D-09). Therefore, the association also stays in contact with 
the local population. An association member pointed out: "The remarks of people 
from this region are very important for the association, because they know the 
needs of the local society. They tell us what is needed and what is not needed," 
(D-02). Furthermore, the fact that most association members have their ori-
gins in Dębrzno and belong to the small local society also eases their work. A 
member reported: "[T]he society here is a small group, and it is not hard to get 
into contact with them since, e.g., people who are working in the association 
also have contact and relations to the people from this region, and they talk to 
them and can see their needs," (D-09). Members of the association also believed 
that the involvement of local inhabitants in the association’s activities is only 
possible due to the association’s promotional activities in the local newspaper 
and on the local TV channels.  
A further important partner and member of the association is the local coopera-
tive bank. The local cooperative bank finances many projects undertaken by An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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the association. This is of particular importance for EU programs. With respect 
to the latter programs, applicants are forced to pre-finance a large amount of 
the investments, which is hardly possible for non-profit organizations like the 
association in Dębrzno. Hence, due to the close cooperation between the local 
cooperative bank and the association, projects were realized which would not 
have been managed by the association alone. Regarding this, it also has to be 
mentioned that the association's office building, which was received from the 
local government, acts as an important guarantee for the bank. Moreover, the 
association also pre-finances their projects with financial contributions from 
the Batory foundation or by reallocating funds between projects that were 
implemented in different periods. 
Figure 4-7:  Organizational structure of the association  
 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
3) Emergence of a strong leader in the association. Some members of the asso-
ciation in Dębrzno emphasized that the successful performance of the associa-
tion was positively influenced by the leadership personality of the chairwoman. 
A member assessed: "The key to the association is Mrs. Chairwoman. She wants 
to do her work and she does it very well. She has her closest assistants, and she 
can delegate the responsibilities very effectively. Sometimes, I am wondering 
where she finds that much power to do so many things. She works for the city 
council, for the association, and for the incubator," (D-08). Besides her successful 
leadership within the association, the chairwoman is also an important repre-
sentative of the association in the local society. Due to her former job as director 
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widespread acknowledgement, not only in the small society of the Dębrzno 
commune. This was important to make the association better known in the local 
society, as one association member reported: "So people were wondering what 
that [the association] could be. But later on, they heard the name of Mrs. Chair-
woman, and then, they already knew that this is a person they can trust in and 
this is for sure a good thing. […] The name of the chairwoman is like a trademark 
and it is important that representatives of these organizations are well known 
in the region," (D-02). The trust that the local society has in the chairwoman 
is also important for encouraging local inhabitants to work in the association 
and contribute to certain projects. An inhabitant mentioned that: "If the chair-
woman asks somebody, they will always help her [the chairwoman] to accom-
plish something. If they hear that the chairwoman is connected with the initiative, 
people will trust in the initiative and will take part in it. She is well known and 
very famous in the region, in the district, and even in foreign countries," (D-13). 
4) Elaboration of a regional development strategy. A last success factor identified 
by the members of the local association was seen in the existence of a commonly 
elaborated regional development strategy. As interviewees mentioned, the elabo-
ration of the strategy was a difficult process. The representatives of the different 
local groups, that is, the members of the local government, the local NGOs, 
and the local entrepreneurs had to contribute ideas, suggestions and visions to 
the strategy. And as mentioned by different respondents, it was often very diffi-
cult to come to common positions. A member of the association stated that: 
"It took us three years to come to a consensus regarding the strategy. At the 
beginning, the city council did not know whether it was a good idea to spend 
money on it [the strategy]. They did not see the results that might emerge from 
the strategy over time. Finally, when we had elaborated the whole strategy, 
we were also able to reach consensus," (D-01). The elaboration of the regional 
development strategy eventually resulted in three outcomes. First, the participants 
were forced to deal with various positions that were represented in the elaboration 
process. As mentioned above, this sometimes complicated the situation, but it 
finally led to the better coordination of individuals’ actions in the process of local 
development. Therefore, in some cases participants had to give up their indi-
vidual positions to achieve the goals that were commonly accepted. However, 
as the following quote shows, the often heated discussions at the beginning 
finally led to better cooperation between the partners of the three local sectors, 
namely, members of the local government, the local NGOs, and the local entre-
preneurs. "For instance, during the first day of elaborating the strategy we only 
created one sentence, because it was so difficult to find an agreement between 
all the persons. However, later it went more smoothly and now, after 5 or 6 
years in the association, the partners have experience. They could see that it was 
necessary to elaborate the strategy. Now, partners know each other, they know 
what the needs of other partners are and they know how to cooperate. That is 
why it goes even more smoothly now," (D-02). Second, the strategy was also An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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necessary to define the direction in which the local economic development aims 
to develop. It thus provides local businesses with the opportunity to coordinate 
their activities and investments and enables the members of the local govern-
ment and NGOs to represent a commonly accepted picture of their region. 
Therefore, it was necessary to identify local needs and to point out the chances 
that emanate from local capabilities. Within this process, participants agreed 
on the development of ecological tourism and implemented a tourism strategy 
comprising, inter alia, the provision of accommodations, tourism activities, and 
products. All projects undertaken by the local association, therefore, aim to 
make the local population capable of following this commonly defined direction 
and to provide them with assistance in order to benefit from this process. Finally, 
third, the strategy also serves as an important instrument for explaining to local 
inhabitants how they can contribute to and benefit from local economic develop-
ment. Related to this, a member of the association mentioned that: "The problem 
that associations like us sometimes have is that nobody in the region really 
knows what the association is doing and also the partners of the association 
often cannot explain all the things they are doing. Therefore, sometimes it would 
be good to have somebody who informs all the people in the region. And that 
is why the strategy is necessary and helpful to explain everything we do. And we 
can therefore explain how inhabitants can contribute to the development process 
in the region," (D-01). 
Besides these success factors, there are still some limitations which hamper the 
success of initiatives and projects that originate from the association. According to 
respondents, the limitations are external rather than internal. That is, in contrast to 
the case study conducted in Dolina Strugu (see Section 4.2) the local development 
initiatives are not so affected by the lacking vitality of the rural civil society. How-
ever, since compared to Dolina Strugu the association in Dębrzno depends more 
on public funds, they are also more strongly constrained by the legal frameworks. 
This to some extent hinders the local association from working more efficiently. 
According to respondents, a main problem is seen in the varying organizational 
structures that are required if associations apply for national and international pro-
grams. As mentioned above, the association in Dębrzno gained positive experience 
in coordinating their projects with the help of thematic working groups. However, 
applying for the EU Community Initiative LEADER, for instance, requires the 
establishment of a local action group (LAG), which is strongly limited regarding 
its application activities for LEADER projects. Hence, LAGs are not able to apply 
for other national or European funds. The association in Dębrzno and the "Partner-
ship of the Northern Necklace" therefore had to register different legal forms to apply 
for different types of national and international programs. One partner assessed his 
concerns as follows: "Now, since we applied for the pilot measure of LEADER, we 
had to change our organizational structure, because one requirement of LEADER is 
that partners be from these three different sectors. Earlier, the partners were selected 
with respect to the projects we wanted to implement. And this worked out well, An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
 
123
because we were looking for people who were interested. Now, it is a completely 
new situation for us, we have to select partners due to their affiliation to the three 
different sectors," (D-01). Furthermore, the strong dependence on national and 
international programs also increases the dependence of the local initiatives on 
governmental standards and decisions. In cases where those standards hinder local 
associations from responding to local inhabitants’ needs, the costs of wrong deci-
sions and mistaken investments emerges. 
4.3.6  Impact of the initiatives on local and regional development 
In the following, the initial impacts of the initiatives undertaken by the "Asso-
ciation for the development of the city and the commune of Dębrzno" and the 
"Partnership of the Northern Necklace" on local social and economic development 
will be discussed. In Section 4.3, the low level of human capital and unfavorable 
local business conditions in terms of lacking access to capital and markets were 
identified as development constraints for the Dębrzno commune. Although the 
impacts of the initiatives starting from the association and the partnership on the 
local labor market and the business environment are hard to quantify so shortly 
after the initiatives began, initial results and in particular qualitative assessments 
of local inhabitants will be presented.  
With respect to the development of local human capital, interview respondents 
emphasized two different changes that had occurred on the local labor market over 
the previous five years: 1) local inhabitants’ skills and motivation increased; and 
2) the cooperation between local inhabitants increased, which led to further initia-
tives aiming to improve local economic development. 
Ad 1) A member of the "Association for the development of the city and the com-
mune of Dębrzno" assessed: "The first visible change is that the awareness of people 
has changed. People became more active and also the local authorities have changed. 
They are more open now," (D-02). But it is not only the members of the associa-
tion that share this opinion. A representative of the local cooperative bank also 
held the belief that: "The trainings and courses they [the association] organized, 
made people who attended these courses more open-minded and improved their 
skills. They provided them with the chance to find a position for themselves," 
(D-28). Local inhabitants often regarded the improvement of people’s professional 
skills as an important result of the association’s activities. Another interviewee 
emphasized the impact of the workshops on unemployed older women from the 
commune: "They [the association] provided training for these women. During this 
training they learned to improve their craftwork skills. And quite a lot of these people 
succeeded in this work, and now, they sell their products under the local brand. 
[…] They also prepared women for working in flower shops. Women from Dębrzno 
were provided with those skills and these women received a certificate afterwards. 
By means of the certificate, these women found a job in the closer region," (D-03). 
These assessments were affirmed by a further respondent, who argued: "The An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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association organizes different courses and trainings. Hence, people can change their 
profession and improve their skills. At the beginning, inhabitants did not know 
that such an association exists here. But now they know the association and they 
convince each other to attend the workshops. They say: ‘The workshops they pro-
vide are very good and helpful’. They accept the association and they are willing to 
come and attend the workshops," (D-05). Furthermore, the association also organizes 
learning workshops and seminars for members of the local government and for 
local NGOs. During these workshops, the people gain insight into the application 
process for national and European programs and funds. 
Moreover, the local association also provides local entrepreneurs with seminars to 
improve their skills and give young inhabitants the opportunity to conduct an 
internship in the association. A local entrepreneur whose daughter worked as a 
volunteer in the association commented on the association’s influence on young 
people: "What they do is really good. Because this is the way for young people to 
find a reason to stay in Dębrzno. They can learn something in the association. 
Basically, the association supports them during their first steps," (D-33). How-
ever, many local respondents also emphasized the new perspectives and opportuni-
ties for inhabitants which were provided by the association. An interviewee stated: 
"After the old system with the state-owned farms collapsed, people were used to 
receiving money. And later on, people had to adjust to the situation where every-
body is responsible for himself, and that what you achieve is related to the efforts 
you put into doing your work. So there were lots of people in the region who were 
willing to do something, and these are really good people. So the association gave 
them the opportunity to become active and to do something. So supporting these 
people reduced a little bit the problems in this region," (D-01). 
Ad 2) Due to the association’s and the partnership’s successfully conducted initia-
tives, local inhabitants were encouraged to undertake actions to improve their 
personal situation by means of cooperation with other local inhabitants. Pertaining 
to this, a local teacher offers the following assessment: "Generally, the association 
had a big impact. They assisted inhabitants in writing project proposals, and finally, 
after the application was successful, they came again and started a new initiative. 
The association has a positive impact, although not all people could profit from 
it, yet," (D-05). According to association and partnership members, the success of 
different initiatives also encouraged the former to develop new projects and to apply 
for larger funds. A member of the association said: "For sure, the biggest success 
the association has made are the experiences we gained and the assets we could 
acquire. That is, people are capable of doing projects and I believe at the moment 
there is no project we are not able to manage. We can write proposals and coordi-
nate projects," (D-09). A similar assessment was given by another member who 
emphasized the increasing cooperation between members: "[…] the second most 
important result is the cooperation between partners. We applied for different 
projects and in these projects different partners were always working together. An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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[…] So, within this process we learned how all these partners are working and 
what kind of projects we are able to do," (D-02).  
In addition to the association’s and the partnership’s investments in local human 
capital, the latter organizations also contributed to improvements in the conditions 
for local businesses. Those improvements are subdivided into three different as-
pects: 1) improvement of access to capital; 2) creation of new sources of income 
for local businesses; and 3) improvement of public investments in the local infra-
structure.  
Ad 1) Access to seed capital and funds in general has been facilitated by means 
of the business incubator and the opportunity for local businesses to apply, together 
with the association, for various national and international funds and programs. 
With the help of the business incubator and the Canadian loan program, local 
businesses were able to gain additional funds for investments but, as entrepreneurs 
assessed, they also received very important assistance in overcoming bureaucratic 
barriers and were provided with workshops and seminars to improve their entre-
preneurial skills. A few local businesses were also able to finance their first steps 
based on funds they gained from EU programs. However, most of these entrepre-
neurs, due to their lack of knowledge about international funds, would not have been 
able to apply for those funds without the assistance they received from the associa-
tion. The positive impact of the local association on local business development can 
also be displayed in the following two quotes: "Thanks to the association, a few 
enterprises have started. And they [the new enterprises] have already become inde-
pendent and do not need any support from other sources," (D-12). "Definitely, there 
are lots of changes that took place in the last few years. The incubator here in the 
association is one of the most important changes. This is because it is actually really 
hard for small businesses to get any financial sources, but the incubator already 
provided funds to many different enterprises," (D-05). However, since the activities 
had not lasted longer than a few years when the case studies were conducted, it is 
hard to quantify the impact of the association’s and the partnership’s initiatives on 
local business development. And since the Canadian loan program is only accessible 
for enterprises that have existed for more than three months, it is also not clear 
whether new businesses only started to make use of the new possibilities provided 
by the loan program.  
Ad 2) In addition to access to funds, activities of the association and the partnership 
also provided local businesses with new sources of income as a result of tourism 
projects related to the "Green Way". In 2005, the first year of the bike trail’s exis-
tence, it attracted almost 35,000 tourists and already in this initial status, first impacts 
on the regional economy were visible. Hotels and agro-tourism farms emerged 
that created an additional source of income for the local population. About 70 new 
tourist accommodations and small businesses producing regional handicraft products 
were founded next to the bike trail. For the next years, the partnership members 
expect about 300 new entities to be founded. These new businesses will provide An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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tourists with accommodations, gastronomy, handicraft products, sport equip-
ment, and tourist information. One member of the partnership reported: "People 
who are living next to the "Green Way" are changing their minds and attitude. 
They start to open small shops or provide accommodations for tourists," (D-12).  
Furthermore, the new local brand provides local inhabitants with access to regional, 
national, and international markets. Also, local products which are not connected 
with tourism activities, like the local ecological mill or a confectionary were pro-
moted in the region and entered new markets. The increasing popularity of the 
town and the commune Dębrzno was also recognized by local inhabitants. A respon-
dent stated: "Thanks to the activities of the association, Dębrzno is known in the 
district, in the voivodship, in Poland, and even outside of Poland. Dębrzno is 
famous," (D-08). A local entrepreneur also observed an increasing number of tourists 
in Dębrzno within the last few years. He explained this development as follows: 
"Definitely, this is thanks to the local authorities, who try to encourage people to 
create tourism facilities. But the greatest job was done by the association and by the 
incubator," (D-32). Hence, promotion activities also emerged as being very impor-
tant for the economic development of the region.  
Finally, in Dębrzno, not least due to the impact of the local association and the 
"Partnership of the Northern Necklace", a slight increase in the number of businesses 
compared to other neighboring communes has become apparent; the number of 
businesses per 100 inhabitants increased in Dębrzno between 2002 and 2005 by 
0.6 % (see Figure 4-8). In most of the neighboring communes like Koczała, Lipka, 
Zakrzewo, and Zlowtow, the number of businesses per 100 inhabitants even de-
creased during the same period. 
Figure 4-8:  Change in number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants in  
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Ad 3) A third outcome that influences local business development more indirectly 
than directly results from the infrastructural projects the local association had 
applied for on behalf of the local government. For instance, the association success-
fully applied for different national and European programs which contributed 
noticeably to the commune’s budget. As a representative of the local government 
reported: "At the moment, the cooperation between the commune and the asso-
ciation is very useful and fruitful for both sides. Lots of projects are carried out 
by the association on behalf of the local government and the commune supports 
the association with financial input. […] The outcomes of these projects are useful 
for the whole region. The application for these projects is the commune’s task, 
but we do not have that many employees nor enough time. So we are simply not 
in the position to complete these applications. The association assists us on how 
to develop the region and this is a good combination," (D-07). During the last six 
years the association successfully applied for programs amounting to 1 million PLN 
[249,066 €]. Of these funds, 80 % were used for infrastructural projects in the 
town and commune of Dębrzno. A noticeable amount of the funds acquired by 
the association were also used to create a business park close to Dębrzno. This 
business park is well-connected with access to energy, water and a local sewage 
plant and should attract larger companies.  
4.3.7  Conclusions on the initiatives starting from the association in Dębrzno 
and the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" 
Both the association in Dębrzno and the "Partnership of the Northern Necklace" 
implemented institutional arrangements that were capable of providing local 
public goods, namely an improved level of human capital as well as improved 
conditions for local businesses. As summarized in Table 4-5, in so doing all three 
governance structures enabled inhabitants to coordinate their actions in order to 
exploit gains from cooperation.  
Though in the 1990s there was a lack of educational facilities and vocational 
trainings, or such trainings did not provide the inhabitants of Dębrzno with skills 
required on the local labor market, the local association and the partnership acted 
themselves as institutions that established workshops, seminars, trainings and a 
local labor agency so that inhabitants were encouraged to improve their skills. 
Those facilities, largely financed by public money, prepared local inhabitants for 
the requirements of the local market because the main initiators of the workshops 
and seminars were community members who were familiar with the local condi-
tions and needs. Therefore, local job-seekers benefited since they were able to im-
prove their skills and to receive employment or start-up their own business. Local 
businesses also benefited as they were able to employ workers sufficiently skilled 
for the jobs they offered. The local labor agency works similarly, as it simply con-
stitutes an institutional arrangement which improves the performance of the local 
labor market by facilitating contact between employers and job-seekers. Inhabitants An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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were able to inform themselves about what local businesses require and local busi-
nesses were able to inform themselves of the job-seekers available on the local 
labor market. The labor agency was financed by public funds but managed by 
community governance. Inhabitants who make use of the labor agency, regardless 
of whether they are employers or job-seekers, thereby visualize their agreement on 
this institutional arrangement. Finally, in Section 4.3.2 I argued that although all 
inhabitants would benefit from an improved level of human capital in Dębrzno, 
a large share of inhabitants rarely undertake actions to improve their own skills since 
they did not expect to be prepared properly for local job offers, or to start-up their 
own businesses. The association and the partnership, however, provided inhabitants 
with incentives as they prepared them for the local labor market, as well as with 
a favorable business environment so that inhabitants began to improve their skills, 
which also improved the attractiveness of the region for new investors.  
Table 4-5:  Success factors of the association and the "Partnership of  
the Northern Necklace" distinguished by market approach,  
governmental regulation, and community management 
Market approach  State  
(Governmental levels)  Community 
- Application of national 
and international funds 
in competition with other 
regional entities  
- Local label prepares  
local entrepreneurs for 
competitive markets and 
also secures a sustain-
able economic develop-
ment when public support 
decreases 
- Initial public investments 
were necessary to found 
a fund that was further 
managed by the commu-
nity  
- Financial contribution 
from local government 
enables application for 
funds that require pre-
finance  
- Excludes free-riding in 
financing projects like 
the Green Way or the  
local brand 
- Fiscal equalization  
enabled larger invest-
ments in the region 
- Local provenance of  
initiators facilitates  
trust between local in-
habitants and association 
members 
- Local provenance of ini-
tiators enable the asso-
ciation to build on local 
needs 
- Close contact between 
association members  
and inhabitants, e.g. in 
thematic working groups, 
enables the association 
to develop projects  
together with local  
partners 
- Use of traditional incen-
tive systems like reputa-
tion is possible due to 
the local provenance of 
the association members 
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Local entrepreneurs’ access to capital was facilitated through the local business 
incubator. With the help of the latter and the Canadian Loan Program, access to 
capital for local entrepreneurs became a good that is now to a large extent managed 
by community governance. Since access to capital based on market mechanisms 
was lacking, the fund, which was publicly provided, is now managed by local in-
habitants. Community members did not make any initial contributions to the fund 
since there were no institutional arrangements capable of monitoring and coordina-
ting inhabitants’ contributions to prevent the free-riding option. That is why it was 
useful that the initial sum of money was publicly provided. However, now the con-
ditions under which inhabitants can apply for credits were adjusted to the local 
situation. The local business incubator thus constitutes an institutional arrangement 
that enables local inhabitants to exploit gains from cooperation. Local inhabitants 
enter into exchange under community governance. The latter pay interest rates for 
the credit, whereas those interest rates repaid by lenders enhance the fund so that 
new loans for other local businesses are available. Consequently, the conditions for 
local businesses improved and investment activities were enhanced. 
The local brand implemented by the partnership facilitated the coordination of in-
vestments undertaken by local businesses. While in the 1990s, local businesses did 
not coordinate their investments and, therefore, did not exploit gains from coopera-
tion, the local association provided the basis for common local economic develop-
ment by elaborating a local development strategy in the late 1990s. Projects con-
ducted by the local association and the partnership, whether its focus was on the 
development of human capital or the improvement of local business conditions, 
were always oriented towards the following principle objectives: a) to strengthen 
environmental-friendly production of all types of products in local businesses; b) 
to facilitate access to or create markets for those products; and c) to combine the 
latter business development with ecological tourism activities. Local businesses 
were able to integrate their investments in the strategy and new businesses were 
also encouraged to undertake investments according to the strategy. Due to the ad-
vice they gave and the projects (e.g. the Green Way) they conducted, local busi-
nesses received additional coordination from the local association and the partner-
ship. Furthermore, due to the local brand, local businesses were also able to enter 
new markets and thus benefit from a competitive market environment. The local 
brand also constitutes an institutional arrangement that enables local businesses to 
coordinate their actions in order to improve market access. While local businesses 
make use of the brand and produce according to the standards defined, they also 
agree on this institutional arrangement. 
The idea that Dębrzno elaborate a local development strategy was suggested by the 
Environmental partnership from Krakow, who generally advised the association 
and the partnership in many different matters. 
The local development process would not have taken place without crucial public 
support. Based on public sources, large projects like the Green Way could be An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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financed which would otherwise not have been realized due to a lack of money. 
Those investments, in contrast, were also possible due to the financial equalization 
among regions that was coordinated by governmental regulation. However, in 
applying for public funds, the association and the partnership had to compete with 
other local or regional entities for limited public sources. The competition between 
regional entities thus ensures the most efficient use of public funds, since applicants 
are forced to develop profound concepts for regional development projects.  
One of the most crucial barriers that hampered local inhabitants from cooperation, 
the lack of trust, was overcome by the local provenance of the association and part-
nership members. The latter, and in particular the chairwoman, had a local reputation 
even before the association was founded. This encouraged other inhabitants to 
get involved in projects and activities and enabled the association to formulate and 
conduct initiatives according to local needs. Furthermore, the association also 
became more and more a connecting link between local inhabitants and the local 
government, since the association brought the latter groups into close contact with 
each other. Inhabitants were strengthened in their impact on the local government 
and, thus, local development decisions. Local inhabitants and in particular local 
businesses can also, without having to join the association officially, contribute 
directly to the development projects undertaken by the association by means of 
the thematic working groups.  
4.4  Improving conditions for local businesses in Bałtów 
Section 4.4 presents the results of the case study in Bałtów. Based on the initiative 
led by two local associations, the conditions for local businesses in Bałtów have 
improved sustainably due to the creation of a dinosaur park and other mainly 
tourism-oriented projects. Section 4.4.1 discusses the unfavorable conditions local 
businesses in Bałtów faced after transition. Section 4.4.2 goes on to explain dif-
ferent reasons that hampered local inhabitants from initiating cooperative initiatives 
to improve the local business environment and the natural and infrastructural 
conditions in the region. Thereafter, local endogenous initiatives will be presented, 
which finally led to the creation of a tourism infrastructure in Bałtów (Section 4.4.3). 
In the following, different success factors and limitations (Section 4.4.4) will be 
described, and the impact of the latter initiatives on the local social and economic 
development (Section 4.4.5) will be discussed. The section ends with some conclu-
sions (Section 4.4.6).  
4.4.1  Unfavorable conditions for businesses in the Bałtów commune  
Bałtów, located in the northeast of the Swiętokrzyskie voivodship, is a rural com-
mune. In 2002, approximately 1,000 of its roughly 4,000 inhabitants cultivated a 
small farm as their main source, or at least an additional source, of income. The 
average farm size was 5.3 ha (GUS, 2003). Thus, local inhabitants are still strongly 
related to agricultural production, although the quality of soil is very poor. Until An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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the early 1990s, most farmers in Bałtów received additional income from jobs in 
a state-owned steel company, which was located in the next bigger city Ostrowiec, 
10 km from Bałtów. In the early 1990s the state-owned steel company collapsed, 
and agricultural production remained the only source of income for the majority 
of families in Bałtów. In 2004, the unemployment rate in the district amounted 
to 29 %. The immense layoffs of workers in the early 1990s had a strong impact on 
the social and economic development in Bałtów and other surrounding communes. 
One inhabitant stated: "In the last ten years, people in this region have had a very 
hard time. Nearly everyone here worked in the steel company. By the time the steel 
company was shut, 38,000 people had become unemployed and these unemployed 
people became desperate and often started drinking," (B-01).  
Besides the high unemployment rate, the shut down of the steel company left fur-
ther effects on regional development. In the 1980s, the majority of the regional 
population found a job in the steel company. Thus, there was no need for local in-
habitants to diversify and to start their own businesses. An interviewee said: "If we 
think about the time fifty years ago, this was a very good and creative region with a 
high educational level. However, the steel company appeared and people started 
to think just in one way. They started to do the same work and to behave in the 
same way," (B-09).  
Since the middle of the 1990s, inhabitants started to see the only chance of develop-
ping their region as using their natural resources for tourism activities. Respondents 
argued that agricultural farms could not provide families with sufficient income and 
other employers, e.g. bigger companies would not invest in Bałtów – not least  
because of its geographical position in a valley. Therefore, the only chance for the 
region was seen in tourism activities. Although inhabitants aspired to develop as 
a tourist region, there were many doubts that had to be overcome. In addition to 
natural resources, respondents were aware they would have to provide accom-
modations, different sites, and other tourist attractions. An interviewee mentioned: 
"Bałtów does not have the tradition of a tourist city. People from Bałtów do not 
travel a lot. They do not know how tourist places are supposed to look like and how 
their resources have to be used. They need time and education," (B-33).  
Investments in the local tourism infrastructure had to be undertaken collectively. 
Tourist development required investments and initiatives providing different 
facilities, which all led to a unified picture of the commune as a place of recreation. 
Single investments, which were not coordinated with investments undertaken by 
other local entrepreneurs, would not have been entirely sufficient and would not 
have shown sustainable results. And if such single investments had not shown the 
expected results, they also would not have encouraged others to invest in the same 
direction. Hence, there were gains from cooperation which remained unexploited in 
Bałtów. If local businesses, local NGOs, local inhabitants and the local govern-
ment had coordinated their initiatives in order to provide a unified tourist region, 
every inhabitant would have benefited from, e.g. the increased inflow of tourists, An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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the new jobs created, the increased demand for products or the improved image 
of the region. However, to coordinate local investments, contributions to public 
infrastructure and activities, institutions or institutional arrangements had to be 
implemented which assured every inhabitant who contributes to the tourist deve-
lopment, regardless of whether he is an investor or a member of an association or-
ganizing local actions, that others would also contribute to tourist-based local 
development. Without such an institutional arrangement coordinating local activi-
ties and investments, no one has the incentive to invest in the same tourist deve-
lopment strategy or to invest at all, since he/she does not expect enough benefits 
from it. But who implements those institutional arrangements and how can inves-
tors be sure that others invest in the same tourist initiatives?  
Hence, a development framework is required that encourages and coordinates local 
entrepreneurs in their ambitions to invest in accommodations, services, shops, or 
other small businesses to provide a tourist facility in the valley of Bałtów. Further-
more, for Bałtów there were two more areas closely combined with tourist develop-
ment in which gains from cooperation remained unexploited; access to public 
infrastructure and the provision of natural resources as a place for tourist recreation. 
Regarding the local infrastructure, one respondent assessed: "Still in 2002, just 
23 % of all people in Bałtów had access to water, nearly nobody had a telephone, 
and the roads were in really bad condition. We also had old and ruinous bridges. 
Only two of them were from concrete," (B-28). A further problem was seen in the 
treatment of local garbage. In 2002, there was no firm that picked up the garbage 
from the local households in Bałtów, meaning that the family members often dis-
posed of their waste on their own. Furthermore, according to other respondents, the 
local infrastructure, in particular in the Bałtów commune, was in very poor condi-
tion compared to neighboring communes since the local government did not under-
take any infrastructural investments over the last ten years. Joint investments in 
local infrastructure would benefit all inhabitants. However, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1.2 with respect to a local telephone infrastructure, such investments always 
entail free-riding options. Since no one can be sure about other inhabitants’ contri-
butions to the local infrastructure, such investments fail to appear. 
Bałtów is located in a forested and hilly region, which provides promising con-
ditions for recreational tourism. However, according to respondents, for the past 
few decades nobody took care of the natural resources. The forests and the river-
side of the local Kamienna River was untended and overgrown, and, due to the lack 
of garbage collection for local households, also riddled with garbage. An inhabitant 
mentioned: "Ten years ago we were like a big hole without any infrastructure. 
[…] The natural resources were in really bad condition. Everything was full of 
garbage and the riverside was full of plastics and the nice places were over-
grown," (B-19). The local preacher, who moved to Bałtów in the middle of the 
1990s, described the conditions of the natural resources as follows: "When I saw 
this place for the first time, it was hard to imagine that this place could change. An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
 
133
The natural resources were really nice, but they were in a very bad condition. They 
were overgrown, full of garbage and not used. There was this beautiful forest with 
lots of animals. […] The people needed to understand what a beautiful place 
they have. […] At the beginning, Bałtów was an absolutely uninteresting place, the 
beauty was not discovered," (B-24). Hence, collective action is required to discover 
the natural potential of the region and to make use of it in terms of a tourist deve-
lopment which pays heed to the natural resources of the region. However, those 
actions also entail free-riding options. That is, even if people undertook actions 
to clean up the riverside or the forest, others might enjoy the benefits of those 
actions without contributing to the cleaning of the natural resources in terms of 
working time or funds. 
4.4.2  Reasons for lacking cooperation between local inhabitants of Bałtów  
The exploitation of gains from cooperation which result from an all-encompassing 
tourist development, the provision of local public infrastructure facilities or the 
cleaning of natural resources requires the implementation of institutional arrange-
ments that coordinate individuals’ interaction with respect to local activities, in-
vestments in infrastructure and tourist offers, and initiatives to discover the natural 
capabilities of the region. By the end of the 1990s, collective investments in Bałtów 
had hardly emerged due to interaction problems among inhabitants. Interviewees 
mentioned that inhabitants did not cooperate with others since they were suspicious 
and could not anticipate other inhabitants’ behavior. Cooperative initiatives between 
local businesses were more or less absent. Only small groups of close friends or 
neighbors organized small initiatives. But those small groups also did not coordi-
nate their initiatives, as the following quote illustrates: "[A]ssociations […] did not 
cooperate with each other. There was a big disintegration. It has not often happened 
that different associations cooperate with each other. They often had the same aims 
but they did not realize them together. Often it is more a kind of competition, but 
they could have worked much better," (B-14). The lack of cooperation pertained 
not only to local associations, it particularly concerned local businesses. A local 
inhabitant who attempted to undertake the first steps towards starting a cooperation 
between a few local businesses mentioned: "Six years ago, I worked together 
with some local businesses and they did not exactly want to say what they do. They 
did not want to explain what kind of plans they have, because they were afraid 
of others to use their ideas," (B-09). In the following, I will present important fac-
tors which hampered local inhabitants from starting common initiatives to provide 
basic conditions (e.g. infrastructure, clean natural resources, or tourist facilities) 
as incentives for local businesses to invest in tourism:  
1) Lack of trust among inhabitants. Interviewees have recognized a stronger sepa-
ration between local inhabitants and a decrease of common initiatives since the 
transformation process started in the early 1990s. The interviewees mostly 
asserted a lack of trust between inhabitants as the main reason for the absence An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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of cooperative actions and common initiatives in the commune. The main rea-
son for the lack of trust was seen in the increasing income disparities between 
inhabitants. "[U]nemployment, on the one hand, and a higher standard of living, 
on the other, have a strong impact on trust between people," (B-18) a respondent 
stated. A local farmer explained the lack of trust similarly: "That is our mentality 
after communism. Right now, we have big differences in the standard of living 
between people. One is poor and the other one is rich," (B-11). These income 
disparities often led to a decrease of social contacts between the inhabitants 
of Bałtów, as an interviewee assessed: "It used to be better. People were nicer to 
each other and much more kindly. There was more communication. They helped 
each other, and they saw each other more often. Now, life is more anonymous. 
People are not very interested in their neighbor’s house and just care for their 
own problems," (B-28).  
2) Passivity of the former local government. Until 2002, an important impediment 
that hampered the local economic development in Bałtów was the local govern-
ment. Actually, the local government should have acted as a facilitator of coope-
ration between inhabitants. However, in Bałtów it was the opposite. An inter-
viewee said: "The second problem was the old local government. They were not 
interested in the development of the region […] or in EU programs. They already 
heard that these programs are working successfully, but they did not want to 
apply for them. And people in this region could not influence the decisions of 
this old local government," (B-26). Local inhabitants reported that the old local 
government did not undertake any actions to invest in the local infrastructure. 
Besides this passivity, the previous local government also interrupted initiatives 
undertaken by local associations to develop the region. A local entrepreneur 
who took considerable part in the latter initiatives, commented: "[T]here were 
only difficulties. People from the previous local government were all communists 
and in particular the mayor. The mayor did not see the possibilities and un-
dermined the different initiatives that attempted to develop the region. People 
who were against the mayor had to emigrate and lots of people emigrated finally. 
The ones who were not allowed to show what they feel and think, and who 
were not able to change what they wanted to change, they emigrated. We had the 
high danger of unemployment in front of our eyes and the local government 
did not react on it," (B-33). Another inhabitant assessed: "We wanted to change 
the situation in the commune and the previous local government did not coope-
rate with the people in this region," (B-26). A further respondent claimed: "About 
eight years ago, I was a member of the local council, and I tried to encourage 
the members of the old local government. I told them to use these beautiful 
natural resources and they answered that it is a stupid idea to use them," (B-19). 
Finally, there was no cooperation between local inhabitants and the local govern-
ment. However, due to the lack of candidates the local government remained 
the same from the socialism era until 2002. An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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3) Lack of local leaders. Furthermore, interviewees also assessed that there was 
a lack of local leaders who could organize activities, collect ideas, and even 
coordinate the realization of common initiatives: "Those persons [local leaders] 
are important. They should collect all the ideas and should present these ideas to 
the local government and to all the other people in the region," (B-12). Besides 
the needed organizational skills, the presence of local leaders in common ini-
tiatives is also important to increase inhabitants' trust in activities: "People 
who organize the festivals or picnics usually do everything on their own. Small 
exhibitions are mostly organized by local inhabitants. They are willing to do 
something. And other people may join them, when they see something is hap-
pening. However, if they saw that the local leaders work with them, they would 
also contribute," an interviewee assessed (B-14). 
4) Lack of seed capital. The last important reason that often hampered inhabitants 
from undertaking common investments in public facilities is the lack of access 
to financial sources. When the steel company in Ostrowiec was shut down, 
peasants mostly lost their employment and gained only a small income from 
farming. Therefore, they mostly do not possess seed capital to start-up busi-
nesses and small shops, or to save money to undertake larger investments, e.g. 
in regional marketing or infrastructure. Hence, not only did the free-riding option 
hinder members of groups which planned to invest in common facilities, but the 
limited access to financial sources itself also hampered local inhabitants from 
undertaking collective investments. Moreover, inhabitants were afraid of taking 
commercial credits or credits to be used for non-agricultural investments. Un-
successful investments undertaken in the early 1990s still discourage inhabitants 
in their decisions of whether to undertake investments. An interviewee said: 
"The transformation of the political system is the main reason. In the transfor-
mation process lots of people started a business and they lost everything. That 
is the main reason why people are afraid of starting a business," (B-33). Be-
sides, due to a lack of guarantees peasants rarely have access to commercial 
investment credits.  
4.4.3  Endogenous initiatives to provide a local tourism infrastructure 
Local economic development in Bałtów strongly required institutional arrange-
ments that combine a large number of local inhabitants in their efforts to overcome 
the abovementioned barriers. The first steps in this direction were taken in the late 
1990s. In 1998, motivated by the high regional unemployment rate and the inactivity 
of the previous local government, a small group of inhabitants started to cooperate 
and to ponder ideas of supporting local economic development in Bałtów. At the 
beginning, there were only eight to ten people who initially acted to counteract the 
increasing decay of natural resources. This small group met regularly and elabo-
rated objectives and initiatives for the development of the Bałtów commune. In 
further public meetings, inhabitants were invited to discuss different prospects An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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for their commune. Then, first initiatives were organized to clean the local natural 
resources i.e., the local forests and the riverside of the Kamienna River. Based on 
those actions, more and more inhabitants joined the group and the meetings became 
more official. In 2001, an association was founded that was called Bałt (Associa-
tion for the development of the Bałtów commune). According to the founding 
members, the principle objectives of Bałt were:  
  Promotion of tourism in the Bałtów commune; 
  Development of the local economy and initiation of cultural activities; 
  Protection of cultural and natural heritage;  
  Vocational activation of local unemployed people. 
One of the first initiatives undertaken by a few members of Bałt was to write a 
guidebook about the history and different natural monuments of the region. Further 
activities followed. Among others, the members of Bałt created tourist facilities, 
like the first rafting and canoeing trail in Poland, bike trails, and tourist paths. A 
member of the local government, who is also a member of the association Bałt, 
assessed: "The cleaning was the first thing […] and then, we thought about doing 
further steps. These were not very expensive steps, but as we started to imple-
ment projects, people recognized the change," (B-26). Another association member 
reported: "But thanks to the good ideas we could encourage inhabitants to change 
something and we mobilized 50-60 people from this village to be active in the 
association. We had easy slogans and talked to inhabitants to change their way 
of thinking. We wanted to open the commune for new investments from outside 
and to apply for funds from the EU," (B-33). 
The first steps of Bałt were funded by the Polish "Environmental Partnership 
Foundation" from Krakow, which also assisted the "Association for the develop-
ment of the city and the commune of Dębrzno" (mentioned in Section 4.3) with 
its first steps. The Environmental partnership foundation additionally provided Bałt 
with knowledge about organizing local development associations. Further input and 
seed capital came from British Petrol (BP). The Polish "Environmental Partnership 
Foundation" also provided association members with trainings on collective ini-
tiatives among local NGOs, local businesses, and local governments aiming to 
achieve common goals in the economic development of the region. 
By the time Bałt was founded, the association also started to cooperate with another 
association called Delta, which was mainly acting on a regional basis. Delta was 
founded in 1998 and its activities mainly targeted Ostrowiec, the next biggest 
city in the region. The Delta association originally focused on actions that support 
the education of inhabitants in the region around Ostrowiec. Therefore, they organi-
zed vocational trainings and provided workshops in local schools. Delta also 
implemented different actions on the regional level that should not only lead to a An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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more efficient use of natural resources for tourism, but should also strengthen the 
economic development in Ostrowiec and the surrounding communes.  
In 2001, as members of Delta recognized the first activities of Bałt, they offered their 
cooperation for common initiatives. After that, plans arose to create a local park as 
a further tourist attraction in Bałtów. In 2003, when scientists found Dinosaurs’ 
footprints on a rock close to Bałtów, a member of Bałt came up with the idea of 
creating not just a recreation park, but to construct a Dinosaur park that serves as 
a unique tourist attraction. During that time, Bałt became more and more famous in 
the region and its number of members doubled. In 2004, more than 120 local asso-
ciations, small businesses, and other individuals had joined Bałt.  
In 2003, Bałt and Delta, together with the local inhabitants, began construction 
of a Jurassic Park theme park, restaurants, and accommodations. Both associations 
applied for various funds, and the total amount spent on the park and other facilities 
exceeded €800,000. These funds were to a large extent taken from European funds, 
in particular from the SAPARD program, but also from commercial credits for 
which a local businessman acted as guarantor. Further investments in Dinosaur 
models, a Dinosaur museum, horse paddocks, a soccer field, and other tourist fa-
cilities followed these initial investments in the park. Delta was mainly responsible 
for the investments in the park, whereas: "In contrast to Delta, Bałt is responsible 
for the local population," (B-01). Bałt organized large local meetings where inhabi-
tants discussed the creation of the park and where those who were willing to contri-
bute to the construction of the park and other facilities were introduced to their 
tasks. Association members also attended workshops organized by FAOW and the 
Environmental Partnership Foundation, where they received valuable knowledge 
and skills. The association also trained inhabitants in new jobs that will be created 
in the park or which will result from other activities undertaken by Bałt and Delta. 
Such vocational trainings for local inhabitants were strongly supported by the 
European Community Initiative EQUAL. Due to the funds from EQUAL, external 
experts, in addition to already trained association members could be invited to give 
lessons. Mainly three types of trainings were conducted, namely: 1) trainings on 
the organization and management of enterprises in heritage tourism; 2) trainings on 
the marketing of services of cultural heritage; and 3) trainings on the organization 
of heritage tourism. Participants received lessons in, e.g. English, informatics, 
teamwork and team management, strategic management, client services, local 
product marketing, or budget administration. In addition to these training sessions, 
Bałt organized workshops on agro-tourism and encouraged local inhabitants to par-
ticipate in local tourism development by opening local shops and stores, or through 
diversifying in agro-tourism. 
The abovementioned activities were successful for the two associations, but in 
particular for the local population. In 2004, the Dinosaur park opened for the first 
time. The park is situated on an area of three hectares and comprised of different 
natural monuments, as well as about thirty Dinosaur models. The number of  An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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Dinosaur models has increased in recent years and the park has become one of 
the most famous tourist destinations in the Swiętokrzyskie voivodship. In 2005, 
the Dinosaur park had already attracted about 156,000 tourists. Both Bałt and 
Delta offer jobs to long-term unemployed people and young inhabitants from the 
Bałtów commune. The income earned by the park and other initiatives is allocated 
to mainly social purposes. That is, further investments were made to create new 
jobs, to provide further vocational training, to encourage the development of new 
local initiatives, as well as to support the protection of cultural and natural heritage. 
Further association earnings were also spent on the local infrastructure. Thus, a new 
pedestrian way next to the main road, as well as road construction, were undertaken 
by means of the profits made by Delta. Furthermore, Bałt also pays teachers to pro-
vide English lessons in the local school of Bałtów, where no foreign language 
lessons were taught before.  
Another initiative undertaken by Bałt is the "Good cooperation is beneficial – 
project", which was implemented to encourage cooperation among local authorities 
and inhabitants. This project was subsidized with 52,100 PLN [€12,976] by a 
national program and enabled citizens to elaborate a map of local needs, as well 
as to develop a local development strategy. Finally, a local information point for 
citizens’ concerns was established and other formal and informal groups like rural 
women circles were reactivated. 
Inhabitants who were active in Bałt or Delta were related through market exchange 
and community bonds. The main activities within the associations were based on 
community relations between an increasing group of local inhabitants. The asso-
ciations started various initiatives to clean up the natural resources, but they also 
transformed into active marketing measures. From market-based initiatives, the 
Dinosaur park was created, which now employs other local inhabitants and, there-
fore, brings them into exchange with each other. In return for doing their job, 
employees of both associations receive a salary, but they additionally contribute 
to a tourist-based development of the region. Since profits made by Delta were 
reinvested in the region, local inhabitants, just by doing their job, also contribute 
to the provision of public infrastructure, contribute to further tourist investments 
and make use of local natural resources as tourist offers. Inhabitants, hence, enter 
into exchange by means of Bałt or Delta, whereas the latter act as institutional 
arrangements coordinating individual interaction so that gains from cooperation 
can be exploited. 
4.4.4  Success factors and limitations  
At the beginning, it was firstly important for Bałt and Delta to encourage local 
inhabitants to take part in the common initiatives undertaken by the two associa-
tions, as well as enter into successful cooperation with the local government. Besides 
these two aspects, other factors also strongly contributed to the success of Bałt 
and Delta. Below, the following success factors will be discussed: 1) the close An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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contact to local inhabitants; 2) the cooperation with the local government; 3) the 
presence of leaders in the associations; as well as 4) the organizational structure 
of the two associations. Finally, at the end of this section various limitations of the 
presented development will be discussed. 
1) Close contact to local inhabitants. The success of Bałt and Delta is strongly 
related to the local inhabitants’ activities. In particular, a higher acceptance 
of tourist offers like the Dinosaur park, which appeared to most inhabitants as 
non-typical for the region, could only be achieved by means of open meetings 
and other common events organized by Bałt. It was necessary to involve citizens 
in the local initiatives and to convince them to make use of the individual chances 
that emerge from tourism activities. Besides organized workshops or meetings 
and the creation of new jobs, the implementation of English lessons in the local 
school, the founding of Junior Bałt and the provision of local infrastructure 
also showed inhabitants that the associations are not primarily interested in 
making profits, but in contributing to common local development. These pro-
jects’ success encouraged further inhabitants to join existing initiatives or to 
realize their own ideas within new actions. As various interviewees mentioned, 
right from the beginning it was clear that close cooperation between the local 
society and the two associations would be a basic requirement. Therefore, many 
workshops were organized to motivate inhabitants to become active, as the 
following two quotes from villagers show: "People are very well informed. 
They have regular meetings that are organized by Bałt, and those who take part 
in these meetings are usually leaders of small local associations or fire brigades. 
And they inform their own group about what has happened. J. [a member of 
the association] also tries to inform people by visiting them in their village," 
(B-18). "They explained in different meetings what they want to do and they 
tried to keep a good contact to the inhabitants. […] To inform people is very 
important. You have to inform people about everything you do, because people 
have to feel important," (B-23).  
2) Close cooperation between the two associations and the local government. 
The close cooperation between the local government in Bałtów and the local 
associations of Bałt and Delta mainly resulted from the successful election of 
an association member in the local government in 2002. Additionally, other 
members of Bałt and Delta are also representatives of the commune council 
and maintain the cooperation. However, both the local government and the two 
associations always tried to maintain a strict distinction between local govern-
ment’s tasks and the tasks of Bałt and Delta. Thus, the local government coordi-
nates all developments in the commune and mainly contributes to the construc-
tion of good infrastructure. The associations, in contrast, focus on tourism 
development and provide support to all inhabitants who are interested in these 
activities. A member of the local authorities assessed: "The local government 
has to think about everyone and everything. Every inhabitant should be satisfied. An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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The association has to follow their direction and they work only on the place 
of Bałtów and develop tourism activities. What the association does is good 
for the commune, they promote the commune. However, the local government 
has to provide a good framework for the association and all inhabitants, but the 
local government is not able to focus just on tourism," (B-28). A partnership 
member also emphasized the possibility of Bałt motivating rural inhabitants, 
whereas the local government is not endowed with the financial and human 
resources to undertake similar actions. "The information the local government 
provides concerns the legal framework of businesses. Bałt shows people how 
to make use of their region and how local inhabitants are able to influence local 
development. The local government should inform people about business start-
up sources and the legal framework, but Bałt should collect partners for deve-
loping this region. And both should cooperate," (B-16). In consequence, due to 
this strict distinction of tasks, both the local government and the two associa-
tions learned how to coordinate their initiatives and acted as partners instead of 
competitors on the local level. 
3) Impact of local leaders. "The most important person, who created the idea and 
this dynamic process, is L. He always knows how to realize ideas, how to sell 
the park. We organized workshops where people taught us how to sell the attrac-
tions of the region. However, by the end of the workshops we realized that L. 
always had the same ideas just by instinct. This was most important. It is not 
important to create something, it is important to know how to sell it. Everything 
became so successful because of L.’s engagement as an entrepreneur. He was 
able to gather people around him and he made them believe that they are able to 
achieve everything. We had lots of problems with bureaucracy and I thought it 
was not possible to overcome these barriers, but he showed me that there is 
always a solution. He treats people always nicely and everybody thinks that 
meeting him is a pleasure," (B-35). This quote by a member of Delta, who 
was involved in all activities right from the beginning, shows the importance 
of one natural leader who contributed considerably to Bałt's and Delta's suc-
cess. This local leader formulated important ideas which were then further 
elaborated upon and realized by the associations. He also acted as guarantor for 
bank credits, which provided important seed capital for the investments in the 
Dinosaur park and other local activities. Furthermore, due to his acceptance in 
the commune, inhabitants started to trust in the associations’ initiatives and also 
contributed to them. As interviewees mentioned, he was able to make them 
believe in what they do. L. also motivated other local inhabitants to take respon-
sibility, to manage projects, and to become leaders in various fields of the local 
development initiatives. 
4) Organizational structure of Bałt and Delta. Members of Bałt mentioned the 
composition of the association, which consists of local government members, 
NGOs, and businesses, as an important factor for the success of the undertaken An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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initiatives. Interviewees strongly emphasized the possibility of exchanging in-
formation and perspectives on current local problems as helpful and beneficial. 
A member of Bałt provides this assessment: "In the association we work with 
local businesses and entities. We have mobilized the local government, and we 
started to cooperate with the latter," (B-33). Only due to the broad basis of Bałt 
was the encompassing local tourism development in Bałtów implemented. 
The composition of Bałt, however, also features the problem of contrasting per-
spectives. This was confirmed by association members, but they also assessed 
conflicts as useful for understanding problems in a more complex way. "Often 
we are waiting for conflicts. Every organization needs conflicts. Cooperation is 
a process and one part of this process is the conflict. Especially when we start to 
distribute the money, or when we have different projects and we try to imple-
ment them, then we have to decide. […] We want to have conflicts, because we 
want to know the reasons for these conflicts and we want to fight to overcome 
these conflicts. Only this enables us to find the most efficient solution," (B-01). 
As depicted in Figure 4-9, Bałt consists of three different bodies. First, 5-10 
times a year there are general meetings. These general meetings are open for 
everyone and those interested in attending receive information on what has 
happened in the region and which projects are going to be implemented. Further 
discussions concern future local projects and questions over the association’s 
budget. The general meetings also act as a platform for members and non-
members to present new project ideas and to discuss the funding and imple-
mentation of projects. Decisions in these general meetings will only be passed 
by the members of Bałt. The other two bodies are the management board and 
the thematic groups. The management enforces the decisions made in the general 
meetings, continues the operational tasks of Bałt, and assists the thematic groups 
in conducting different projects. The management board also employs a full-time 
general director and a program director, both of which coordinate the daily work 
in the association. The thematic groups are similar to those in Dębrzno (see 
Section 4.3) in that they serve not only as a body to implement projects, but they 
also unify different inhabitants that work on similar local problems and initia-
tives. A member of Bałt assessed: "The different thematic groups are important. 
There are people of varied experience in these groups. And they solve problems 
much easier than somebody who does it on his own," (B-32). An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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Figure 4-9:  Organizational structure of the associations Bałt and Delta 
 
Source:  Author’s depiction.  
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amount of Delta’s profits, however, serves as seed capital for further invest-
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A member of Bałt mentioned that: "Money from the EU is like a UFO. Every-
body has heard something about it but nobody has ever seen it. It is hard to apply 
for EU sources because they are changing their forms and rules all the time," (B-01). 
And another association member argued: "EU funds! Oh, it is not easy to receive 
them. The funds, which are connected with education like e.g. workshops, you 
can easily apply for, but it is hard to find sources for investments. If you wanted 
to counteract unemployment it would not be enough to organize workshops, you 
have to make investments to overcome this problem. In this situation, workshops 
would not help people if there was no place they could find employment. General-
ly, the EU spends too much money for workshops and not enough for invest-
ments," (B-35). 
Furthermore, members of Bałt and Delta, as well as members of the local govern-
ment, emphasized the problem of pre-financing projects that were approved by 
European funds. Neither the local government nor local NGOs have access to 
liquid funds, as a member of the local government reported: "A big problem is still 
bureaucracy. Often the application forms are too difficult to fill in. For the com-
mune it is also not possible to apply for different programs since we are forced 
to pay large amounts as our own finance. However, no bank will give us a credit 
for those investments," (B-31). 
Further limitations are the inhabitants’ passivity and lack of skills, as well as 
their lessened but ongoing distrust of one another. A member of Bałt assessed: 
"A problem is still the lack of human capital as a result of the lack of tourist tradi-
tion in this village. It is important that people contribute to this tourism develop-
ment which takes place in Bałtów. It sounds strange, but what should we do? 
Should we start everything a little bit more slowly to wait for them," (B-33)? Some 
older people still do not trust in the current development. One inhabitant stated 
that: "We have the worst situation with people between 40 and 65. They always 
complain and say: ‘This is not a good way’," (B-03). As justification for their atti-
tude, older inhabitants mostly asserted that tourism activities and events were 
mostly specific to young people. That is why some older inhabitants feel somewhat 
passed over. Finally, although Bałt tries to involve local inhabitants in its actions, 
changing the minds of the older local population still needs some time. 
4.4.5  Impact of the initiatives on the local and regional development 
In the following, I will discuss different outcomes for the Bałtów commune that 
resulted from the actions and initiatives conducted by Bałt and Delta. Just as for 
Dolina Strugu and Dębrzno, for Bałtów it is also difficult to present outcomes that 
can be solely ascribed to the analyzed initiatives. Therefore, I will show some im-
pacts the two associations had on the provision of local public infrastructure and 
the valorization of local natural resources. Furthermore, I will discuss Bałt and 
Delta with respect to their contributions to common local tourism development. An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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Finally, I will also describe how those initiatives which started from the two as-
sociations led to an increase of trust and cooperation among local inhabitants.  
Although Bałt and Delta had a direct impact on the provision of local infrastructure 
facilities by funding, e.g. the construction of the local pedestrian way and the repair 
of some local roads, even more important for the development of the region was 
the indirect impact they had on local government. As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, 
an important development barrier for the Bałtów commune and the social coopera-
tion in the commune was seen in the previous local government, which tried to im-
pede the association's initiatives, as well as all kinds of collective actions on the 
local level because they were afraid of losing power and influence over local 
inhabitants. A member of the present local government reported: "Three years 
earlier, the association Bałt had no opportunity to work successfully. The old local 
government was eager to interrupt them and gave them no chance to work," (B-28). 
In 2002, as Bałt noticed that there was no way to cooperate with the previous 
local government, they decided to nominate their own candidate for the local elec-
tion. A member of the association explained: "We then tried to do something 
against the local government. The local government did not do anything for this 
region. So, we started on the local election. As we won the election, one member of 
our association was elected with 90 % of all votes," (B-19). Since 2002, when the 
new local government was elected, there has been good cooperation between the 
new local government and the Bałt association. An association member assessed: 
"The present mayor cannot help us a lot, since he has to solve the infrastructure 
problems in the commune. However, he does not interrupt our work in the asso-
ciation and this is very helpful. So we do not lose energy by fighting against the 
local government anymore," (B-35). The newly-elected local government then 
successfully applied for European funds and invested in the local water supply and 
sewage system, constructed new roads, repaired local bridges, and spent funds on 
further local infrastructural projects. In 2005, all households in the commune had 
access to water, a new sewage treatment plant was constructed, and the garbage 
from 95 % of the local households was collected by a local company.  
As mentioned above, members of Bałt started in the late 1990s with various ac-
tivities to clean up local natural resources. Although only a small group of inhabi-
tants joined these actions in the beginning, other inhabitants noticed the changes 
in the environment and also started to become members of such initiatives, too. 
One inhabitant mentioned: "They [members of Bałt] started with small initiatives, 
like cleaning the forest or the riverside, but they convinced more and more people 
to take part in these initiatives. At the beginning, they tried to show local inhabi-
tants the beautiful natural resources in the commune. It was like they opened the 
window and showed them the beauty that belongs to this village," (B-23). Finally, 
these initial actions not only led to a better handling of natural resources, it also 
encouraged inhabitants to think about how to use these resources, e.g. with respect 
to local tourism. Respondents further mentioned that inhabitants also started to An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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take care of their yards, to paint their fences and houses, and to encourage each other 
to take responsibility for different public places. Related to this, two interviewees 
mentioned: "People start to think about how to use the natural resources in this 
commune and how to develop tourism based on the latter. The association here 
encourages the inhabitants to use the opportunities we have in this village. And 
people also start to take care of their village. They clean their yards and everybody 
looks at the yard of his neighbor to see whether they do the same," (B-16). Another 
interviewee mentioned: "Bałtów looks much nicer now. A few years earlier it was 
not that green everywhere. Everything changes in a good direction and Bałtów 
looks much nicer than before," (B-22). 
Initiatives undertaken by Bałt and Delta resulted in two strong impacts on the local 
economy. First, the Dinosaur park in particular became an important employer for 
the commune. Eighty people found a job in the park or in the offices of Bałt and 
Delta, and 95 % of these employees come from the Bałtów commune. In the last 
four years, this has led to a decrease of the local unemployment rate in the com-
mune from 29 % (2001) to 17 % (2005). As an inhabitant reported: "Thanks to the 
associations and the partnership, some people have already found a job. They 
[Bałt and Delta] are the only institutions here which try to reduce the unemploy-
ment rate. People who have received a job feel much better and much stronger 
now. The best thing the associations could do was to create new jobs," (B-18). A 
member of the Delta association emphasized the importance of creating new jobs: 
"The association is not working to make money. This is merely important for reali-
zing its main objective: the creation of new jobs. We want to counter unemploy-
ment and the effects of unemployment. We create new jobs and help people to find 
new sources for living. And it is working and we are now the biggest employer 
in the region. We employ eighty people just in the park. So, more than one hundred 
families can find their sources of living thanks to this," (B-35). Additionally, at the 
workshops organized by Bałt, local inhabitants receive the opportunity to improve 
their professional skills. And the ones who attended these workshops received a 
diploma, which improves their opportunities on the labor market. 
Second, in addition to the new jobs created in the Dinosaur park, the local standard 
of living, as well as the demand for products provided by local shops and other 
stores, has increased. The most market-stimulating aspect is the influx of tourists 
who sleep in the local agro-tourism farms and make use of offers like the rafting 
course, the hiking trails, or the horse riding school. In a short period of time, such 
tourist offers have attracted a large number of paying tourists. Bałt and Delta also 
assist local businesses in applying for national or European programs and they 
support farmers who plan to found an agro-tourism farm. Bałt organizes workshops 
where all those interested receive information on the legal requirements for ago-
tourism, assistance in creating a business plan and fulfilling other bureaucratic 
requirements. In 2005, nine agro-tourism farms were established and a few shops 
opened around the park. An owner of a small shop in Bałtów mentioned: "First An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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of all, the possibility to earn some money increased. This is a beginning. The influx 
of people is much higher than before, and that means there are better opportunities 
for shops and all kinds of other stores. […] It is hard to see no changes. Everything 
is still changing. The villagers here have many more chances now. The economic 
situation is much better. There are many more jobs, and villagers can improve their 
standard of living. This gives people the chance to feel better. […] In the future, I 
think villagers will choose tourism and agro-tourism. What has happenend here 
can encourage other people to take part in this development. It can also encourage 
young people to come back to the village. However, it does not need to be like this. 
But it could be preferable for young people to come back. This will be a tourist vil-
lage and it will be much better to move to Bałtów than to stay in Ostrowiec. In 
Ostrowiec, they just build new supermarkets, here, they really create new jobs. 
In particular, young people take an active part in this development," (B-25). 
A further positive impact on the local economy is seen in the promotion activities 
undertaken by Bałt, which promotes Bałtów at different fairs in Poland and also 
in foreign countries. Those promotion activities encouraged many tourists from 
Warsaw and Krakow, and other parts of Poland to come to Bałtów. An employee 
of a local media company from Ostrowiec mentioned: "Thanks to Bałt, this region 
is being promoted. A few years ago there was nothing and now, we have lots of 
guests from the whole country. […] A few years ago, tourists came to Ostrowiec, 
and now, they go to Bałtów. They do not just create commercial festivals, they 
also organize exhibitions. They also start cultural activities," (B-14). 
As shown in Figure 4-10, the number of local enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants in-
creased in Bałtów between 2002 and 2004 more rapidly than in other neighboring 
communes. This fact cannot solely be ascribed to the impact of Bałt and Delta. 
But respondents also mentioned that there is no doubt that the favorable conditions 
for local businesses that were provided due to the actions undertaken by the two 
associations also strongly encouraged and still encourage local inhabitants to diver-
sify their sources of income. However, since in most cases existing farms diversified 
into agro-tourism, small local shops or other tourist activities and family members 
of local farm households found employment in the Dinosaur park, local economic 
development will not affect the number of business start-ups as much as it affects 
the income of local households.  
Respondents further mentioned the positive impact of Bałt and Delta on the attrac-
tiveness of the Bałtów commune. Inhabitants stated that in particular more and 
more young people who grew up in Bałtów are moving back to their home village. 
This is also noticeable by the positive net migration to Bałtów compared to neigh-
boring communes in 2002 and 2004 (see Figure 4-11).  
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Figure 4-10:  Change in number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants in  























































Source: CROSS BOARDER DATA BASE, 2008. 
Figure 4-11:  Change in migration in Bałtów and neighboring communes  

































Source: CROSS BORDER DATABASE, 2008. 
According to respondents, Bałt and Delta have also influenced the attitude of local 
inhabitants directly. In Section 4.4.2, the lack of trust between local inhabitants 
was identified as an important barrier for cooperative initiatives in the Bałtów 
commune. The impact of Bałt and Delta on the local population was noticed by 
respondents in three different ways: a) an increased level of activity; b) an in-
creased identification with their region; and c) an increase in trust between inhabi-
tants. The impact of Bałt on the local population was summarized by a member 
of the local government as follows: "Yes, people start to build networks and the 
activities of the association can encourage other people to be more active. You can 
see it in this commune. However, also in other communes people become more An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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active," (B-28). Another member of the local government also recognized an in-
crease in its inhabitants' identification with the region: "Inhabitants of Bałtów 
are beginning to be proud of this place. They want to show their home village to 
other people from Poland," (B-26). Another villager also mentioned: "It is a small 
revolution and only with the help of the inhabitants could we do so much in this 
short period of time. This was a small village, and now we have a town with attrac-
tions," (B-19). Furthermore, the success of the undertaken initiatives, as well as the 
contribution of inhabitants to common activities also increases the trust between 
villagers in general. An interviewee mentioned that: "The associations can help to 
increase trust. If people recognize that they receive support, they will feel much 
more comfortable. And that also increases the trust of other people," (B-18). 
Furthermore, in addition to the jobs Bałt and Delta provide, in particular for young 
inhabitants older than 20 years, the associations also try to strengthen the identi-
fication of local students with their home village. For instance, a local association 
called Junior Bałt was founded, which consists of local students who organize small 
local events, improve their Internet skills, and spend parts of their holidays on 
jointly-organized trips. Junior Bałt also applied successfully for national programs 
which focus on improving the Internet and language skills of local students. The 
leader of Junior Bałt assessed: "It is important to show those young people that it 
is not necessary to go abroad and look for a job there. It is also possible to find a 
job right here and they should try to do something in Bałtów. They should learn to 
express their mind, they should not be afraid to say what they are thinking," (B-17).  
4.4.6  Conclusions on the local development initiatives starting from Bałt and 
Delta  
The encompassing local development process in the Bałtów commune, although it 
started from the local association Bałt, is strongly based on a successful coopera-
tion among three local entities, namely, the associations Bałt and Delta, and the 
local government. In what manner each of the three different governance structures 
contributed to the successful exploitation of gains from cooperation between local 
inhabitants is summarized in Table 4-6. 
Bałt was founded by inhabitants who shared similar interests and community bonds 
and who noticed the same problems in the region. Although they were often not 
friends until they joined the group, they knew each other for years, which helped 
them to establish a trust-based cooperation among members. Cooperation between 
the members of Bałt and Delta was based mainly on traditional incentives like 
trust, reputation or reciprocity, which generally facilitate community life. Bałt also 
strengthened those incentive systems as it enabled more frequent interaction bet-
ween community members. Furthermore, the success of Bałt also strongly resulted 
from the involvement of local leaders who were able to motivate the association 
members and other local inhabitants to contribute to the initiatives. An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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Bałt always acted as an important information channel for Delta. Members of Bałt 
who were also members of Delta were able to voice their perceptions of local needs 
and thus enabled the coordination of activities between both associations. 
However, development based solely on community relations would probably not 
have shown the successful results now found in Bałtów. The initiatives that started 
from Bałt and Delta also go back to market exchange between inhabitants; the 
Dinosaur park is a commercial entity and at the same time an institutional arrange-
ment which enables local inhabitants to coordinate their interaction in order to ex-
ploit gains from cooperation/exchange. As mentioned above, inhabitants contribute 
working time and receive a wage while working for the Dinosaur park or for one 
of the associations. But they also contribute to the economic development of the 
region since the profits made by the park and other activities will be further in-
vested to create new jobs or will be simply used to improve the local public infra-
structure. Therefore, under the umbrella of the park and other local commercial 
entities established by Bałt and Delta, inhabitants enter into exchange and thus 
exploit gains from cooperation. 
Table 4-6:  Success factors of the local development initiatives conducted in 
Bałtów distinguished by market, governmental, and community 
background 
Market approach  State  
(Governmental levels)  Community 
- Application of national 
and international funds 
in competition with other 
regional entities 
- Dinosaur park as com-
mercial entity coordi-
nated inhabitants’ con-
tribution to local deve-
lopment based on  
market-exchange 
- Organizational structure 
as for-profit organization 
enabled Delta to obtain 
commercial credits 
- Public funds contributed 
essential financial means 
for initial investments 
and workshops to im-
prove human capital, 
whereas those invest-
ments would not have 
taken place privately due 
to free-riding options 
- Local government pro-
vided basic infrastruc-
tural facilities that  
would not have been 
provided privately due  
to free-riding options 
- The foundation of Bałt 
was only possible due  
to traditional incentive 
systems like trust, repu-
tation and reciprocity, 
which minimize moni-
toring costs 
- Local provenance of ini-
tiators facilitates trust  
between local inhabitants 
and association members 
- Local provenance of ini-
tiators enabled the asso-
ciation to build on local 
needs 
- Community relations en-
courage all inhabitants to 
take part in local deve-
lopment by cleaning their 
yards, etc., as they feel 
controlled by neighbors  
Source: Author’s  depiction. An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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Due to the investments made by Bałt or Delta, local inhabitants and in particular 
local businesses who neither worked for Bałt or Delta nor maintained a member-
ship in the associations, felt encouraged to invest in local tourist offers like agro-
tourism farms or small shops and additionally received advice from the association 
by making those investments. The tourist offers implemented by the two associa-
tions also stimulated investments in other local businesses since they constitute a 
certain direction for the local economic development. 
To undertake initial investments and to organize workshops and seminars in order 
to train local inhabitants, Bałt and Delta had to apply for public funds. Making use 
of these funds prevented any free-riding options that would emerge if local inhabi-
tants attempted to finance such initial investments jointly. But, as in the other case 
study areas, in Bałtow the local associations had to apply for those public funds 
in competition with other regional entities. Additionally, since Delta was organized 
as a for-profit organization, commercial credits could be obtained as well. 
Finally, it again goes back to the community relations that inhabitants contribute to 
local development by cleaning their house, painting their fence and cutting the lawn 
in their yards, as they feel encouraged by neighbors who also maintain their homes 
in such a way. 
4.5  Summary 
In Chapter 4, I discussed local public goods that were successfully provided by 
various local institutional arrangements in three case study regions located in rural 
Poland. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I focused on the local provision of a telephone 
infrastructure, the improvement of local conditions for local peasant farms, and 
the preservation of the cultural landscape in the Dolina Strugu region. With respect 
to Dębrzno, in Section 4.3 I analyzed human capital and favorable conditions for 
local businesses as local public goods which were indispensable for initiating a local 
development process. Favorable conditions for local businesses was also the public 
good that I analyzed in the last case study (Section 4.4) located in the Bałtów 
commune. In the three case studies I aimed to first illustrate the different reasons 
for a lacking provision of the particular local public good in the concerned regions. I 
further presented the development of institutional arrangements which were capable 
of providing those particular local public goods, and I then discussed the impact 
of these local public goods on local development. Finally, I defined the success fac-
tors and limitations that made the development of such local institutional arrange-
ments possible, or restrained them, respectively. 
In the early 1990s, in all three case study regions, independent of the local public 
good I was focusing on, interaction problems among local inhabitants hampered 
them from jointly contributing to public goods provision. Since the provision of the 
local public goods would have benefited all inhabitants, the absence of these goods 
constitutes unexploited gains from cooperation. In most cases, inhabitants were sus-
picious that once they contributed certain shares like working time or capital to An empirical analysis in rural Poland 
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initiatives that, e.g. aimed to create a local telephone network or implement a com-
mon processing plant for agricultural products, others would not contribute and 
would hence enjoy a free-ride. In those cases a social dilemma defined the situation. 
However, in other cases it was not necessarily the fact that others could take advan-
tage of their contributions that hampered inhabitants from cooperation, but rather 
the lack of institutions coordinating inhabitants’ contributions that kept them from 
exploiting gains from cooperation. That is why certain local public goods, although 
they might enable all inhabitants to improve their individual standard of living, were 
not provided. Moreover, efforts to overcome the social dilemma were additionally 
weakened by different barriers. The joint provision of local public goods was ham-
pered by a few barriers which could be identified in all three cases as independent of 
the kind of local public good that was in question. These barriers were: a) the lacking 
trust of local inhabitants among each other; b) the lack of local leaders; and c) the 
lack of seed capital. 
The implementation of institutional arrangements capable of providing the particular 
local public goods was, in all three case studies, strongly influenced and forced by 
local partnerships. Those partnerships consisting of local NGOs, local government 
members and local entrepreneurs elaborated institutional arrangements which com-
bined, to a larger or smaller extent, all three governance structures; namely, the mar-
ket approach, government regulation, and community. In so doing, the core idea of 
the arrangements was to force individuals to contribute to the local public goods 
and to exclude free-riding behavior. This was possible because the institutional 
arrangements assured inhabitants that they could only benefit from the local public 
goods if they contributed their own share to it. Thus, various arrangements, e.g. 
clubs in the case of the telephone cooperative, a public-private partnership in the 
case of "Chmielnik Zdrój", a local brand in the case of Dębrzno, or commercial enti-
ties managed by local development associations, as was the case in Bałtów, were 
established. Those arrangements differed from each other regarding the involvement 
of local inhabitants. In some cases, like with the telephone cooperative, inhabi-
tants had to join, whereas in other cases, like "Chmielnik Zdrój" or the Dinosaur 
park in Bałtów, inhabitants were related to the institutional arrangement based on a 
market relationship. 
The three case studies have further shown that there are governance structures 
which seem to be more suitable for overcoming certain local barriers that hamper 
inhabitants from contributing jointly to the provision of local public goods. For in-
stance, the lack of trust among inhabitants could best be overcome through commu-
nity governance. Thus, local institutions that increased the frequency of interaction 
between inhabitants also improved local trust and resulted in stronger cooperation 
among community members. However, in cases where the lack of trust among 
inhabitants was not overcome, the implementation of institutions that brought 
inhabitants into market-based relations (e.g. in the case of "Chmielnik Zdrój" or the 
Dinosaur park) has shown positive results, too, whereas the foundation of those An empirical analysis in rural Poland  
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institutions still goes back to community relations. With respect to the lacking 
access to seed capital for local projects, the availability of public funds played an 
important role. Projects might often have failed had inhabitants financed the initial 
investments solely from their own contributions. The access to public funds en-
abled inhabitants to overcome free-riding problems which are often strongly related 
to a joint funding of projects. Also, the availability of public funds set up important 
incentives for inhabitants to first of all think about common initiatives in their local 
commune. 
However, independent of the organizational structure of the local partnerships 
and the institutional arrangements they have implemented, there are a few factors 
which contributed to the success of all three case study regions. They are: a) the 
existence of local leaders who were able to inspire and encourage local inhabi-
tants
18; b) the elaboration of a common local development strategy based on the 
involvement of local inhabitants, local governments, and local entrepreneurs
19; 
c) the close cooperation between local partnerships and local government members; 
and d) the availability of a permanent staff which takes care of operational tasks, 
the realization of projects, and connections between single projects, as well as spe-
cializing in different program application procedures. Limitations, in contrast, 
differed strongly between partnerships and ranged from the limited involvement of 
the local population to organizational problems resulting from organizational stan-
dards for partnerships which were defined by European agencies. 
 
                                                 
18 According to the research I completed for this study, I assume that regions in general have 
more than one natural leader. But these leaders do not always provide their skills for stimula-
ting local development based on local projects that benefit all inhabitants. The success of local 
development projects strongly depends on whether local leaders were trained in organizing 
development associations, whether these leaders received inspiration from external projects 
or institutions, and whether they were already successful in a private local business or as local 
government members so that they already had gained the local inhabitants’ respect. 
19  This success factor applies only for the partnerships in Dębrzno and Bałtów.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter aims to put forth some conclusions regarding the major findings of this 
study. The first section focuses on the results of the theoretical analysis. Section 5.2 
presents the findings and the main conclusions derived from the empirical analysis. 
In Section 5.3, I offer some policy recommendations, and Section 5.4 suggests 
an outlook for further research.  
5.1 Theoretical  conclusions 
In Chapter 2, based on a discussion of three economic theories, an analytical frame-
work was developed which is compatible with policy measures of the new rural 
paradigm. This section will summarize the main elements of the framework and 
will draw further conclusions on the role of governments in rural development 
policy. 
1) The first part of Chapter 2 emphasized the importance of local public goods 
for rural development and identified the lacking provision of these goods as an 
important reason for development problems in rural areas. Local public goods 
like, for example, local public infrastructure, human capital, cultural landscape, 
and favorable conditions for local businesses are to a large extent characterized 
by non-rivalry in consumption and the non-excludability of consumers. Although 
inhabitants of a region benefit from those local public goods, the latter are often 
provided only to a slight extent or are even absent, which discourages a large 
share of local actors from starting up or continuing economic or social activities. 
However, since local public goods are a necessity for successful rural develop-
ment, rural development policy needs to be analyzed with respect to its capability 
of facilitating the provision of local public goods in rural areas. 
2) Before it is possible to have an understanding of how rural development policy 
measures should work, the problems that the policy measures have to address, 
i.e., the lacking provision of local public goods, has to be perceived theoretically. 
Hence, in this study the views of three different economic theories on problems 
in local public goods provision and the role of the state in public good problems 
were analyzed. As Section 2.2.1 shows, the welfare economics theory perceives 
public goods as resulting from positive externalities provided by individuals 
who do not receive adequate compensation for the profits they provide for others. 
According to the welfare economics theory, once positive externalities exist, 
the state has to intervene by subsidizing the producer of the positive externalities 
to prevent a cessation of its production. However, since the welfare economics Conclusions 
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theory neglects the importance of institutions as mechanisms that coordinate 
individuals’ behavior, its explanation of the role of local institutions like coopera-
tions between local NGOs, local governments, and local entrepreneurs, which 
constitute the core element of rural development policies of the new rural 
paradigm, is less than satisfying. Also the application of a world with perfectly 
competitive markets as a normative reference criterion for policy evaluation 
does not adequately regard real world conditions. 
3) The property rights theory discussed in Section 2.2.2 also considers institutions as 
it identifies lacking public goods provision as a problem of individual interaction. 
Since all individuals involved in a public goods problem claim to benefit from the 
concerning good, but the costs of its provision cannot be distributed completely, 
the property rights theory proposes to define property rights on resources or 
goods such that individuals are able to negotiate for the right to use the con-
cerned resources. Since in most cases the exact assignment of property rights is 
not possible in the real world, in addition to a property rights regime, other 
institutions involving, e.g. governmental action or public courts might solve 
the public good problems. Which institution would be most adequate for solving 
the latter problem depends on its ability to coordinate the individual use of the 
concerned goods or resources. According to the property rights theory, an institu-
tion is most preferable when it maximizes the social net benefit surplus. Govern-
ments, therefore, do not necessarily have to intervene directly as the welfare 
economics theory suggests, but should solely facilitate the implementation of 
institutions which enable, compared to the status quo, an improvement in social 
net benefit surplus. However, this also entails an offset of individual costs and 
benefits of all parties involved which is inconsistent with normative individual-
lism. The property rights approach, therefore, provides a suitable framework for 
analyzing public goods problems positively, but neglects to propose a normative 
criterion. 
4) As described in Section 2.2.3, the constitutional economics theory perceives 
problems of public goods as interaction problems similar to the property rights 
theory, but also introduces the distinction between individual behavior (moves) 
and rules, which broadens the perception of interaction problems. While on 
markets individuals change goods under a certain set of rules to improve their 
utility, in public good problems the current set of rules treated at least one in-
dividual unfavorably, which hampered the individual from improving his/her 
utility through entering exchange. The constitutional economics theory thus 
proposes, with respect to public good problems, to change the current rules in 
a way that all individuals involved would approve of them. Only then would 
individuals enter exchange and thus gains from cooperation (formerly perceived 
as externalities by the welfare economics theory) could be exploited. Hence, ac-
cording to the constitutional economics theory, the consensus of all individuals Conclusions 
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involved in the concerned rule changes constitutes the only criterion for nor-
mative policy analysis. 
5) Factual consensus on rules can hardly be applied to all kinds of sub-constitutional 
decisions. The normative institutional economics theory, which I presented in 
Section 2.2.5, proposes, in accordance to the constitutional economics theory, 
to distinguish between moves and rules but introduces the social dilemma as a 
heuristic to analyze policy action in a more applied positive and normative 
manner. According to the normative institutional economics theory, problems of 
public goods result from the existence of free-riding options in the status quo, 
which hampers individuals from contributing to the public goods provision. 
Hence, the abolition of the free-riding options by a certain set of rules would 
find individual assent and would lead to a joint provision of a public good. 
However, although it might often be too costly to reach factual consensus, the 
individual contribution of all individuals involved to the provision of the con-
cerned public good as a kind of exchange determines individuals’ acceptance 
of the concerned set of rules. Exchange, therefore, is an applied characteristic 
of general consensus on the current set of rules. 
6) Normative institutional economics theory provides an adequate framework 
for rural development policy analysis by applying the social dilemma heuristic. 
Thus, individual moves within a certain set of rules can be analyzed positively 
and the consensus, specifically the exchange criterion, allows for policy evalua-
tion in a normative manner. Thus, policy action should aim to implement a set 
of rules (institutional arrangement), which facilitates the joint contribution of 
all inhabitants in a certain region to the provision of local public goods. If such 
an institutional arrangement induces the involved individuals to contribute to 
the provision of the public good and therefore enables the latter to improve their 
individual benefits (due to exploiting gains from cooperation), the latter arran-
gement will find general agreement and can thus be assessed as preferable. 
7) In Section 2.3 I discussed how institutional arrangements which facilitate ex-
change between individuals have to appear. The literature discusses three dif-
ferent governance structures which are able to attenuate interaction problems 
between individuals and which therefore are able to facilitate the provision of 
public goods. Those governance structures are: market exchange, governmental 
regulation and community management. On the one hand, market-based pro-
vision of public goods in terms of privatization has advantages over government 
regulation and community management. Due to its effective decentralized price 
mechanism, markets reveal information that would otherwise be private. On the 
other hand, in the case of asymmetric information or problems of property rights 
definition, the market approach also shows weaknesses. Due to their coercive 
power, governments are able to establish property rights or rules and can en-
force cooperation where non-cooperation between inhabitants is inefficient. 
However, with respect to public goods provision, governments often lack access Conclusions 
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to local information concerning consumer preferences or different local circum-
stances and are prone to rent-seeking behavior. The community management 
of public goods can involve traditional incentive systems like trust, reputation or 
reciprocity and thus can implement sanction systems at low costs. But this is 
only sustainable in small-sized communities, whereas the small size may prevent 
the exploitation of gains from trade, economic diversity, and economies of 
scale. 
Figure 5-1:  Institutional arrangements facilitating cooperation among  
inhabitants in local public goods provision 
 
Source: Author’s  depiction. 
8) According to the literature it is often a synergy of all three governance struc-
tures which can be found in the real world (see OSTROM (1990, p. 17-19), 
GREIF (2000) or AOKI and HAYAMI (2000)). That is, local public goods in rural 
areas are provided by institutional arrangements which combine elements of all 
three governance structures. Figure 5-1 shows, on the left, a situation of lacking 
public goods provision in a rural community. Here, individuals find no common 
agreement on rules facilitating the joint provision of a certain public good like 
public infrastructure. On the right, we see inhabitants entering exchange due to a 
certain institutional arrangement which ensures the joint provision of a local pub-
lic good. Because of this institutional arrangement, every individual community 
member constrains his/her behavior as part of exchange in return for benefits 
anticipated from reciprocal restrictions on the actions of others. Here, exchange 
is similar to the consensus on the concerned institutional arrangement. 
9) Finally, governmental action should aim to support local inhabitants in their 
efforts to elaborate institutional arrangements which consist of all three gover-
nance structures and which are capable of bringing all local inhabitants into 
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doing, governments, on the one hand, can act on the meta-level, e.g. by defining 
regulations and property rights, as well as by providing and allocating public 
funds for and among communities in order to attenuate interaction problems on 
the community level. On the other hand, governments can also act directly on 
the community level by means of local governments. On the community level, 
e.g. by undertaking public investments or advising local inhabitants, local govern-
ments can participate in the local development process and assist inhabitants in 
overcoming interaction problems.  
5.2 Empirical  conclusions 
The empirical analysis served to prove: a) whether interaction problems among 
rural inhabitants are the reason for the lacking provision of certain local public 
goods in rural Poland; b) whether different institutional arrangements which 
emerged through local initiatives are able to overcome the lacking provision of cer-
tain public goods; c) whether those institutional arrangements comprise elements 
of the three governance structures; and d) whether consensus constitutes a useful 
normative criterion for the evaluation of institutional arrangements. While the first 
three issues belong to the positive analysis undertaken in the three case studies, the 
normative analysis had to examine the last issue.  
1) The empirical results of three rural case studies in Poland have shown that in 
the early 1990s inhabitants of the case study regions refused to contribute their 
own shares in terms of capital or working time to the provision of certain public 
goods because they were not able to anticipate other inhabitants’ willingness 
to contribute. The joint provision of the concerned local public goods failed to 
appear, although all inhabitants would have benefited from them. Hence, an 
interaction problem characterized the situation. 
2) In all three case studies, institutional arrangements were formed to successfully 
provide local public goods. The core idea was to establish an institutional frame-
work to coordinate the provision of local public goods. To enable the provision 
of such goods, it was necessary to induce inhabitants to contribute their own 
shares to the provision. This was only possible if the contributors were sure 
they would improve their benefits by providing their individual shares. Hence, 
institutional arrangements enabled the provision of local public goods as they 
facilitated cooperation among inhabitants, which finally led to gains from 
cooperation in terms of the successful provision of certain local public goods. 
Further, by making use of these goods, all contributors were able to improve 
their situation. These institutional arrangements emerged due to the strong 
engagement of rural partnerships involving local NGOs, local entrepreneurs, 
and local government members. The partnerships’ composition is equivalent 
to the local action groups that constitute the core element of the Community 
Initiative LEADER, which belongs to development policy measures under 
the new rural paradigm. Conclusions 
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3) The partnerships facilitated cooperation among inhabitants in terms of joint 
contributions, as they created institutional arrangements which enabled inhabi-
tants to benefit from contributing a particular share in terms of, e.g. working time 
or capital to the public goods provision. With respect to the telephone cooperative 
in Dolina Strugu, local inhabitants joined the cooperative as a club good and 
paid regular fees, which led to a joint provision of a telephone network and 
local calls free of charge. Other institutional arrangements like the public-
private partnership ("Chmielnik Zdrój") in Dolina Strugu encouraged peasant 
farmers, due to its market-based approach, to jointly provide their agricultural 
products without being a member of the partnership. With respect to Dębrzno 
and Bałtów, the development associations set up incentives for inhabitants to 
undertake actions to improve their personal skills or to invest in their local 
businesses, which can be seen as individual contributions that finally resulted in 
the provision of a higher level of human capital or of more favorable conditions 
for local businesses identified as local public goods in Section 2.1. These individ-
ual contributions, however, were only made since the involved individuals 
knew that they would have benefited to a greater extent if they had contributed 
their own share to the provision of the local public good than if they had not 
contributed. 
4) The institutional arrangements coordinating inhabitants’ contributions to local 
public goods provision comprise elements of all three governance structures 
mentioned above. The market approach in all three case studies assured an effi-
cient use of public sources. Thus, with respect to the rural partnerships, a com-
petition for public sources between rural entities provided those partnerships 
with funds which contained the most profound concepts for local development. 
The concept of the public-private partnership "Chmielnik Zdrój" in Dolina 
Strugu further involved local governments as market actors in a joint stock 
company and forced them to combine efficiency and social objectives. Moreover, 
the market approach in the case of "Chmielnik Zdrój" eliminated the free-
riding option for peasants too. While, for example, in a producer group peasants 
were able to free-ride with regard to the funding of the group, if peasants are 
market participants, as in the case of "Chmielnik Zdrój", these free-riding op-
tions do not exist. Furthermore, by means of the local brand in Dębrzno, the re-
gional provenance of products becomes a marketable good which benefits busi-
nesses selling their products under the brand, and at the same time contributes 
to the image of the region. Further, the Dinosaur park in Bałtów induced inhabi-
tants, from a market based-relation, to contribute to the favorable conditions 
for local businesses as well as to the provision of local public infrastructure. 
5) First of all, governmental regulation played an important role by providing public 
funds for initial investments within the local development projects. Many pro-
jects would have failed without governmental support since free-riding options 
had hampered inhabitants from making their contributions to such projects. Conclusions 
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The impact of governmental action was further visible in the case of ecological 
production standards that peasants of Dolina Strugu had to fulfill in order to 
deliver their products to "Chmielnik Zdrój". Here, the definition and control of 
standards by state agencies reduced the negotiation and control costs between 
peasants. Local governments also played an important role as guarantors for 
the credits the telephone co-operative, "Chmielnik Zdrój", and the development 
associations in Dębrzno and Bałtów had applied for. Here, the principal-agent 
problem between the guarantor of a credit and the credit users was overcome, 
or in some cases, the access to credits became possible in the first place. Not 
least due to the local governments different investments in the public infra-
structure were undertaken, which would otherwise have failed due to free-
riding options connected with joint investments in the latter local public good. 
Altogether, governmental action in the three case studies acted as a facilitator 
of local cooperation to enable a joint provision of public goods rather than as 
a subsidizer of public facilities. 
6) Community relations enabled local initiators to have recourse to traditional 
incentive systems like, e.g. reputation and trust in the first place. Their local 
reputation, be it to improve their chances in local elections or to receive credit in 
general, encouraged local leaders to become actual leaders in development 
projects, whereas their local provenance persuaded them not to belie inhabitants’ 
expectations and trust. The local provenance of the main initiators also enabled 
the latter to respond directly to local needs and conditions with their activities, 
something that became visible in all three case study regions. In addition, due 
to the institutional arrangements that were implemented by the local partnerships, 
the frequency of interaction among people increased, which further led to an 
increase in trust among inhabitants. Also with respect to the thematic working 
groups in the development associations in Dębrzno and Bałtów, new contacts 
and cooperation between inhabitants could emerge, which would otherwise not 
have come about. 
7) There are governance structures, which seem to be more suitable to overcome 
certain local barriers, preventing inhabitants from joint contributions to the provi-
sion of local public goods. In cases, where a lack of trust among inhabitants 
hampered individuals from cooperation, community governance has shown 
advantages over the two other governance structures. Thus, local institutions, 
which increased the frequency of interaction between inhabitants, also im-
proved local trust and resulted in a stronger cooperation among community 
members. Furthermore, in all three case study regions the reputation of certain 
local leaders encouraged other inhabitants to join common initiatives and to begin 
cooperating. The access to public funds by local partnerships through govern-
mental regulation would almost certainly have been inefficient as governmental 
institutions often lack access to local information. Also, in many cases commu-
nity management would not apply as it only works on a limited regional level. Conclusions 
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In contrast, market competition among partnerships resulted in a more effi-
cient use of public funds. In addition, the privatization of the cultural landscape 
and the image of the region like in the case of Dolina Strugu or in terms of the 
local brand in Dębrzno, led to a more efficient use of the latter public goods. A 
lack of funds for initial investments in the local infrastructure or in development 
projects was often overcome by means of public funds. In all three case studies 
many projects might have failed, if inhabitants had financed the initial invest-
ments solely based on their own contributions. The use of public funds enabled 
inhabitants to overcome free-riding options that are often related to a joint fun-
ding of projects. 
8) Finally, it has to be discussed whether consensus constitutes a useful normative 
criterion for the evaluation of policy measures of the new rural paradigm. First 
of all, the consensus criterion with respect to the evaluation of rural develop-
ment policy measures focuses strictly on all individuals involved. That is, in my 
analysis the focus was only on individuals who were to some extent influenced 
by the provision or lacking provision of certain local public goods. The latter 
fact implies that in order to implement institutional arrangements for local public 
goods provision with support of policy measures of the new rural paradigm, 
individuals who constitute potential veto-players have to be convinced and in-
volved in the (joint) provision of local public goods as well. This is only possible, 
if a factual compensation of potential veto-players exists. In the case of "Chmiel-
nik Zdrój" local peasants would not have accepted a situation, where they 
were obliged to cultivate under certain standards without receiving any factual 
compensation for that. On the other hand, inhabitants of Dolina Strugu would 
not have bought local products from "Chmielnik Zdrój", if they were not sure 
that the production of those products contributes to the preservation of the local 
cultural landscape. Therefore, "Chmielnik Zdrój" constitutes an institutional 
arrangement which is based on local approval. This local approval becomes 
visible since local peasants use "Chmielnik Zdrój" as market channel to sell their 
products and the majority of local inhabitants buys those products processed 
by "Chmielnik Zdrój". All three case studies have shown similar situations, 
where potential veto-players were able to profit from the implementation of an 
institutional arrangement for local public goods provision and therefore approved 
the arrangement by way of contribution. Those institutional arrangements 
enabled inhabitants to exploit gains from cooperation. Successful cooperation in 
terms of a joint contribution of individual shares, like working time or funds 
contributed to common activities, or the joint provision of products, like in 
the case of "Chmielnik Zdrój", was facilitated by elements of the three gover-
nance structures that were combined in different institutional arrangements. 
The fact that due to the implementation of certain institutional arrangements, 
inhabitants involved in a local public good problem started to cooperate, demon-
strates their agreement with the respective institutional arrangement. Thus, an 
institutional arrangement which facilitates cooperation among individuals, so Conclusions 
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that the latter are able to exploit gains from cooperation, finds approval among 
all inhabitants involved. Finally, in many cases such as in the three case studies 
a successful provision of local public goods requires the contribution of a large 
share of the local inhabitants and therefore must be based on the approval of 
the latter. 
5.3 Policy  recommendations 
The policy recommendations refer to the implementation of rural development 
policy measures in Poland. These recommendations might be useful for policy 
makers of the Polish government, specifically for representatives of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINROL), for policy makers in pre-
accession countries planning to implement LEADER-type policy measures, for 
members of the EU Commission dealing with rural development policy, and for 
NGOs promoting the implementation of rural development policy measures of 
the new rural paradigm. 
In this study, I aimed at elaborating an analytical framework compatible with deve-
lopment policy measures of the new rural paradigm. I have given a theoretical 
understanding of major problems in the rural development process as I emphasized 
the lack of certain local public goods as important development barriers for the 
economic development of rural areas. I further discussed whether policy measures 
of the new rural paradigm are suitable for overcoming such problems. The theore-
tical considerations were tested within case studies conducted in three different 
Polish rural regions in 2005.  
Only when Poland joined the EU in 2004, were the first policy measures of the new 
rural paradigm implemented, whereas the implementation of the most famous 
representative of these policy measures, the Community Initiative LEADER, 
started within pilot projects between 2005 and 2006. That is why I was unable to 
make use of important results of LEADER in Poland while conducting the empiri-
cal research for this study in 2005. Therefore, in this monograph I analyzed rural 
development partnerships in Poland, which were based on the same characteristics 
as those of LEADER, as they involve local government members, members of local 
NGOs and local businesses in the rural development process as equal partners. 
All three case studies present successful examples of rural partnerships which are 
able to overcome crucial development problems that are characteristic for Polish 
rural areas. The success of the partnership resulted mainly from the implementation 
of institutional arrangements that induce inhabitants to contribute jointly to the 
provision of certain local public goods, which are necessary for an economic and 
social development in the respective regions. 
In his discussion on local public goods in rural areas, PETRICK (2007b) concludes 
inter alia as follows: "After all, the question is not whether the state should provide 
public goods or not, but how complementarities between different institutional Conclusions 
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arrangements, notably various layers of government, market and community, can 
be combined best to achieve this end" (ibid., p. 17). This statement implies the ques-
tion, which was essential for this study, namely: how rural development policy is 
able to contribute to the successful provision of different local public goods in 
rural areas? The case studies have shown that governmental action is successful 
and its results are sustainable, where it assisted local initiators in elaborating and 
implementing institutional arrangements capable of providing local public goods. 
This further includes the statement made by PETRICK (2007b) above, that is, to 
facilitate the creation of institutional arrangements for local public goods provision, 
which combine basic elements of all three governance structures in a way that 
closely responds to local conditions and needs. 
Since the analyzed partnerships were successful in overcoming crucial develop-
ment problems typical for Polish rural areas, local action groups (LAGs) that are 
supported by the Community Initiative LEADER and that are equal to the rural 
partnerships analyzed in the case studies, may show similar positive results in 
Poland. The LEADER approach itself combines all three governance structures 
mentioned above. It contains market elements (by forcing competition among LAGs 
for public funds), governmental levels (by involving local governments to repre-
sent social and long-term aspects of local investments), and community (by invol-
ving local actors in the local decision making process). According to my theo-
retical and empirical considerations, the LEADER approach appears to be capable 
to facilitate local public goods provision in rural Poland and, therefore, to contribute 
to a sustainable development of rural areas. But still some further recommendations 
should be made to render policy measures of the new rural paradigm more eligible 
for responding to specific problems in Polish rural areas: 
1) Training and inspiring of local leader personalities. In all three case studies, 
local leaders contributed crucially to the success of the local development 
projects. However, in addition to the skills they are naturally endowed with, 
leaders also have to be inspired and trained. Therefore, more efforts should 
be spent on the training of local leaders. In addition to basic bureaucratic and 
business skills, local leaders have to be instructed in organizing local associa-
tions, in dealing with people, and in elaborating local development strategies. 
In order to not concentrate knowledge and skills on only a single local actor, 
it might be useful to train more than one person per municipality as well as to 
organize local trainings and workshops, promoting the idea of local partner-
ships. 
2) Creation of platforms to promote rural development initiatives in the com-
munity. In addition to the LAGs, other platforms have also to be implemented 
to involve non-members in local initiatives and to enable local inhabitants to 
express ideas and needs. Moreover, these platforms have to be used for calling 
inhabitants’ attention to rural development programs and for illustrating suc-
cessful examples of local development initiatives. In particular, the case study Conclusions 
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in Dolina Strugu has shown that the lack of knowledge about rural development 
measures causes widespread reluctance to become involved in the local collec-
tive actions. 
3) Organization of trips to successful rural development projects to inspire local 
actors. Knowledge about rural development measures in general as well as 
about its application to crucial local development problems in particular was 
also missing among local partnership and local government members. Here, a 
greater number of organized trips to successful partnerships can supply those 
wants. Interviewees who already attended similar trips stated to have obtained 
important information, inspirations, and visions from the latter. 
4) Provision of external monitoring and advice during the founding process of 
the partnerships. As discussed above, within the founding process of the 
partnerships in Dębrzno and Bałtów, it was very useful to receive valuable 
advice from the Environmental Partnership Foundation from Krakow on the 
organization of rural partnerships and the preparation of local development 
strategies. In section 4.5, I mentioned that the common elaboration of a local 
development strategy among local governments, private persons, and enter-
prises was emphasized as an important success factor in two case studies. How-
ever, it was also shown that the elaboration of such a strategy is often a long-
term and tough process, which in many other cases of rural development initia-
tives was not crowned with success. External monitoring, though, can facilitate 
this process by pointing out common interests and by structuring local deve-
lopment problems and prospects. This external monitoring, as well as other  
financial and technical assistance for strategy development, can be provided by 
governmental or European funds. A public provision of those funds minimizes 
the probability of interaction problems on financial issues that could already 
emerge in the beginning of the strategy elaboration process. 
5) Differentiation between general and local-based success factors. All three 
case study regions were based on specific local success factors, which cannot 
be easily transferred to other rural partnerships. For instance, the successful 
development of "Chmielnik Zdrój" definitely resulted from the positive expe-
rience with cooperation that local initiators in Dolina Strugu had already made 
in the telephone co-operative. Also, the initial idea for the innovative approach 
of the telephone co-operative resulted from the previous contacts of Dolina 
Strugu’s inhabitants with an US American municipality that had a telephone 
co-operative with a similar approach. The same is true for Bałtów. There, the 
discovering of dinosaurs’ footprints and the idea to commercialize this discovery 
in terms of a Dinosaur park cannot be easily applied to other rural communes 
in Poland or elsewhere. But there are a few factors, which can be transferred 
to other rural regions. For example, the image of a region as a place for natural 
tourism, organic products or with unique characteristics can become marketable 
products by means of local brands. And furthermore, a market-based business Conclusions 
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concept of those local brands or other local marketing concepts, e.g., for agricul-
tural marketing cooperations increases flexibility in cases where producer asso-
ciations would require a large number of members like in "Chmielnik Zdrój" 
or Bałtów. Moreover, in cases, where a lack of trust among inhabitants ham-
pered individuals from cooperation, the implementation of local institutions, 
which increased the frequency of interaction between inhabitants, also improved 
local trust and resulted in a stronger cooperation among community members. 
That is why partnership projects on the local level, in addition to economic 
objectives, should first aim at increasing interaction between local inhabitants. 
6) Facilitate access to capital by means of local credit funds. The case study in 
Dębrzno has shown that a local business incubator, combined with the imple-
mentation of a local credit fund, contributes successfully to the development 
of local businesses. Public guarantees constitute an important incentive for local 
inhabitants to found a credit fund that eases local businesses’ access to capital. 
While the state may define basic standards for a local credit fund, local partner-
ships may also determine further locally-based requirements. On the one hand, 
the requirements should guarantee the sustainability of the fund. On the other 
hand, these local-based requirements should enable local businesses to receive 
utility through entering exchange. The constitutional economics theory thus 
proposes, quirements to local conditions. While banks in rural Poland often 
provide credits only at high interest rates
20 or do not provide local businesses 
with loans at all due to the lack of collaterals, community relations, like trust, 
reputation or pride might reduce the trust problem among credit lenders and 
borrowers within local credit funds. Hence, local partnerships could also be intro-
duced to the idea of local credit funds, and public guarantees would help them to 
realize those ideas in their local communities.  
5.4  Outlook for further research 
Further research on local public goods in rural areas could complement this study. 
The definition of local public goods in section 2.1 followed in particular different 
studies conducted in rural areas of western European countries. There is a lack of 
studies dealing with local public goods provision in central and eastern European 
countries, especially however, in Poland. Further research is required in eastern 
European countries to expose special features of local public goods provision, 
which go back to the countries’ socialist and transition background. Other studies 
need to be conducted as well to define different local public goods, which are neces-
sary for a successful rural development process, but they have not been discussed 
in this monograph. 
                                                 
20  Problems of local businesses regarding the access to bank credits as well as the high costs 
combined with bank credits were discussed for Dolina Strugu in GRAMZOW (2005, p. 13) 
and for Dębrzno in GRAMZOW (2006a, pp. 16-17). Conclusions 
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Furthermore, the success factors and limitations of local partnerships presented 
in this study resulted only from the three qualitative case studies conducted in 
Poland. Further research could aim at developing success factors and limitations 
of partnership activities based on quantitative analysis. A larger number of cases 
should be studied in Poland or other countries. In this context then, the impact of 
local leaders, the importance of the tourist background of a region, the impact of 
external monitoring and external animators or the embeddedness of the partnership 
in development networks could be analyzed more thoroughly by means of econo-
metric models.  
Future research may also concern the further implementation process of the Com-
munity Initiative LEADER in Poland. In this study, I was unable to rely on the 
results of the pilot projects of LEADER. However, in the case study regions the 
implementation of LEADER projects started in 2005. For those areas it will be inter-
esting to analyze if the newly founded LAGs turn out to be successful local insti-
tutions, which continue the development process, or if the new organizational 
standards the existing partnerships had to implement due to LEADER may now 
hamper local collective action. Not least such investigations may yield interesting 






Since the beginning of the 1990s a new rural development policy, which has later 
been called the "new rural paradigm" by the OECD, has received increasing atten-
tion in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. It is expected that these policy 
measures attenuate social and economic problems in rural areas on a broader basis 
than the agricultural sector alone. They support local stakeholders like non-govern-
mental organizations, local governments and local businesses in implementing local 
development strategies that are based on endogenous potentials and spatial inter-
action.  
Polish rural inhabitants, suffering among many other issues, from a lack of non-
agricultural jobs, an unfavorable business environment and an insufficient public 
infrastructure, pinned high hopes on those new measures. However, it is not proven 
whether those measures of the new rural paradigm will stimulate the economic and 
social development of Polish rural areas. So far, their impact on the local develop-
ment processes was mostly analyzed empirically, and those studies were strongly 
dictated by guidelines of legislative bodies. Studies with theoretical reflections 
can rarely be found. This study aims at elaborating an analytical framework for 
rural development policy analysis that provides a basic understanding of govern-
mental action in rural development processes as well as allowings a normative 
evaluation of rural development policy measures. This analytical framework could 
further be used to empirically analyze the impact of those policy measures on the 
development of Polish rural areas.  
Central to this analysis is the perception of rural development problems as a conse-
quence of a lacking provision of local public goods. Local conditions, like a well 
constructed public infrastructure, a favorable local business environment, a high 
level of human capital, or a local landscape in sound conditions, can be defined 
as local public goods as they are characterized by a low rivalry in consumption and 
non-excludability. Local public goods, however, although they benefit all inhabi-
tants of a region, are often poorly provided or even remain absent. This study 
hypothesizes that precisely the latter deficiency is tackled by policy measures of 
the new rural paradigm. It is argued that those policy measures aim at facilitating 
the implementation of local institutional arrangements that provide inhabitants 
of a region with certain local public goods. 
In order to understand the effects of measures of the new rural paradigm, the lacking 
provision of local public goods was analyzed theoretically and empirically. Theo-
retically, the lacking provision of public goods was discussed by means of three Executive summary 
 
167
different theories. Welfare economics, the first theory presented, understands 
market prices as the only mechanism coordinating individual interaction. Hence, 
once market prices fail to reveal the scarcity of a good, like in the case of public 
goods, market failure comes to the fore and can only be cured by governmental inter-
vention. But institutions like trust, reciprocity and property rights, which coordinate 
individual interaction, find no place in the welfare economics scheme. However, 
rural development measures of the new paradigm strongly focus on the implemen-
tation of formal and informal institutions, which coordinate individual efforts in rural 
development processes. The property rights theory, the second theory discussed, 
approves the coordination capacity of institutions as it refers to the interaction prob-
lems inherent in problems of public goods provision. Institutions channel individual 
behavior and enable therefore the provision of local public goods. For the evaluation 
of institutions the property rights theory proposes the offset of costs and benefits 
that are borne/gained by individuals within different institutions which, however, is 
inconsistent with normative individualism. Constitutional economics theory, the 
third theory presented, by distinguishing between rules and moves, avoids the flaws 
of the latter theories and proposes to evaluate institutions with respect to their ap-
proval by all individuals involved in a public good problem since only consensus 
guarantees that no individual will be worse off after implementing the institution. 
But factual consensus on institutions, which should coordinate the provision of 
local public goods in rural areas, seems to be unfeasible and to be combined with 
high decision making costs.  
Because of the latter fact the normative institutional economics theory was pre-
sented, which introduces the social dilemma as a heuristic to apply the consensus 
criterion to all kinds of institutions in everyday life. A social dilemma describes a 
situation in which, because of unresolved coordination problems, actors of a group 
do not make full use of their opportunities. That is, they do not exploit all gains 
from cooperation. The social dilemma enables to analyze public good problems in a 
positive and normative manner. Positively, individuals’ behavior channeled by 
certain institutions can be analyzed. The normative analysis asks whether institu-
tions can be modified by way of institutional reform so that individuals, involved in 
a public good problem, will jointly contribute to the public good provision, and 
gains from cooperation will be exploited. In consequence, institutions which channel 
inhabitants’ behavior in order to jointly provide a certain public good, find general 
agreement. And policy measures, which facilitate the implementation of those insti-
tutions, will therefore also find general agreement. 
This leads to the questions of how institutional arrangements have to be composed 
to facilitate the provision of public goods in rural areas. Three governance struc-
tures, the market approach, government regulation, and community management 
were presented, which all cover unique elements that facilitate individuals’ coope-
ration, so that a joint provision of local public goods can be realized. Executive summary 
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Whether the implementation of institutional arrangements, capable of providing 
local public goods in Polish rural areas, is facilitated by policy measures of the 
new rural paradigm was analyzed within three case studies conducted in south-
eastern and north-western Poland. The case study regions were all endowed with 
local partnerships that reflect the idea of the new rural paradigm as they consist 
of cooperation among local government members, local businesses and local 
NGOs. The case studies comprise 104 guideline interviews with local govern-
ment members, members of local NGOs, local entrepreneurs, farmers and local 
inhabitants in general. Guideline interviews were also completed by participant 
observation and a small standardized questionnaire.  
In the early 1990s, in all three case study regions particular local public goods 
were not provided due to interaction problems that hampered individuals from a 
joint contribution. By means of the social dilemma heuristic, the public good 
problems in the case study regions were analyzed positively and normatively. 
The positive analysis focused on the institutions that formerly hampered inhabi-
tants from a joint contribution. Then, for regions where certain local public goods 
were successfully provided, the institutional arrangements, facilitating the success-
ful provision, were investigated and the impact of market-based relations, govern-
ment regulation and community relations on public good problems was analyzed. 
In the normative analysis, institutional arrangements were assessed as preferable 
only if exchange in terms of a successful joint provision of local public goods 
was realized and mutual gains from cooperation were exploited. Finally, if policy 
measures of the new rural paradigm facilitate institutional arrangements capable 
of coordinating individual interaction so that inhabitants contribute jointly to the 
provision of certain public goods, they were assessed as preferable.  
It turned out that the foundation of local partnerships facilitated the implementation 
of institutional arrangements, which induced inhabitants to jointly contribute to 
the provision of certain local public goods. And those institutional arrangements 
comprise elements of all three governance structures. But there were governance 
structures which seem to be more suitable to overcome certain barriers, hampering 
a joint provision of local public goods, than others. For instance, in cases where 
a lack of trust among inhabitants hampered individuals’ cooperation, community 
governance has shown advantages over the two other governance structures. 
With respect to local partnerships’ access to public funds the implementation of 
market competition among partnerships for funds, enabled a more efficient use, 
while the access to public funds in general often enabled inhabitants to overcome 
free-riding problems that were related to a joint funding of projects.  
Furthermore, in all three case studies the success resulted among other things from 
the following factors: a) local provenance of main initiators; b) the existence of 
local leader personalities; c) the elaboration of a common local development 
strategy; d) a close cooperation between the local development partnership and Executive summary 
 
169
the local government; and e) the availability of a permanent staff taking care of 
operational tasks. 
Finally, the empirical analysis has shown that within policy measures of the new 
rural paradigm, governmental action rather acts as a facilitator of public goods pro-
vision than as a subsidizer of rural economic sectors. The latter measures stimulate 
the socio-economic development as they facilitate the implementation of institu-
tional arrangements, consisting of elements of three governance structures that 
are capable of providing local public goods successfully. In this case, the institu-
tional arrangements induce all inhabitants involved in a local public good problem 
to contribute to the provision of the good as they enable inhabitants only to improve 
their individual benefits through contribution. However, a joint contribution consti-
tutes the exploitation of gains from cooperation and visualizes the agreement of 
all involved inhabitants in a public good problem on the institutional arrangement 
that enables the joint contribution. Thus, consensus among inhabitants involved 
is a normative criterion that should be taken into consideration when evaluating 





Seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre gewinnt in der EU und über EU Grenzen hinaus 
ein neuer Ansatz ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik zunehmend an Bedeutung. Von 
diesem neuen Konzept, welches von der OECD als "neues ländliches Paradigma" 
bezeichnet wurde, wird angenommen, dass es sich im Gegensatz zur traditionellen 
Agrarpolitik sozialen und ökonomischen Problemen im ländlichen Raum durch 
wesentlich komplexere Ansätze nähert. Politikmaßnahmen des neuen Paradigmas 
unterstützen besonders lokale Partnerschaften, bestehend aus lokalen Interessen-
gruppen wie Vereine, Kommunalverwaltungen und lokalen Unternehmen bei der 
Implementierung von lokalen Entwicklungsstrategien. Diese Entwicklungsstrate-
gien sollen vor allem auf endogene Potentiale der jeweiligen Regionen und räum-
liche Interaktion gründen. 
Die ländliche Bevölkerung Polens, die unter anderem durch fehlende außerland-
wirtschaftliche Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten, ein ungünstiges Unternehmensumfeld 
und eine wenig ausgebaute Infrastruktur in ihrer Entwicklung gehemmt ist, erhoffte 
sich von diesen neueren ländlichen Politikmaßnahmen eine Verbesserung der 
Lebensqualität. Es ist jedoch nicht erwiesen, dass Maßnahmen des neuen ländlichen 
Paradigmas tatsächlich eine stimulierende Wirkung auf die soziale und ökono-
mische Entwicklung im ländlichen Raum Polens haben. Bislang sind überwiegend 
empirische Studien vorhanden, die sich sehr stark an vom Gesetzgeber formulierten 
Richtlinien orientieren, und, teilweise theoretisch unreflektiert, den Einfluss neuerer 
ländlicher Politikmaßnahmen auf lokale Entwicklungsprozesse in Polen beschreiben. 
Diese Arbeit zielt darauf ab, einen analytischen Rahmen zu entwickeln, der einerseits 
staatliches Handeln im Bereich der ländlichen Entwicklungspolitik erklärt und 
beschreibt, andererseits aber auch als Grundlage für empirische Untersuchungen 
im ländlichen Raum Polens genutzt werden kann.  
Ein zentraler Gedanke dieser Arbeit ist die Annahme, dass ländliche Entwicklungs-
probleme aus einer unzulänglichen Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter resul-
tieren. Lokale Voraussetzungen, wie beispielsweise eine gut ausgebaute öffentliche 
Infrastruktur, ein günstiges Unternehmensumfeld, ein hohes Niveau an Human-
kapital oder eine gepflegte Kulturlandschaft können als lokale öffentliche Güter auf-
gefasst werden, da sie durch fehlende Rivalität im Konsum und Nicht-Auschließ-
barkeit geprägt sind. Jedoch werden lokale öffentliche Güter, obwohl sie allen 
Einwohnern einer Region zugute kommen, nur unzureichend oder gar nicht bereitge-
stellt. Hier lautet eine zentrale Hypothese dieser Arbeit, dass gerade Politikmaßnah-
men des neuen ländlichen Paradigmas an dieser unzureichenden Bereitstellung Zusammenfassung 
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lokaler öffentlicher Güter ansetzen können. Es wird angenommen, dass jene Maß-
nahmen die Gründung von institutionellen Arrangements fördern, mit deren Hilfe 
bestimmte lokale öffentliche Güter im ländlichen Raum bereitgestellt werden 
können. 
Die Untersuchung der Wirkungsweise von Politikmaßnahmen des neuen Paradig-
mas erfolgt theoretisch und empirisch. Theoretisch wird zunächst die fehlende 
Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter mit Hilfe von drei verschiedenen ökono-
mischen Ansätzen rekonstruiert: der Wohlfahrtsökonomik, der Theorie der Eigen-
tumsrechte und der Verfassungsökonomik. Die Wohlfahrtsökonomik sieht den 
Marktpreis als einzigen Mechanismus, der individuelles Handeln koordiniert. Das 
heißt, wenn ein Marktpreis nicht die genaue Knappheit eines Gutes wiedergibt, 
wie im Falle von öffentlichen Gütern, so liegt nach Meinung der Wohlfahrtsöko-
nomik Marktversagen vor, welches lediglich durch das Eingreifen des Staates 
überwunden werden kann. Institutionen wie Vertrauen, Reziprozität oder Eigen-
tumsrechte, welche ebenfalls das Verhalten von Individuen beeinflussen, werden 
hingegen von der Wohlfahrtsökonomik nicht berücksichtigt. Ländliche Entwick-
lungsmaßnahmen des neuen Paradigmas zielen aber gerade auf die Stärkung von 
informellen und formellen Institutionen ab, die die Kooperation zwischen länd-
lichen Bewohnern in sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Prozessen stärken. Die Theorie 
der Eigentumsrechte führt die fehlende Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter auf Inter-
aktionsprobleme zurück, welche zwischen allen Individuen bestehen, die an der 
Bereitstellung und Nutzung der Güter beteiligt sind. Des Weiteren hebt sie hervor, 
dass mit Hilfe von Institutionen individuelles Handeln so koordiniert werden 
kann, dass öffentliche Güter erfolgreich bereitgestellt werden können. Eine Bewer-
tung dieser Institutionen erfolgt aus Sicht der Theorie der Eigentumsrechte durch 
die Gegenüberstellung aller individuellen Kosten und Nutzen. Letztere Vorge-
hensweise ist jedoch mit dem normativen Individualismus unvereinbar. Die Ver-
fassungsökonomik, die dritte Theorie, die in dieser Arbeit vorgestellt wird, erkennt 
die Unzulänglichkeiten der obengenannten Theorien und versucht diese aufzu-
heben, indem sie die Unterscheidung zwischen Aktionen und den Regeln (Insti-
tutionen), welche die Aktionen beeinflussen, einführt. Das Hauptaugenmerk liegt 
hierbei zunächst auf der Akzeptanz der Regeln. So empfiehlt die Verfassungsöko-
nomik die allgemeine Zustimmung aller Individuen zu einer Institution als alleiniges 
normatives Kriterium für die Bewertung von Institutionen bzw. Regeln, denn 
nur die Zustimmung aller zur Implementierung einer bestimmten Institution beugt 
möglichen Benachteiligungen Einzelner vor.  
Im Hinblick auf Institutionen, welche die erfolgreiche Bereitstellung öffentlicher 
Güter im ländlichen Raum regeln sollen, kann festgestellt werden, dass eine fakti-
sche Zustimmung zu diesen Regeln unmöglich scheint bzw. mit sehr hohen Ent-
scheidungsfindungskosten verbunden ist. Aus diesem Grund wurde die Normative 
Institutionenökonomik, die teilweise eine Erweiterung der Verfassungsökonomik 
darstellt, ebenfalls in dieser Arbeit diskutiert. Die Normative Institutionenökonomik Zusammenfassung 
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nutzt das Soziale Dilemma als Heuristik, um das Konsenskriterium auch auf Ent-
scheidungen anzuwenden, mit denen Individuen im täglichen Leben konfrontiert 
sind. Das Soziale Dilemma beschreibt eine Situation, in der aufgrund von Koor-
dinationsproblemen Mitglieder einer Gruppe kollektiv unter ihren Möglichkeiten 
bleiben. Das heißt, sie sind nicht in der Lage, Kooperationsgewinne zu erzielen.  
Mit Hilfe des Sozialen Dilemmas kann die fehlende Bereitstellung öffentlicher 
Güter aus zwei Perspektiven, einer positiven und einer normativen, nachvollzogen 
werden. Positiv wird das Verhalten von Individuen analysiert, die durch bestimmte 
Institutionen (Regeln) beeinflusst werden. Normativ lässt sich fragen, durch welche 
institutionellen Reformen Individuen dazu bewegt werden können, gemeinsam ein 
lokales öffentliches Gut bereitzustellen, sodass von allen Beteiligten Kooperations-
gewinne erzielt werden können. Dies bedeutet, dass die Aussicht auf Kooperations-
gewinne alle Beteiligten dazu veranlassen würde, der Einführung von Institutionen 
zuzustimmen, welche eine gemeinsame Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter 
regulieren. Politikmaßnahmen, die die Einführung ebensolcher Institutionen unter-
stützen, müssen deshalb ebenfalls allgemeine Zustimmung unter den Beteiligten 
finden. 
Dies führt weiter zu der Frage, aus welchen Elementen sich Institutionen bzw. insti-
tutionelle Arrangements zusammensetzen sollten, wollen sie die gemeinschaftliche 
Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter ermöglichen. Um diese Frage zu klären, 
werden in dieser Arbeit drei Arten von Governance-Strukturen untersucht – der 
Marktansatz, die staatliche Regulierung und die Gemeinschaft – die mittels spezieller 
Elemente die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Individuen fördern und somit die gemein-
same Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter in einer Region ermöglichen. 
Anhand von drei Fallstudien im Südosten und Nordwesten Polens wurde daraufhin 
untersucht, ob Politikmaßnahmen des neuen Paradigmas tatsächlich in der Lage 
sind, die Implementierung von lokalen institutionellen Arrangements zur gemein-
schaftlichen Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter zu forcieren. In allen drei 
Fallstudienregionen existieren lokale Partnerschaften, die auf einer Kooperation 
zwischen Kommunalverwaltung, lokalen Vereinen und lokalen Unternehmen be-
ruhen und daher der Idee des neuen ländlichen Paradigmas entsprechen. Die Fall-
studien umfassen im Wesentlichen 104 Leitfadeninterviews mit Mitgliedern von 
lokalen und regionalen Behörden, Mitgliedern lokaler Vereine, lokalen Unterneh-
mern, Landwirten und Einwohnern. Die Leitfadeninterviews wurden zusätzlich 
durch beteiligte Beobachtung und einen kurzen standardisierten Fragebogen   
ergänzt. 
Zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre gab es in allen drei Untersuchungsregionen einen 
Mangel an bestimmten lokalen öffentlichen Gütern. Dieser Mangel wurde weitest-
gehend auf lokale Koordinationsprobleme zwischen den Einwohnern der Regionen 
zurückgeführt. Diese Koordinationsprobleme hielten die Einwohner davon ab, ge-
meinsam in die Bereitstellung bestimmter lokaler öffentlicher Güter zu investieren. Zusammenfassung 
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Auf Grundlage der Heuristik des Sozialen Dilemmas wird nun das Problem der 
fehlenden Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter in der Region analysiert. Die 
positive Analyse zeigt auf, durch welche Institutionen bzw. das Fehlen derselben 
die Einwohner einer Region früher davon abgehalten wurden, gemeinsam lokale 
öffentliche Güter bereitzustellen. Weiter wird in Regionen untersucht, in denen be-
stimmte lokale öffentliche Güter erfolgreich bereitgestellt werden, welche insti-
tutionellen Arrangements diese Bereitstellung ermöglichen. Hierbei wird eben-
falls analysiert, welchen Einfluss Marktbeziehung, staatliche Eingriffe und Gemein-
schaft auf die erfolgreiche Bereitstellung haben. Die normative Analyse ermöglicht 
nun, lokale institutionelle Arrangements zur Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter 
als wünschenswert bzw. nicht wünschenswert zu beurteilen. Institutionelle Arran-
gements sind demnach dann wünschenswert, wenn sie eine gemeinschaftliche 
Bereitstellung von bestimmten öffentlichen Gütern ermöglichen, sodass Koope-
rationsgewinne für alle Beteiligten entstehen. Maßnahmen des neuen ländlichen 
Paradigmas können demzufolge auch nur dann als wünschenswert angesehen 
werden, wenn sie die Implementierung von institutionellen Arrangements forcieren, 
mittels derer die Bereitstellung von lokalen öffentlichen Gütern durch alle Betei-
ligten ermöglicht wird. 
Grundsätzlich stellt sich in allen drei Fallstudien heraus, dass durch die Gründung 
von lokalen Partnerschaften solche institutionellen Arrangements implementiert 
wurden, welche die Einwohner einer Region dazu veranlassen, gemeinschaftlich 
Beiträge für die Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter zu leisten. Diese insti-
tutionellen Arrangements enthalten jeweils unterschiedliche Elemente aus den drei 
verschiedenen Governance-Strukturen. Einige der Governance-Strukturen scheinen 
jedoch besser geeignet, bestimmte lokale Koordinationsprobleme zwischen Indivi-
duen zu überwinden. So zeigt sich, dass in Fällen fehlenden Vertrauens zwischen 
den Einwohnern einer Region die Gemeinschaft als Governance-Struktur vorteil-
haft gegenüber den anderen beiden Ansätzen ist. Im Gegensatz dazu führt die Ein-
führung von Wettbewerb zwischen lokalen Partnerschaften um öffentliche Mittel 
zu einer effizienteren Nutzung staatlicher Ressourcen.  
Es wird des Weiteren herausgearbeitet, dass der Erfolg in allen drei Fallstudien unter 
anderem aus folgenden Faktoren resultiert: a) die lokale Herkunft der Hauptakteure;  
b) das Vorhandensein lokaler Führungspersönlichkeiten; c) die gemeinschaftliche 
Erarbeitung einer lokalen Entwicklungsstrategie; d) eine enge Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen der lokalen Partnerschaft und den lokalen Behörden; und e) der Verfüg-
barkeit von festen Mitarbeitern in den Partnerschaften zur Durchführung von ope-
rationalen Aufgaben. 
Es zeigt sich in den theoretischen und empirischen Untersuchungen dieser Arbeit, 
dass der Staat im Rahmen der Maßnahmen des neuen ländlichen Paradigmas eher 
die Bereitstellung von lokalen öffentlichen Gütern in ländlichen Regionen forciert, 
als dass er, wie im Falle der traditionellen Agrarpolitik, einzelne ländliche Wirt-
schaftssektoren subventionierte. Die Politikmaßnahmen des neuen Paradigmas Zusammenfassung 
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unterstützen die sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung einer Region, indem sie die Imp-
lementierung von institutionellen Arrangements vorantreiben, mit deren Hilfe wie-
derum eine erfolgreiche Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter ermöglicht wird. 
Diese institutionellen Arrangements veranlassen die Einwohner einer Region, zur 
Bereitstellung eines öffentlichen Gutes beizutragen. Dies kann geschehen, indem 
allen Beteiligten nur dann ermöglicht wird, von diesem Gut zu profitieren, wenn 
ein individueller Beitrag zur Bereitstellung geleistet wird. Die gemeinschaftliche 
Bereitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter entspricht der Erzeugung von Koopera-
tionsgewinnen, von denen alle Beteiligten profitieren. Somit sichert der individuelle 
Anteil eines jeden Beteiligten an den Kooperationsgewinnen folglich auch dessen 
Zustimmung zu den institutionellen Arrangements, durch welche die Kooperations-
gewinne erst gemeinschaftlich erzielt werden konnten. Deshalb sollte die Zustim-
mung aller Beteiligten auch als normatives Kriterium für die Bewertung von Poli-
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1  Interview partners from Dolina Strugu 
Interview partners from the local government: 
DS-13:  Member of the local government of Błażowa, member of the commune 
council, has a farm with 2 ha. 
DS-27:  Member of the local government of Błażowa, responsible for cultural 
events. 
DS-28:  Employed by the local government of Błażowa, works a bit on LEADER. 
DS-29:  Representative of the local co-operative bank in Błażowa. 
DS-34:  Representative of the local co-operative bank in Błażowa. 
 
Interview partners from the local association "Dolina Strugu" 
DS-01:  Member of "Dolina Strugu", responsible for a loan program for local 
businesses. 
DS-02:  Member of "Dolina Strugu", head of the office, previous mayor from 
Tyczyn. 
DS-03:  Employee of "Dolina Strugu", works in a program bringing unemployed 
people back to work. 
DS-04:  Employee of "Dolina Strugu", works in a program bringing unemployed 
people back to work, writes also applications for EU projects. 
DS-05:  Employee of "Dolina Strugu", works in a program bringing unemployed 
people back to work. 
DS-06:  Employee of "Dolina Strugu", advises farmers in applying for direct 
payments and other programmes like structural rents. 
DS-11:  Member of "Dolina Strugu", works for Chmielnik Zdrój. 
DS-19:  Member of "Dolina Strugu", works for the telephone co-operative. 
DS-33:  Member of "Dolina Strugu", former member of the local government 
of Hyżne, national politician. Appendix 
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Interviews with local entrepreneurs and local inhabitants in general 
DS-09:  Woman, works for the local library and the local newspaper, attended 
meetings of Dolina Strugu. 
DS-10:  Young woman, works for the local library. 
DS-12:  Teacher of the local high school, has an own museum of local history, 
representative for 100 telephone co-operative members. 
DS-14:  Owner of a local pet shop. 
DS-15:  Owner of a clothes shop in Błażowa. 
DS-16:  Owner of a clothes shop in Błażowa. 
DS-17:  Insurance agent who has his own agency, worked for a few years in 
Austria and speaks very good German. 
DS-20:  Young entrepreneur, produces caskets, started the enterprise with the 
help of credits from the World Bank program with the assistance of 
"Dolina Strugu". 
DS-21:  Mechanic who has his own garage with 4 workers, started his garage 
with the help of credits from the World Bank program with the assistance 
of "Dolina Strugu". 
DS-23:  Owner of a local kiosk. 
DS-24:  Owner of a small shop selling garden tools, has a 2 ha farm. 
DS-26:  Employed by the state agency for agriculture, advises local farmers. 
DS-31:  Director of an old people home, co-operates with "Dolina Strugu". 
DS-32:  Local entrepreneur, has a bakery and delivers different shops in the 
region. 
 
Interviews with local farmers: 
DS-07:  Owns, together with his wife, an agri-tourism farm, has additionally 
9 ha and one cow, he used to work for a governmental agency before he 
retired. 
DS-08:  Owner of an agri-tourism farm, her husband works abroad, owns 3 ha in  
15 small plots. 
DS-18:  Owns, together with his wife, one of the biggest farms in the region, 
owns 11 ha. 
DS-22:  Owner of an ecological farm, cultivates 11 ha and has 2 cows, works 
additionally in the local school. 
DS-25:  Owner of an agri-tourism farm, owns 32 ha of grass land and 20 horses. Appendix 
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DS-30:  Owns a large farm with 20 ha and 120 pigs, took the farm over from his 
father. 
 
2  Interview partners from Dębrzno 
Interview partners from the local government:  
D-07:  Representative of the local government, member of the city council of 
the commune of Dębrzno.  
D-08:  Representative of the local government, member of the city council of 
the commune of Dębrzno, member of the "Association for the develop-
ment of the city and the commune of Dębrzno". 
D-22:  Representative of the regional government in the administrative district 
Człuchów, Department for regional development and EU integration. 
D-34:  Employee of the local government of the commune Dębrzno, accountant. 
D-35:  Representative of the local government, member of the city council of the 
commune of Dębrzno. 
 
Interview partners from the "Association for the development of the city and 
the commune of Dębrzno" and the Partnership of the Northern Necklace: 
D-01:  Chairwoman of the "Association for the development of the city and the 
commune of Dębrzno", member of the city council of the commune 
Dębrzno, employed by the local government. 
D-02:  Member of the "Association for the development of the city and the 
commune of Dębrzno", her tasks in the association concern the intro-
duction of the pilot measure to implement Leader+ in the region. 
D-03:  Works for the business start-up agency which provides the Canadian Loan 
Programme, the business start-up agency is an initiative of the "Associa-
tion for the development of the city and the commune of Dębrzno". 
D-05:  Two members of the "Association for the development of the city and 
the commune of Dębrzno", their tasks in the association concern the 
coordination of the project "Youth patrol for the environment", teachers 
in the local school. 
D-09:  Vice chairman of the "Association for the development of the city and 
the commune of Dębrzno", works for the local social aid centre. 
D-12:  Member of the "Association for the development of the city and the 
commune of Dębrzno", his tasks in the association concern the coordina-




D-17:  Chairman of the "Association for the Development of the centre and 
the commune of Kamieñ Krajeñskie", (Association is member of the 
partnership of the Northern Necklace), member of the city council of the 
commune of Kamieñ Krajeñskie. 
D-18:  Member of the "Association for the Development of the centre and the 
commune of Kamieñ Krajeñskie", (Association is member of the partner-
ship of the Northern Necklace), responsible for the entrepreneurship 
incubator of the association. 
D-21:  Employee of the Forestry office, commune Lipka, (Forestry office is 
member of the partnership of the Northern Necklace), one of the main 
initiators who rebuilds the local park in the city of Lipka. 
D-23:  Members of the Association of Stare Gronowo (female inhabitant, local 
shop owner, a local farmer, head of the local fire brigade), the association 
was founded to restore an old estate in the middle of the village, the asso-
ciation of Stare Gronowo is a partner of the "Association for the develop-
ment of the city and the commune of Dębrzno". 
D-31:  Two members of the Environmental Foundation for the countryside of 
Chojnice and Zaborski (Foundation is member of the partnership of 
the Northern Necklace), both are teacher of a local high school. 
 
Interviews with local entrepreneurs and local inhabitants in general: 
D-04:  Owner of an agrotourism farm in a village close to Dębrzno, member of 
the "Association for the development of the city and the commune of 
Dębrzno". 
D-06:  Works for the local labor agency in Dębrzno which is an initiative of 
the "Association for the development of the city and the commune of 
Dębrzno". 
D-10:  Owner of a store for sporting goods and toys in Dębrzno. 
D-11:  Owner of a hardware store in Dębrzno. 
D-13:  Owner of an agrotourism farm in Dębrzno. 
D-15:  Owner of a hardware store in Dębrzno. 
D-16:  Owner of a hardware store in Dębrzno. 
D-19:  Representative of the local government of the commune Kamieñ Kra-
jeñskie, this commune is close to Dębrzno. 
D-25:  Priest in Dębrzno, also works as a teacher in the local school and lives 
in the local house for priests. 
D-27:  Owner of an insurance agency. Appendix 
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D-28:  Representatives of the local co-operative bank in Dębrzno. 
D-32:  Owner of a bakery in Dębrzno, member of the "Association for the deve-
lopment of the city and the commune of Dębrzno".  
D-33:  Owner of an agrotourism farm and a clothes store in Dębrzno, used to 
work for the state-owned farm, retired. 
 
Interviews with local farmers: 
D-14:  Owner of a large farm in Dębrzno, member of a local producer group. 
D-20:  Owner of a large farm in a village close to Dębrzno, member of a local 
producer group, member of the "Association for the development of the 
city and the commune of Dębrzno". 
D-24:  Owner of a small farm in village close to Dębrzno. 
D-26:  Owner of a small farm close to Dębrzno. 
D-29:  Owner of a large farm in a village close to Dębrzno, member of a local 
producer group. 
D-30:  Owner of a large farm in Dębrzno. 
 
3  Interview partners from Bałtow 
Interview partners from the local government: 
B-06:  Representative of the regional government in Ostrowiec. 
B-07:  Representative of the regional government in Ostrowiec. 
B-08:  Representative of the regional government in Ostrowiec, Department 
for Regional development. 
B-09:  Representatives of the regional government in Ostrowiec. 
B-26:  Member of the local government in Bałtów. 
B-27:  Member of the local government. 
B-28:  Member of the local government, has also an agricultural farm. 
B-29:  Representatives of the local government in Lipsko (neighbouring 
commune of Bałtów), representatives from the departments for agri-
cultural and regional development as well as local entrepreneurs. 
B-30:  Representative of the local government in Solec (commune close to 
Bałtów). 




B-34:  Representative of the regional government, department of agricultural 
development. 
 
Interview partners from the Association Bałt or Delta: 
B-01:  Member and employee of the association Bałt. 
B-02:  Employed by the cultural center in Ostrowiec. 
B-14:  Works for a local media company, lives in Ostrowiec. 
B-15:  Works for a local media company, lives in Ostrowiec. 
B-16:  Works for an association that organizes events in memory of the Polish 
writer Witold Gombrowicz. 
B-17:  Youth group of the association Bałt, 12 young students and the group 
leader. 
B-32:  Employee of a cultural foundation in Ostrowiec, lives in Ostrowiec. 
B-33:  Member of the association Bałt, local entrepreneur, lives in Bałtów. 
B-35:  Member of the association Delta. 
 
Interviews with local entrepreneurs and local inhabitants in general: 
B-03:  Employee of the association Delta, lives in Bałtów, works in the Dino-
saur park. 
B-04:  Employee of the association Delta, lives in a small town close to Bałtów, 
works in the Dinosaur park. 
B-10:  Employee of the association Delta, lives in a village close to Bałtów, 
works in the Dinosaur park. 
B-12:  Employee of a regional agricultural agency close to Ostrowiec, respon-
sible for direct payment applications of farmers, lives in a village close to 
Bałtów. 
B-18:  Employee of a shop in Bałtów, lives in a village close to Bałtów, has a 
small farm together with her husband. 
B-21:  Owner of a small shop in Bałtów, has an additional income from a small 
farm. 
B-22:  Owner of a small shop in Bałtów. 
B-23:  Priest from Bałtów. 
B-24:  Unemployed inhabitant from Bałtów. 
B-25:  Owner of a small shop in Bałtów. Appendix 
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Interviews with local farmers: 
B-05:  Inhabitant of a village close to Bałtów, lives on a small farm with her 
family. 
B-11:  Owner of a small farm next to Bałtów, has an additional job in Ostrowiec. 
B-13:  Owner of a small farm with agritourism, lives in Bałtów. 
B-19:  Owner of a small agrotourism farm in Bałtów. 
B-20:  Owner of a small farm in Bałtów, retired. 
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